GLOCALISM
Journal of culture, politics and innovation

globus et locus

GLOCALISM

TEN YEARS OF CULTURE, POLITICS AND INNOVATION

Edited by

Piero Bassetti and Davide Cadeddu

Milano University Press

GLOCALISM

Ten Years of Culture, Politics and Innovation

Edited by Piero Bassetti and Davide Cadeddu

Milano University Press

Glocalism. Ten Years of Culture, Politics and Innovation edited by Piero Bassetti and Davide Cadeddu. Milano: Milano University Press, 2024.

ISBN 979-12-5510-078-2 (print)
ISBN 979-12-5510-080-5 (PDF)
ISBN 979-12-5510-082-9 (EPUB)
DOI 10.54103/milanoup.154

Published by Milano University Press
Via Festa del Perdono 7 – 20122 Milano
Web Site: https://milanoup.unimi.it
e-mail: redazione.milanoup@unimi.it

The print edition of this volume can be ordered from all physical and online bookstores, and is distributed by Ledizioni (www.ledizioni.it)

INDICE

INTRODUCTION

LOCAL

GLOBAL

GLOCAL

For the 25th Anniversary of Globus et Locus

INTRODUCTION

TEN YEARS OF GLOCALISM

Piero Bassetti
Globus et Locus

Davide Cadeddu
University of Milan

Elia Zaru
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna

In 2018, as we celebrated the first five years of *Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation*, we spoke of the journal as "an intellectual undertaking that involves numerous individuals spread around the world, both authors and readers". In the meantime, this undertaking has continued to expand, and today *Glocalism* turns ten years old. As it continues to pursue its mission – to stimulate an increasing awareness and knowledge around the idea of the characterising dynamics of glocal reality – the journal has also been able to consolidate its cultural, intellectual and scientific presence. Over the span of the past ten years, *Glocalism* has published more than 300 articles in English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Russian. It has involved more than 600 referees, coordinated by more than 30 peer-review coordinators. The journal continues to be available in open access and thus contributes to the growth of open-science practice. As we stated five years ago, "nowadays, a journal on 'glocalism' seeking to be recognized in the cultural-academic context and, at the same time, aiming to correspond with the very concept of being 'glocal', must be available online".

In recent years, *Glocalism* has also continued in its attempts to establish serious theoretical reflection on glocalization in concrete ways. This has taken place, for example, in 2017, during the conference "Italics as a Global Commonwealth" held at the United Nations headquarters in New York, as well as in 2019, during the "Global Civilizations: from History to Sustainable Development Goals" conference, held at the University of Milan and attended by Tatiana Valovaya, Director General of the United Nations in Geneva. These two examples demonstrate "the will to create a bridge between the theoretical reflection on glocalism and the practical aspects that draw inspiration from it [...] with the intention of supporting the managerial class to meet the challenges of glocalization with a new political culture and value system [...] in step with dynamics of the globalized world", as we wrote after the first five years of the journal's life.

Today, the work done by *Glocalism* appears to have gained value. According to many scholars, in fact, we are facing a turning point in the history of the world. What is happening to globalization? First, populism and the so-called "resurgence" of nationalism, then the pandemic, then the ecological and climate crisis, and now the war in Ukraine and in the Middle East all seem to question the very nature of globalization and its processes. For this reason, the idea of a "crisis of globalization" is spreading, along with analyses which consider the world order in the light of a comeback of the nation-state or regional spaces in general. Are we facing a process of "deglobalization"? Or, as some other scholars argue, does the global dimension of these phenomena challenge this assumption at its core? Only historical developments will answer these and other similar questions.

The fact that any response must be addressed on a transnational plane, however, indicates how the global (both theoretically and empirically) is still far from being removed from our perspective. The very idea of "glocalism" helps us in escaping the narrowing perspective of a juxtaposition between global and local implicated by the debate on deglobalization mentioned above. Once again, we need to deal with the questions posed by the "hybridity" characterizing our glocal world. Therefore, there still is "an urgent need for adequate cultural tools to interpret the new scenarios proposed by glocalism", as stated in the first editorial of *Glocalism*.

Five years ago, we highlighted the necessity of a more ordered and direct theoretical work process capable of both producing innovative intellectual tools, concepts, and social-political categories, and providing new names for new things. Ten years after the birth of *Glocalism*, various and precious attempts may be perceived as defining a "general theory of glocalization": one of the goals the journal keeps at its forefront and the theme that is most present in its various issues. That being said, the goal has not yet been completely fulfilled. The reason for this lies in the fact that such a "general theory" cannot be defined once and for all but must be adapted according to the ongoing changes occurring in the world. By looking at and reflecting on these changes, we can define glocalization. The very path to the goal of achieving a general theory of glocalization is in itself a fundamental part of such a goal.

Nowadays, *Glocalism* continues to serve this purpose: enriching the frame of understanding glocalization's process. This is well shown by the articles that we have collected in this book, which have been published in the journal over the last five years. By doing so, our aim is twofold. First, to show the richness and depth which continues to characterise the activity of the journal. Second, to stimulate further the continuation on the path of a definition of a general theory of glocalization. Certainly, other work has to be done.

List of issues titles of the last ten years

2013, 1: Hybridity
2014, 1-2: Feeding the planet. Energy for life
2014, 3: Global cities

2015, 1: Global polity and policies
2015, 2: Glocal social capital
2015, 3: On Global Risks

2016, 1: Networks and New Media
2016, 2: Local and Global Democracy
2016, 3: Territories, Borders and The New Geography

2017, 1: The Glocal Political Power
2017, 2: Global Identities and Communities
2017, 3: Beyond Democracy: Innovation as Politics

2018, 1: Towards Global Citizenships Issue
2018, 2: Globalization and Federations
2018, 3: Sustainability

2019, 1: Civilizations and Globalizations
2019, 2: State, Nationalism and Globalization
2019, 3: Globalization and Gender Implications

2020, 1: Geopolitics and Glocalism
2020, 2: Globalization, Market and Economic Policies
2020, 3: Glocalization and Everyday Life

2021, 1: New Glocal Forms of Financial Participation and Revenue Mobilization
2021, 2: The Glocal World of Historical Archives
2021, 3: Cities and Migration in the New Post-Pandemic Normal

2022, 1: The Glocalization of Technocultures
2022, 2: Humanitarian Action and Glocalism
2022, 3: New Technologies, Migration and the Future of Work

2023, 1: Environmental Crisis, Migration and Social Policy
2023, 2: Longevity and Globalisation
2023, 3: Life Chances in a (Un)Sustainable World

Members of the Editorial Board (2013-2023):

Direction Committee: Arjun Appadurai (New York University); Daniele Archibugi (Birkbeck University of London); Zygmunt Bauman (University of Leeds); Seyla Benhabib (Yale University); Sabino Cassese (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa); Manuel Castells (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya); Fred Dallmayr (University of Notre Dame); Anthony Giddens (London School of Economics and Political Science); David Held (Durham University); Robert J. Holton (Trinity College Dublin); Sheila Jasanoff (Harvard University); Hans Köchler (University of Innsbruck); Alberto Martinelli (Università degli Studi di Milano); Anthony McGrew (La Trobe University, Melbourne); Alberto Quadrio Curzio (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano); Roland Robertson (University of Pittsburgh and University of Aberdeen); Saskia Sassen (Columbia University); Amartya Sen (Harvard University); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Columbia University); Alain

Touraine (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales); Salvatore Veca (IUSS, Pavia).

Editor-in-chief: Piero Bassetti (Globus et Locus).

Executive editor: Davide Cadeddu (University of Milan).

Peer-review coordinators: Clementina Battcock (*Hispanic culture*, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia), Lorenzo Casini (*public law*, IMT Institute of Advanced Studies), Maria Luisa Catoni (*art and culture*, IMT Insitute for Advanced Studies), Luca Ciabarri (*anthropology*, University of Milan), Silvia Conca (*economic history*, University of Milan), Massimo De Giuseppe (*contemporary history*, IULM University of Milan), Tommaso Dell'Era (*political language*, Tuscia University), Ugo Dessì (*study of religions*, University of Vienna), Zsuzsanna Fejes (*public law*, University of Szeged), Fabio Finotti (*linguistics and literature*, University of Trieste), Joshua Forrest (*political science*, La Roche University), Giampietro Gobo (*methodology of social research*, University of Milan), Matteo Bolocan Goldstein (*geography and urban planning*, Politecnico di Milano), Jonathan Hankins (*innovation*, Giannino Bassetti Foundation), Roger Hayter (Simon Fraser University), Felicitas Hillmann (*migration studies*, Technische Universität Berlin), C.A. Josukutty (*international relations*, University of Kerala), Habibul Khondker (*sociology*, Zayed University), Salvatore Mancuso (*comparative public law*, University of Palermo), Maria Cristina Marchetti (*political sociology*, Sapienza University of Rome), Vincenzo Matera (*anthropology*, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna), Sandhya Rao Mehta (*Indian culture and English literature*, Sultan Qaboos University), Anna Molnár (*political science*, National University of Public Service), Gabriele Natalizia (*geopolitics and international relations*, Sapienza University of Roma), Mariella Nocenzi (*sociology and gender studies*, Sapienza University of Rome), Lionel Obadia (*anthropology*, Université Lumiere Lyon 2), Cláudia Toriz Ramos (*political science*, University Fernando Pessoa), Martin Reisigl (*linguistics*, University of Bern), Marzia Rosti (*history and institutions of Latin America*, University of Milan), Victor Roudometof (*sociology*, University of Cyprus), Roberta Sala (*philosophy*, University Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Amidu Sanni (*Islamic studies*, Lagos State University), Franciscu Sedda (*semiotics*, University of Cagliari), Mohammad Shamsuddoha (*economics*, Western Illinois University), Balázs Sipos (*political communication*, Eötvös Loránd University), Priyanka Srivastava (*capitalism and economic history*, University of Massachusetts), Narendra Subramanian (*Indian culture and politics*, McGill University), Mónika Szente-Varga (*history*, National University of Public Service), Manon Westphal (*political philosophy*, University of Muenster), Cielo Zaidenwerg (*history and institutions of Latin America*, Universidad de Barcelona).

Peer-review secretary: Enrico Ciappi (University of Pavia), Matteo De Toffoli (University of Pisa), Elia Zaru (Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna).

Copy editor: Andrea Spallino (University of Milan).

Social media editor: Jacopo Manessi (Glocalism).

Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation (ISSN 2283-7949) has been published at https://glocalismjournal.org **and will be published at** https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/glocalism

It is included in the following databases of citation data:

DOAJ – Directory of Open Access Journals

ERIH PLUS – European Reference Index for the Humanities and the Social Sciences

ROAD – Directory of Open Access Scholarly Resources ACNP – Catalogo Italiano dei Periodici

ACNP – Catalogo Italiano dei Periodici

BASE – Bielefeld Academic Search Engine

WorldCat – The World's Largest Network of Library Content and Services

Ulrichsweb – Global Serials Directory

JURN – Search Tool for Open Access Content

JournalSeek – The Largest Completely Categorized Database of Freely Available Journal

MIAR – Information Matrix for the Analysis of Journals G-Gate – The Largest e-Journal Gateway

J-Gate – The largest e-journal gateway

It is recognized as a scientific journal by ANVUR (Italy) for ASN in the following fields:

Area 08 – Ingegneria civile ed Architettura

Area 10 – Scienze dell'antichità, filologico-letterarie e storico-artistiche

Area 11 – Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e psicologiche

Area 12 – Scienze giuridiche

Area 13 – Scienze economiche e statistiche
Area 14 – Scienze politiche e sociali

Editorial Note

The articles collected in this book were previously published in the issues mentioned between brackets:

C. Moreno, *Living in a Proximity in a Living City* (2021, no. 3).
J. Mraz, *More Than Vestiges: Photographic Archives of Ancient Mexico* (2021, no. 2).
C. Crouch, *The Economic Geography of Xenophobic Populism* (2019, no. 2).
H. Köchler, *Nation and Civilization in the Global Age* (2020, no. 2).
A. Touraine, *History, Modernity and Global Identities* (2020, no. 2).
A. Appadurai, *The Haptic and the Phatic in the Era of Globalization* (2022, no. 1).
J. Hyman, *New Glocal Forms of Financial Participation* (2021, no. 1).
J. Butler, *What Threat? The Campaign against "Gender Ideology"* (2019, no. 3).
R. Robertson, *Glocalization: Self-Referential Remembrances* (2020, no. 3).

LOCAL

LIVING IN PROXIMITY IN A LIVING CITY

CARLOS MORENO
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (France)
carlos.moreno@univ-paris1.fr

The "15-Minute City" (Moreno et al. 2021: 93-111; Garnier 2021), a concept that has gone global, is now present in all latitudes (Dricot 2020). Why is this approach so popular? In this time of an increasingly evident climate change, and with a raging global pandemic of Covid-19, this proposal, originally put forward in 2016 (Moreno 2016), found itself in the international spotlight in early 2020 (Willsher 2020). Since then, it has opened up a very wide debate around the world on the indispensable need to change the paradigm of our urban and territorial lives.

I was surprised to see how this idea took shape, spontaneously on all continents. I was also amazed at the profusion not only of discussions, but also of commitments and concrete practices generated. I was happy to see, like any researcher who finds his idea set in motion, how this polycentric, multi-service, multi-use city, with a decarbonised roadmap, has become a new approach to proximity to change our way of understanding the city.

WHAT IS THE 15-MINUTE CITY CALLED?

No longer an “organised campaign”, a “miracle solution” or a “magic copy and paste”, the “15-Minute City” for dense areas and its twin concept “30-Minute Territory”(*The White Paper – Minute City, 30 – Minute Territory* 2019) – for medium and low- density areas – have come to provide, at the right place and at the right time (Obel award 2020), a conceptual framework, a methodological approach and analysis tools to encourage a new urban and territorial practice, with a different way of thinking and acting as a backdrop, by putting the use of the city at the heart of it.

We wanted to put a simple question at the centre of the reflection: “What kind of city do we want to live in? We have provided a complete, in-depth, systemic but also broad and open framework, with proposals to face our challenges, for a better life in our cities and territories. More than planning the city, we are above all interested in planning life in the city (Moreno 2020).

Bruno Latour rightly evokes the structural contradiction between “the world we live in” and “the world we live in”. In an urban and territorial world where the quality of life must be at the heart of our concerns, I wanted to add this dimension to the reflection, which is “the world where we think we live”. With the “15-Minute City”, at the heart of the problem, we are thus setting out another way of living, producing, consuming, moving around, but also of feeling the city. Our approach is inspired by the matrix laid out by our colleague, Prof. M. Yunus, Nobel Prize winner in 2006 (Yunus 2016) and the imperatives of the Sustainable Development Goals 13 (United Nations) and 11(Allam et al.2022). We take this path, “the triple zero: zero carbon, zero poverty, zero exclusion”. The “15-Minute City” is a proposal for convergence in the creation of ecological, economic and social value, to make our cities economically viable, ecologically liveable and socially equitable places.

URBAN DEAD ENDS AND THE 15-MINUTE CITY

Faced with the segmentation of the city, a major factor in the deterioration of the quality of life, we ask ourselves: *a*) Are we going to continue to accept the social-territorial fractures that are becoming more and more widespread, in order to go faster and further with a "sacrosanct mono-use" that preempts so many precious resources? Like the university campuses, which are often far away and disconnected from any urban reality, or the business districts, such as La Défense to the west of Paris with its almost 4 million square metres^2 of office space and 180,000 employees (Agence François Leclercq 2016), whose model is now affected by the Covid-19 crisis? *b*) Are we going to continue to accept that we no longer have any useful time because we are sacrificing it every day by going to and from work, in difficult transport conditions, as France is the country in Europe with the highest proportion of employees commuting to their workplace every day (77 per cent) (Atelier International du Grand Paris 2016)?; *c*) Is it normal to see that 70 per cent of the active population in metropolitan environments move around in the same time slots that converge in the daytime on less than 10 per cent of the territory? Do we have to live with this commuting?

Yes, we want a new chrono-urbanism in order to leave behind subjugated mobility and move towards chosen mobility. The key words are: taking care of the time we have regained, changing rhythms, desaturating public transport, roads, workplaces, reception areas where everyone arrives and leaves at the same time, and decentralising work. Is it still acceptable that buildings are used for one function only between 30 per cent and 40 per cent of the time, and the rest of the time they are closed? Is it sustainable to have so much and yet so little being used? How can we make better use of existing resources to save personal time? How can we have social time? How can we reorganise our presence in urban space?

Yes, make more use of places, develop their mixed use on a massive scale. Changing the uses of buildings so that they are multi-purpose is the second element, chronotopy. Can we continue to accept the disembodiment of our living areas, our neighbourhoods, which often fail to provide us with a broad coverage of our essential needs? Let's take the Priority Neighbourhoods of the City Policy (QPV). The report of the French Court of Auditors of February 2020 (Cour des comptes, Chambres régionales et territoriales des comptes 2020) is very clear: "The State devotes approximately €10 billion to them each year [...]. Despite the financial and human resources deployed, the attractiveness of priority neighbourhoods around three dimensions of daily life: housing, education and economic activity has made little progress in ten years". It is a question of "better articulating urban renewal and the social, educational and economic support of the inhabitants within the framework of neighbourhood projects".

Yes, we need to recreate a functional, social and also emotional link between the inhabitant and the place in which he or she is located. This third element is topophilia. This makes it possible to build mutual aid links, as we have seen with Covid-19. These links need to live in the neighbourhoods. Using public spaces for activities helps to create social links. Reinstalling local commerce, cultural and economic activities and local health centres.

THINKING AND LIVING THE CITY DIFFERENTLY

This is why, with the "15-Minute City" (Moreno 2020a), we have proposed to find another way of thinking, through the use of the city, its decentralisation, its networking, its hybridisation between compact and less dense areas, in a continuum of poly-centrals, through the optimisation of its resources, through its through its renewed humanity

Decentralisation and community life

We express the need to radically change the temporalities of life and the use of the existing, to change the rhythms of life, to be able to work differently, to recover essential social functions that are more accessible, for a quality life, to recover the intensity of social links, the affects lost by the weight of anonymity and solitude, to reclaim the love of place, to give otherness a place of choice in our lives, to recreate and relocate employment and activities, to reclaim public space for citizens, to encourage citizen participation in local (*La ville du ¼ d'heure* 2021) life.

The common good guaranteeing an urban policy at the service of all

With the "15-Minute City" and its hybridisation with the "30-Minute Territory", we are faced, here and now, with the profound inequalities that result in cities that generate wealth, which is very localised, but also poverty, attractiveness and visible exclusion. Cities where beautiful architectural achievements coexist with fragmented, segmented, fractured urban spaces (Moreno 2020b). To fight against gentrification, the key notion is that of the "common good" which contributes to the general interest, which is translated into regulatory tools in urban policy: social mix, city landholdings, commercial landholdings, participatory budgets, local public services. The metamorphosis towards the common good is the challenge of the next decade. Living spaces everywhere for a common good, taking up this mutualist motto.

A new urban ontology for a high societal quality of life

We have proposed a new urban ontology with the modelling of six essential urban social functions accessible through low-carbon proximity: living with dignity, working while reducing commuting, buying supplies through short circuits, taking care of one's physical and mental health in proximity, accessing education and culture, and blossoming in conditions of harmony and resilience with nature. The detailed development of this ontology gives a roadmap in terms of uses and services, irrigating the city everywhere in a polycentric way.

The operational pillars of this model are: *a*) ecology, to have a low-carbon city with a virtuous behaviour on a daily basis; *b*) proximity, to develop new urban economic models to create value; *c*) solidarity, to develop social links; *d*) citizen participation to embody this new urban culture. These elements embody the "15-Minute City" with a new matrix of High Societal Quality of Life and its cross-cutting indicators of social functions with those of Well-being, Sociability, and Committed Ecology (*The White Paper – Minute City, 30 – Minute Territory* 2019).

A GLOBAL MOVEMENT

Six years ago it was a concept. Today it is a reality in motion and this concept is becoming a global movement. In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, during the first wave in March 2020, the global network of cities for climate, the C40, set up a "Recovery Covid-19 Task Force". It is headed by the mayor of Milan, the capital of Lombardy, Giuseppe Sala. The sixth hard-hit European metropolis and epicentre of this new virality that has put our cities under a bell. This new situation, with its set of unprecedented measures, has made us question our future. Joint reflections with the C40 on the scope of this crisis have enabled us to bring out the "15-Minute City" as an urban and territorial way to bounce back (Moreno 2020c).

We proposed 5 years ago, just after the COP21 in Paris, to reflect on the climate crisis and the paradigm shift that is essential for our cities, which are the main contributors to CO_2 emissions, by questioning our lifestyles, production, consumption and travel patterns. We had talked about another way of life, to break with decades of functional urbanism, which accommodates urban specialisation, which encourages its fragmentation, which sacrifices quality of life for the benefit of long distances to be travelled, where "distance becomes a vice", as Richard Sennett (2020) says. Our proposal (C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group) is based on a new model, an urban ontology, which, by going back and forth between theory and practice, proposes a vision of polycentric urbanism, based on uses, circularity, mixity and high social intensity. The latest international survey by the International Workgroup Place(2020) and movin'on kantar (movin' on Mobility Survey) shows that the working population between 18 and 40 years of age is in favour of this new urban (International Workgroup Place 2021) approach. Decentralised "corporate working" places are emerging Action Longement, Communiqué de presse 2021).

The C40 has launched a global initiative and in 18 cities around (C40 Cities 2021) the world, it has given rise to concrete projects. The list of cities now engaged in this process around the world is long (Wright 2021; United Nations for Climate Change 2021). Zurich has just held a referendum on this decentralized (Bussilnger 2021) city model. China has just announced its "15 minute circles of life" project and the new master plan of the city of Chengdu has been the framework for a large-scale project followed by 52 other cities(Yang Jian 2021). In France, multiple cities have announced their approach in this sense, in addition to Paris, Nantes, Aix-en-Provence and Mulhouse, to name only four different city sizes. The private sector with multiple actors has joined this paradigm; La Poste has just launched its new "Business Unit" based on proximity (Barnéoud 2020: 39-45; La Poste 2020). Projects highlighting proximity to the "15-Minute City" are now underway. For example, Altarea has signed an agreement with Carrefour to transform the land footprint of its Nantes hypermarket using the "15-Minute City" concept. More structurally and internationally in their 9 countries of operation, the Mulliez family launched in January 2021, Nhood, a new urban services operator for urban real estate regeneration and transforming an initial portfolio of 82 managed retail sites in France. Numerous property developers and private sector players around the world have taken it upon themselves to transform sites that were previously 100 per cent office space, or built land used differently, to move towards mixed use and services.

The recognition by the "obel award" on 21 October 2021 in Paris, for the global impact of the "15-Minute City", as well as the "International urban leadership" in Barcelona on 18 November 2021, illustrate the scope of this dissemination worldwide.

REFERENCES

Action Longement (2021*), Corpoworking : Un nouveau modèle disruptif d'organisation du travail initié par Action Logement Occitanie*, Communiqué de presse 2021, http://www.tarbes-infos.com/IMG/pdf/cp_al_corpoworking_2021_vf1.pdf.

Agence François Leclercq (2016), *La Défense Vers Un Quartier D'affaires A Haut Niveau De Services* (Paris : Atelier International du Grand Paris).

Z. Allam, C. Moreno, D. Chabaud, F. Pratlong (2022), *Proximity-Based Planning and the "15-Minute City": A Sustainable Model for the City of the Future*, in R. Brinkmann (ed.) *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Sustainability* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan).

M. Barnéoud (2020), *Making La Poste the Leader in Human Proximity Services*, in "Le journal de l'école de Paris du management", 143, pp. 39-45.

B. Bussilnger (2021), *Zurich, future "ville à 15 minutes"*, in "Le Temps", https:// www.letemps.ch/suisse/zurich-future-ville-15-minutes.

C40 Cities (2021), *Students to reinvent 18 world cities to tackle climate crisis as C40 Cities launches new competition*, https:// www.c40.org/news/students-reinventing-cities.

C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, https://www.c40knowledgehub.org/s/article/How-to-build-back-better-with-a-15-minute-city?language=en_US.

Chaire ETI (2020), *Livre Blanc N°2. La ville du ¼ d'heure, du concept à la mise en œuvre* (IAE -Paris: Université Paris1 Panthéon Sorbonne).

Cour des comptes, Chambres régionales et territoriales des comptes (2020), *L'évaluation De L'attractivité Des Quartiers Prioritaires Une dimension majeure de la politique de la ville Rapport public thématique Évaluation d'une politique publique*, https://www.ccomptes.fr/system/files/2020-12/20201202-rapport-quartiers-prioritair es.pdf.

L. Dricot (2020), *La ville du quart d'heure, un concept qui provoque un engouement planétaire en pleine pandémie*, in "RTBF.be", https://www.rtbf.be/article/la-ville-du-quart-d-heure-un-concept-qui-provoque-un-engouement-planetaire-en-pleine-pan demie-10645408?id=10645408&programId=11090.

International Workgroup Place (2020), *The 15-Minute Commute, A new work paradigm for the 21st Century*, https://assets.iwgplc.com/image/upload/v1620812137/IWG/MediaCentre/xsndewyg2co5d2va6dgq.pdf.

International Workgroup Place (2021), *The Future of Work*, https://old.iwgplc.c om/MediaCentre/Article/future-of-work-2021-according-iwg-mark-dixon.

Y. Jian (2021), *52 cities to follow Shanghai in building 15-minute community life circles*, https://www.shine.cn/news/metro/2112018954.

La Poste (2020), *La proximité, solution à la crise et à la reprise ?*, https://www.laposte.fr/entreprise-collectivites/a-la-une/articles/la-proximite-solution-a-la-crise-et-a-la-reprise.

La ville du ¼ d'heure (2021), in "Chaire-ETI Entrepreneurship Territory Innovation Chair with IAE Paris-Sorbonne Business School Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne".

C. Moreno (2016), *La ville du quart d'heure : pour un nouveau chrono-urbanisme*, in "La tribune" https://www.latribune.fr/regions/smart-cities/la-tribune-de-carlos-mo reno/la-ville-du-quart-d-heure-pour-un-nouveau-chrono-urbanisme-604358.html.

C. Moreno (2020a), *Droit de cité: de la ville-monde à la ville du quart d'heure*, (Paris: Éditions de l'Observatoire).

C. Moreno (2020b), *Masterclass, "The 15-mn city"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Graduate School of Design-Harvard University).

C. Moreno (2020c), *The 15-Minute City, C40 Webinar – Asia & Oceania region*, C40 international organization.

C. Moreno (2020), *Vie urbaine et proximité à l'heure du Covid-19* (Paris: Editions de l'Observatoire).

C. Moreno, Z. Allam, D. Chabaud, C. Gall, F. Pratlong (2021), *Introducing the "15-Minute City": Sustainability, Resilience and Place Identity in Future Post-Pandemic cities*, in "Smart Cities", 4, pp. 93-111.

Movin' ON Mobility Survey, *Post-Covid mobility and lifestyles: What changes do 18–34-year-olds want to see?*, https://www.movinonconnect.com/press-release/post-covid-mobility-and-lifestyles-what-changes-do-18-34-year-olds-want-to-see.

Obel Award (2021), *https://obelaward.org/winner-2021.*

R. Sennett (2020), *Preface to Droit de Cité: de la ville-monde à la ville du quart d'heure* (Paris: Editions de l'Observatoire).

The White Paper – Minute City, 30 – Minute Territory (2019), in "Chaire-ETI Entrepreneurship Territory Innovation Chair with IAE Paris – Sorbonne Business School Paris 1 Panthéon- Sorbonne".

United Nations for Climate Change (2021), *The 15 Minute City*, https://unfccc.int /blog/the-15-minute-city.

United Nations, *Sustainable Development Goals, 17 objectifs pour sauver le monde*, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/objectifs-de-developpement-durable.

K. Willsher (2020), *Paris mayor unveils "15-minute city" plan in re-election campaign*, in "The Guardian", Febraruary 7.

S. Wright (2021), *The 15-Minute City Old-Fashioned Compact, Convenient, Mixed-Use Development for a Modern, Post-Pandemic, Walkable World*, https://www. nar.realtor/on-common-ground/the-15-minute-city.

C. Yunus (2017), *Towards a three-zero economy: zero poverty, zero unemployment, zero carbon emissions* (Paris: JC Lattès).

Abstract

Rethinking urban life in a world of massive disruptions (climate change, air pollution, nature, water biodiversity and now Covid-19) has become one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century. To face these crises we must urgently address lifestyles and mobility, move away from the omnipresent car and the petroleum era and question what kind of city we really want to live in. The proposition of Professor Carlos Moreno is the "15-Minute City" concept, in a compact zone (or the "30-Minute Territory" in a semi-dense or sparse zone), where inhabitants can access all their essential needs of life: living, working, supplying, caring, educating, enjoying. The 15-Minute City addresses the key components required for a sustainable world (ecological, social, economic) and integrates the concepts of chrono-urbanism, chronotopia, and topophilia. This reinvention of proximities utilizes the convergence of open data, digital mapping, geolocation and the massification of new services. Nevertheless, citizens and their quality of life are always at the heart of the 15-Minute City. It is thus a polycentric city which combines urban intelligence, social inclusion and technological innovation and ultimately defines itself as an urban life planning. Paris is among the world's first cities to have implemented the 15-Minute City, where it is famously quoted as the "big-bang of proximities". It has recognized this innovative approach based on a global and systemic vision of the city in order to meet the fundamental needs of its inhabitants and to urgently address the unprecedented challenges it is facing today. This concept has now become a global movement.

Keywords

15-Minute City, 30-Minute Territory, Covid-19, polycentric urbanism, new urban culture.

MORE THAN VESTIGES: PHOTOGRAPHIC ARCHIVES OF ANCIENT MEXICO

John Mraz
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla (Mexico)
mraz.john@gmail.com

> It is hard to escape the impression that sixteenth-century Europeans…all too often saw what they expected to see… But, how to convey this fact of difference, the uniqueness of America, to those who had not seen it? The problem of description reduced writers and chroniclers to despair.
>
> J.H. Eliot (1970, 21)

A thought-provoking gauntlet has been thrown down: “imagine that photography does not have its origins in the invention of the device, but rather in 1492” (Azoulay 2021: 27). What sort of photographic archives might exist of the conquest and colonization of Mexico? Let us assume that it was a European invention that the Spanish brought with them in the course of establishing the empire and dominating the indigenous, though the latter must quickly have learned to make use of the new media for their own purposes.

The first photos from the Caribbean would have shown the startled reactions of “rather primitive” natives to the fortune-hunting, battle-seasoned, sexually-starved, and highly-militarized Spanish forces. For instance, one can imagine the celebratory safari-style shots of imperial violence: the cut-off heads held up proudly and the lopped-off ears worn around the necks of the conquistadores (as in Vietnam), the festive reveling in torture (as in Abu Ghraib), even the ghoulish pornography that might exist of rapes or "snuff" imagery. Fray Bartolomé de las Casas would have critically documented the cruel practices of the Spanish, sending the pictures to the king to prove his allegations. The denunciatory visual evidence would be suppressed and hidden in the imperial archive, but foreign enemies would circulate it, as they did with the powerful, if inaccurate, engravings of Theodore de Bry in las Casas' *Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, a major contribution to what Spanish imperialists describe as the "Black Legend".

Of the Mexican conquest there would be many photos of the indigenous civilizations that came peacefully to join the Spanish, believing that they would be useful tool to free themselves from the Aztec empire under which they suffered. These pictures would show that many of the actual military operations were undertaken by these indigenous allies, who outnumbered the actual Spanish forces by thousands to one. However, they might not be immediately accessible in the imperial archives because they contravene the Spanish myths of the conquest as a result of white superiority and technological advantage. Some photos would have shown what an extraordinary cultural accomplishment was the bustling colorful city of Tenochtitlán, seated in the middle of a lake, with its canals, streets, and monumental painted temples. To conquistador Bernal Díaz del Castillo, it was "like the enchantments they tell of in the legend of Amadis, with great towers and temples (*cúes*) and buildings rising from the water, and all built of stone and masonry (calicanto) […] I'm not sure how to recount it: to see things never heard of, never seen, never even dreamed of" (Díaz del Castillo [1568] 1939: 308). Other photos might have documented how it was reduced to rubble as religious sites were dismantled and their stones thrown into the canals, bringing to an end a city built upon and connected by water.

The imperial archives would contain evidence of war, growth, and scientific discoveries. The building of cities constructed on top of destroyed indigenous ruins would be documented, although those carrying out the labor would probably be replaced with photographs of smiling natives in exotic clothing. The intellectuals and scientists of the empire would come from the church in such men as the ethnographer Fray Bernardino de Sahagún. Their dedication to studying the flora and fauna, including the native inhabitants, would be preserved in Spain or some other European museum. Al-though the spectacular mass sacrifices and skull racks would be photographed prolifically, probably few images would have been made of innumerable atrocities celebrated by the conquerors, the effects of the plagues, overwork, rape, depression, and alcoholism that led to an enormous loss of life among indigenous communities. There may have been critical imagery by some in the religious orders, and contestatory indigenous photographs documenting settler colonialism – the way the natives were forced off land, and incorporated at the lowest level of the workforce – but it would have be unearthed from church archives or remain in small private collections that have disappeared over time, such as the 1910-1920 images of Emiliano Zapata's forces made by Cruz Sánchez, the photographer that most documented that revolutionary army, but whose archive has yet to be discovered (Berumen 2009: 385).

Of course, photographs from the 15th century do not exist, but remnants of the original civilizations have been captured on film since the 1840s[1] . One might be tempted to think that photographs have somehow preserved a paradise lost: an ancient, bucolic and communal possibility for living. Anthropologist Roger Bartra makes short work of that inducement; for him they embalm something very different: “they are testimony of one of the greatest cultural catastrophes in the history of the universe: the devastation of pre-Hispanic societies, the global destruction of their cultures and the annihilation of their populations” (Bartra 1996: 238).

It would appear that foreigners were the first to turn their photographic gaze upon Mexico’s indigenous cultures. Such traveler-photographers were usually funded by their governments, and should be seen as part of the broader process of imperialism and neocolonialization, providing intelligence about unknown areas of the world. The intellectual and artistic forerunner of French imperialism in Mexico, Desiré Charnay was commissioned by the Ministère de l’Education to spend the years 1857-1861 there. On his return to Paris in 1861, he immediately presented Napoleon III with a photographic album of his travels documenting the ancient Mesoamerican ruins. He came back with the invading army in 1864, accompanied by a large expedition organized by the French Scientific Commission on Mexico. Mexico was made into a scientific object, and the reconstruction of its ancient past was an attempt to “civilize” the country. According to Charnay, Mexicans “should only applaud” the French invasion, and he felt it was imperial destiny, “does it not correspond to a nation like ours, leader and light of the world, to take possession of these precious monuments” (Bueno 2016: 29).

Among Charnay’s official missions was that of providing the Louvre Museum with visual information about the rich

---

[1] I have written more extensively about Indianist Imagery: Imperial, Neocolonizing, and Decolonizing Photography, in Mraz 2021: 140-186.

cultural heritage of Mexico, with the idea of producing a publication that would "give amateurs foreigners, and artists a collection of the more curious Mexican monuments, and of the imposing ruins". (Casanova 2005: 12). Charnay made "some anthropological pictures of Indians, front and side view, near a measuring apparatus, or others where Indian and European helpers appear to give scale to the monuments" (Naggar 1993: 44). When Charnay returned in 1888 to continue uncovering antiquities for the Trocadéro Museum, he faced resistance from the Mexican Congress who rejected a contract that allowed him to export pieces in return for photographs of them. One deputy claimed that it was like a marriage that takes away a daughter, but leaves her father with her portrait (Bueno 2016: 49). His imagery is widely distributed in French archives, as well as other imperial collections such as the Smithsonian Institute and the Getty Museum.

An officer of Maximilian's forces, Teoberto Maler – and his images – remained in Mexico when the invading forces retired. He made himself into an itinerant photographer who lived from taking portraits in modest rural towns all over Mexico, representing businesses, and documenting pre-Hispanic ruins (Gutiérrez Ruvalcaba 2008). His attraction to the country was based on his empathy with the native populations, to which he scrupulously referred as the "original peoples" rather than *indios,* a term that carried(s) a denigrating connotation:

> the original peoples or "*los indígenas*" are the most interesting for me. They are the most solid part of the population in Mexico, upon whose shoulders fall the major part of the work, but they live in extreme ignorance, because the dominant classes tax them but only construct schools for Spanish speakers and will not tolerate schools in the Indian languages (Maler, cited in Gutiérrez Ruvalcaba 2008: 75).

Maler learned Nahuatl, and clearly understood that the miserable living conditions suffered by the native peoples were a product of their exploitation. Moreover, he explicitly celebrated the natives' countrywide attempts to overthrow the white and mestizo ruling classes. Although some photographers had Native Americans as their clients, Maler's may well be the first portraits commissioned by indigenous people in Mexico, and he commented that what "Zapotec women most desire is to have an effigy of themselves" (Gutiérrez Ruvalcaba 2008: 31). The acquisition of Maler's archive by the Fototeca Nacional (National Photographic Archive) is no doubt related to the fact he stayed in Mexico, his empathy for its native population, and his corresponding capacity to capture that on film.

León Diguet and his photographs are largely unknown and unstudied, but they can be found in the Musée du Quai Branly-Jacques Chirac in Paris. As with Charney, Diguet was commissioned by the French Ministry of Education to undertake six scientific missions during 1893-1914 (Debroise 2001: 126). His achievements were not limited to photography, for he carried out thoroughgoing investigations of many Mexican resources: shellfish and succulents, orchids and insects, cochineal and oyster cultivation, modern Indians and their ancient ruins. He studied the Huichol language, and wrote a book about it in 1911: *Idiome Huichol: Contribution à l'étude des langues mexicaines*, which was published by the "Journal de la Société des Américanistes". He took the *de rigueur* police-style frontal and profile shots, but he also made portraits, as well as documenting their ceremonies, dwellings, and ritual objects.

Diguet's is essentially a colonialist vision: the Amerindians are simply another product of nature about which knowledge could prove profitable, as well as primitive examples that demonstrate the superiority of Caucasians by comparison.

Hence, there is no evidence of rapport with his unsmiling subjects, who appear quite uncomfortable in front of the camera. The inducement Diguet offered the Indians for their consent and participation is unknown. A picture of two Huichol women, breasts exposed, pressed up against an adobe wall offers an example of his perspective and the natives' rather forced resignation to their fate. One of the natives returns the camera's gaze with particular vehemence, as if made to feel somehow ashamed to be photographed in a dress that was perfectly natural to them.

Anthropologist Frederick Starr was the most imperial of ethnographic imagemakers, exemplifying academia's role in the neocolonial process, and his photos have found their final resting place in a great archive of empire, the Smithsonian Institute. A professor at the University of Chicago for some forty years, he was funded by that institution to research in Mexico during the years 1896-1899, although the bulk of his financing may have come from trafficking in archeological pieces[2]. Ethnological studies were (and are) related to the interests that finance them, and in the developed countries were part of the rationalization of racism and neocolonial rule. One of the most racist and uninformed anthropologists of his time, he compared Mexican indigenous peoples to pygmies, and suspected that the Oaxacan Mixes practiced cannibalism.

Starr employed the carrot of money as well as the stick of official authority to ensure that Indians participated in his investigations. He sometimes paid volunteers to allow themselves to be measured and photographed, often with the frontal and profile poses employed in police photography. The anthropologist also hired some natives to have their heads molded in plaster casts, which must have been a

---

[2] Gabriela Zamorana, communication, 20 July 2017.

rather unpleasant experience. More important than money were the letters Starr had from the dictator, Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911), to all the pertinent officials giving the unconditional order to cooperate with him; Starr was instructed to go first to the political boss before making contact with the Indians (Starr 1908: vii). For photohistorian Jaime Vélez Storey, Starr's *modus operandi* was that of direct coercion, which also involved the church: "it was neither closeness nor friendly interaction nor consensus that permitted him to make his photographs, but the force of governmental and clerical authority" (Vélez Storey 2012: 49).

The Norwegian, Carl Lumholtz, displayed a very different attitude toward Amerindians. Although his appreciation of their cultures was conditioned by the reigning concept of a hierarchical cultural development, he nonetheless understood that it did not necessarily signify underdevelopment: "I felt myself carried back thousands of years into the early stages of human history. Primitive people as they are, they taught me a new philosophy of life, for their ignorance is nearer to the truth than our prejudice" (Lumholtz, cited in Broyles et.al. 2014: 77). The anthropologist carried out scientific expeditions throughout Mexico from 1890 to 1910, traveling back to the U.S. to raise funds from time to time. He attracted the interest of millionaires Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan, and the Vanderbilts, who were interested in opening up the unknown areas to investment. However, his financial backers remained anonymous, as the work was carried out under the auspices of the American Geographical Society and the American Museum of Natural History.

On his third trip to Mexico he studied the Tarahumara, Cora, Tepehuan, Tarasco and Huichol cultures. His imagery of these groups is among the finest of ethnological photography, for he abandoned anthropometric documentation to focus on daily life. Moreover, he had learned how to take good photographs, and his images registered the different meanings of indigenous clothing decorations. These Indian cultures were largely unknown, and resistant to outsiders. However, Lumholtz was able to establish a friendship with a Tarahumara shaman, Rubio, who opened doors for his cameras, even allowing him to record their sacred ceremonies. Most of his imagery is of Indians posing, some of whom smile, but he also captured them in the acts of hunting, grinding corn, and weaving. His negatives are housed in the American Museum of Natural History and the Museum of Cultural History in Oslo.

Research in Mexican archives reveals relatively few images of Native Americans made by Mexicans during the period 1860-1910. However, Porfirio Díaz eventually commissioned pictures of the ancient monuments and current inhabitants for international consumption. Images of the indigenous peoples were a cornerstone in the Mexican expositions in Paris in 1878 and 1889, the 1892 *Exposición histórico-americana* in Madrid, *Exposición Colombina Mundial* in the Peabody Museum at Harvard University in 1893, and the *X International Congress of Americanists* in 1894 in Stockholm (Rabiela, Gutiérrez Ruvalcaba 2018: 13)[3]. In 1889, an extensive photographic project was funded throughout Mexico in order to prepare for such international exhibits. This resulted in the first "ethnographic mapping" of "Indian nations", as they were referred to on the backs of the images (Rodríguez Hernández 1997: 27). The director of the Museo Nacional incorporated already-existing images from their holdings, and photographers were hired all over the country to participate in constructing what to this day remains Mexico's "calling card": the pre-Hispanic civilizations.

---

[3] The Brazilian government, in contrast, had included Amazonian tribes more than ten years before, in the Universal Exposition of Paris in 1867 (Navarrete 2017: 84).

Mexican photographers appear to have largely ignored the Indian nations until they "crash the party" and force themselves onto the stage. Hence, they generally had to make their presence known by subverting the established order of representation whether they be the Mayans who rose up in the Caste War in Yucatán (1847-1901) or the Yaquis who had offered continual resistance on the northern frontier. With the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, Amerindians entered massively into the anti-Porfirian armies, from many different groups. Yaqui and Mayo Indians appeared with bows and arrows as part of Maderista forces in the northwest; Chamula giants and dwarfs were photographed with a Maderista governor in Chiapas (Mraz 2012: 221, 81).

With the triumph of the (moderate) revolutionary forces in 1917, governmental policies toward the Amerindians underwent a profound transformation. The indigenous peoples were now incorporated as a nationalist symbol within Mexican culture, rather than just for international consumption. Moreover, the misery in which many Amerindians lived was defined as a socio-economic problem that could be solved, instead of a demonstration of their racial inferiority. Nonetheless, with few exceptions, "Indians themselves lacked any shared sentiment of Indianness"; post-revolutionary *indigenismo* was a creation from above, and "cannot be attributed to any direct Indian pressure or lobbying" (Knight 1990: 75, 82).

A key figure in carrying out the new government's policy was Manuel Gamio, who argued in his influential work, *Forjando patria* (1916) against the evolutionary racist and hierarchical theories espoused by liberal thinkers that consigned Indians to a primitive dead end: "the Indian has the same aptitudes to progress as does the white" (Gamio 1916: 38). He called for anthropological studies that would establish respect for the native cultures, paving the way for the eventual "fusion" of Indians and mestizos, by involving the former into the capitalist project: "we do not intend to incorporate the Indian by suddenly 'Europeanizing him;' on the contrary, we will 'Indianize ourselves' a bit" (Gamio 1916: 172).

Governmental agencies were established to embody the pluralist ethos espoused by Gamio, who was appointed the founding director of the Department of Anthropology, created in 1917 within the Secretariat of Agriculture and Development. President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) was particularly concerned to find ways to incorporate the native communities. In 1936, he established the Department of Indian Affairs (Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas-DAI), and in 1939, he created the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH). The DAI was replaced by the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI) in 1948, and is today known as the Instituto Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas (INPI) (Dawson 2004). These projects evolved into extraordinary spaces that offered the opportunity to develop systematic esthetic projects for photographing the native peoples, which provided work to outstanding ethnographic imagemakers such as Julio de la Fuente, Alfonso Fabila, Alfonso Muñoz, and Nacho López, among many others. The INAH and the INPI also contain large archives of Indianist imagery.

Julio de la Fuente offers one of the more fascinating stories of politically-committed Indianist photography, dedicated to enabling ethnic justice, as well as carrying out a "salvage ethnography" of disappearing cultural artifacts. From the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s, de la Fuente focused on developing forms of visual education within the INI as well as in the Amerindian communities: teaching courses on drawing and the making of lithographs and posters, as well as programing film series in which movies were critically analyzed. He published prolifically, writing about indigenous ceremonies, illnesses common among the native peoples, rural schools, ethnic relations, nutrition, statistical bias in the national census, the transformation of clothing styles as cultural change, and folklore.

To judge from his images in the Fototeca Nacho López of the INPI, de la Fuente was constrained by anthropological methods that took precedence over his political commitments or esthetic concerns. The 2500 photographs are largely informational rather than expressive; they demonstrate the necessity to take pictures containing as much data as possible, in order to provide material for later confirmation and revision by other anthropologists. The archive is composed of landscapes and townscapes, markets, churches, indigenous dwellings and ceremonies, pre-Hispanic architecture, standing portraits largely of women, children, and INAH functionaries, as well as photos of schools, some taken at a distance of children and their teacher gathered to be photographed. The reception of his images among the Zapotecs provides a window onto how those pictured felt about de la Fuente's work. They criticized the lack of pictures showing agricultural labor or the elaboration of sandals, but felt his photographs, above all those that visually preserved traditional clothing such as the *huipil* (a common upper-body garment among Amerindian women in Mesoamerica) were generally valued as documents of a history that should be recovered and preserved for the community (Petroni 2009).

Nacho López could arguably be considered the maestro of this genre in Mexico, not only in terms of his exceptional images, but in his reflections on photographing Amerindians. From the mid-1950s to the end of 1970s he worked at times for the INI, photographing a wide range of *pueblos indígenas*, among them, Tzeltales, Tsotziles, Mixes, Coras, Huicholes, Tarahumaras (Rarámuris), and Chontales;

his Indianist photography was published in an INI book, *Los pueblos de la bruma y el sol* (López 1981). In 1978, López contributed an article, *El indio en la fotografía*, for a publication celebrating the 30th anniversary of INI, where he argued that, "the camera can be an instrument of aggression or a connection between friends" (López, cited in Mraz 2021: 174).

Developing rapport – that delicate, if difficult to describe, relationship between photographer and photographed – is crucial to moving beyond the representation of non-concurrence, and may well be one of the primary mediations of the Indianist esthetic. The personal relations that López had established with the native peoples are apparent in their interaction with the photographer, at whom they smile trustingly, as can be seen in his imagery of the Tzotziles. Even when Amerindians do not smile at López, they return the camera's gaze, masters of the situation rather than objects of the photographer. López searched for ways to empower the Amerindian peoples and to avoid exoticism. Establishing rapport and utilizing angles to give them force within the image were two important esthetic strategies. Another was infusing images with movement within the frame. Rather than being quiet and resigned, the indigenous in López's images are often active and caught in the act of moving.

The 150,000 images of indigenous peoples in the Nacho López Fototeca of the INPI are indicative of the efforts Mexican governments since the revolution have made to construct memories and identities through photographic imagery. Mexican photographic archives are the most developed in Latin America, and perhaps the entire neocolonial world[4]. The Fototeca Nacional of the INAH contains almost a

---

[4] With the exception of the Moreira Salles Institute's holdings of 2 million images in Rio de Janeiro, Latin American photographic archives are relatively small and scattered among national libraries and regional

million images, and the Archivo General de la Nación is home to some 6 million negatives. In 1988, a researcher encountered more than 500 photographic archives in Mexico, and there have since been significant developments in founding municipal *fototecas*, and in publishing books of that imagery (Davidson 1988). Moreover, the Fototeca Nacional has been instrumental in the creation of local archives, offering training in cleaning, preserving, digitalizing, and cataloguing images. Perhaps because Mexico is a particularly ocular culture, there has been a general comprehension of the strength provided by the preservation of their own visual history. As photohistorian Elizabeth Edwards affirmed, "communities which had photographs related to their past were believed to be in a more powerful position in asserting their identities, in negotiating their place in the modern world and in the complex inter-community politics around local leadership and resource ownership" (Edwards 2005: 321).

After Egypt, Mexico was the world's most-photographed country by foreigners during the 19th century (Naggar 1993: 44). The vast majority of those images went into imperial archives. The Mexican Revolution produced a consciousness of the necessity to rescue and preserve the sources upon which to construct a new national identity. One of those sources, certainly one of the most important in Mexico, is photographic imagery. The indigenous peoples are the cornerstone of that identity, and post-revolutionary governments established institutions, such as the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH) and the National Institute of Indian Peoples (INPI), which created photographic archives that include large numbers of Indianist images. The establishing of Mexican *fototecas* from the national and state levels to the municipalities offers an

---

collections. I thank Fernando Osorio for informing me in general terms about the condition of photographic archives in Latin America.

instructive example of how what we might loosely call "The Mexican Archive" moved from being under imperial dominion – where information could be censored, unavailable for consultation or too costly to reproduce – to become one of the most powerful tools with which to construct Mexican nationhood and identity.

References

A.A. Azoulay (2021), *Toward the Abolition of Photography's Imperial Rights*, in K. Coleman, D. James, *Capitalism and the Camera* (London: Verso).

R. Bartra (1996), *Stuffing the Indian Photographically*, in *Mexican Photography*, Special Issue, "History of Photography", 20, 3, pp. 236-239.

M.A. Berumen (ed.) (2009), *México: fotografía y revolución* (Mexico City: Televisa).

B. Broyles, A.C. Eek, P. La Farge, R. Laugharn, E. Macías Guzmán (2014), *Among Unknown Tribes: Rediscovering the Photographs of Explorer Carl Lumholtz* (Austin: University of Texas Press).

C. Bueno (2016), *The Pursuit of Ruins: Archeology, History and the Making of Modern Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press).

R. Casanova (2005), *De vistas y retratos: la construcción de un repertorio fotográfico en México*, 1839-1890, in E. C. García Krinsky (ed.), *Imaginarios y fotografía en México*, 1839-1970 (Mexico City: Lunwerg), pp. 2-57.

A. Dawson (2004), *Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press).

M. Davidson et.al. (1988), *Picture Collections: Mexico. A Guide to Picture Sources in the United Mexican States* (Metchuen and London: Scarecrow Press).

O. Debroise (2001), *Mexican Suite: A History of Photography in Mexico*, tr. Stella de Sá Rego (Austin: University of Texas Press).

B. Díaz del Castillo (1939 [1568]), *Historia verdadera de la conquista de Nueva España*, vol. 1 (Mexico City: Editorial Pedro Robredo).

E. Edwards (2015), *Photographs as Strong History?*, in C. Caraffa, T. Serena (eds.), *Photographic Archives and the Idea of Nation* (Berlin: De Gruyter), pp. 321-329.

J.H. Eliot (1970), *The Old World and the New, 1492-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

M. Gamio (1916), *Forjando patria (Pro nacionalismo)* (Mexico City: Porrúa Hermanos).

I. Gutiérrez Ruvalcaba (2008), *Teoberto Maler: Historia de un fotógrafo vuelto arqueólogo* (Mexico City: INAH).

A. Knight, (1990), *Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940*, in R. Graham (ed.), *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940* (Austin: University of Texas Press) pp. 71-113.

N. López (1981), *Los pueblos de la bruma y el sol* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional Indigenista-FONAPAS).

J. Mraz (2021), *History and Modern Media: A Personal Journey* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press).

J. Mraz (2012), *Photographing the Mexican Revolution: Commitments, Testimonies, Icons* (Austin: University of Texas Press).

C. Naggar (1993), *The Fascination for the Other*, in C. Naggar, F. Ritchin, *México Through Foreign Eyes* (New York: Norton), pp. 41-53.

J. Navarrete (2017), *Fotografiando en América Latina* (Montevideo: Centro de Fotografía de Montevideo).

M.C.A. Petroni (2009), *La recepción de la imagen. Una reflexión antropológica sobre la representación del indio en México*, in "Aisthesis", 46, pp. 128-150.

G. Rodríguez Hernández (1997), *Miradas sin rendición*, in "Luna Córnea", 13, pp. 24-31.

T. Rojas Rabiela, I. Gutiérrez Ruvalcaba (2018), *Catálogo de la Colección de Antropología del Museo Nacional* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Cultura/INAH/CIESAS).

F. Starr (1908), *In Indian Mexico: A Narrative of Travel and Labor* (Chicago: Forbes & Co.).

J. Vélez Storey (2012), *Alegorías raciales de una mirada distante: Los retratos de Frederick Starr*, in D. Poole, G. Zamorano Villarreal (eds.), *De frente al perfil: Retratos raciales de Frederick Starr* (Michoacán: El Colegio de Michoacán), pp. 43-50.

Abstract

This article explores the importance of photographic archives (*fototecas*) in preserving the sources with which to create a national visual history and identity. It charts the arc from imperial photography of Mexico, lodged in European and U.S. archives, to the development of Mexican institutions dedicated to the preservation of the photographic patrimony. Particular attention is paid to the photography of indigenous peoples by foreigners and Mexicans, and the location of the archives in which that imagery is held. Some of the archives mentioned are found in Mexico: Archivo General de la Nación, the Fototeca Nacional-Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH), the Museo Nacional, and the Instituto Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas (INPI). Others are located elsewhere: the Smithsonian Institute, the Getty Museum, the Musée du

Quai Branly-Jacques Chirac, American Museum of Natural History, and the Museum of Cultural History in Oslo. Among the photographers mentioned are: Desiré Charnay, León Diguet, Teoberto Maler, Frederick Starr, Carl Lumholtz, Julio de la Fuente, and Nacho López.

Keywords

Photographic archives, Native Americans, Mexico, *Indigenismo* (Indianism), imperial photography.

THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF XENOPHOBIC POPULISM: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

COLIN CROUCH
University of Warwick (United Kingdom)
colincrouch@me.com

The current rise of xenophobic populism has a distinct geography. With some exceptions it tends to be concentrated in regions that are outside the main growth activities of the modern economy. Attention has focused on old manufacturing and mining areas in decline, and therefore with relatively poor, working-class populations. However, voting for right-wing populist parties is also strong in certain prosperous areas, which despite their relative wealth, are outside the most dynamic sectors. Both types of area can therefore be covered by the term often used to describe the new populist heartlands – "left behind" – but with rather different implications.

Both kinds of "left behind" relate to the two processes in the contemporary economy that are causing various kinds of dislocation: globalization and the transition to a post-industrial economy. As the former changes comparative advantage across the world, many cities and regions find their former activities are no longer competitive and have to search for new ones. Even if they are currently prosperous, these areas might fear for a future that has no place for them.

Also, the opening of the world to intensified international trade brings with it the movement of people, which disturbs cultural homogeneity in areas with little past experience of ethnic diversity. There is both a sense and a reality of growing disconnectedness of the historical local economy, society and culture from a wider world that comes to be seen as menacing. Anger is likely to become focused on immigrants and ethnic minorities as the visible and ostensibly most easily attacked manifestation of the overall phenomenon.

Partly a separate factor, partly connected to the economic reorganization consequent on globalization, is the general sectoral shift in employment towards various services activities. High value-added services sectors that do not have any particular need for customers among local populations have few logistical constraints, and can choose where they go. They tend to prefer high-quality locations, especially if they are primarily employing highly skilled people who need to be attracted.

The decline of employment in manufacturing and mining also brings other changes. The power of employee interests is weakened through the decline of unions, while the gender balance within economy and society is changed as the more evenly balanced services sectors replace strongly male manufacturing and mining. The kinds of economic activity that can flourish in various locations, and the ways in which these connect to the global economy, therefore have major effects, not only on the local economy itself, but on politics and culture too. The public policy implications of these developments are profound.

In the following we shall examine in turn these issues: the geography of populism; its relationship to the geography of economic sectors; and the kinds of public policy that are relevant to tackling emerging geographical inequalities.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF POPULISM

The current rise of xenophobic populism has a distinct geography across a range of countries, although the weight of local factors varies. With some exceptions it tends to be concentrated in regions that are outside the main growth activities of the modern economy. This does not define only areas in decline, but those whose prosperity seems rooted in the past and therefore likely to face a vulnerable future, such as thriving but traditional industrial cities, or wealthy small towns and rural areas.

There is relevant evidence from a number of countries. In the 2016 US presidential elections, the votes for Donald Trump, who stood on a socially conservative, xenophobic platform, were concentrated in counties that accounted for 36 per cent of GDP, those for Clinton in those accounting for 64 per cent (Muro, Liu 2016). Since both candidates scored broadly equal number of votes, this suggests strongly that Trump voting was associated with the least dynamic and productive local economies. Trump's votes also correlated rather strongly ($r^2=0.50$) with employment in the "old" (agriculture, mining and manufacturing) economy, and even more strongly ($r^2=0.61$) with the proportion of white persons with no high school diploma in the area (Irwin, Katz 2016).

In the UK the vote to leave the European Union (Brexit) in the referendum of June 2016 was concentrated in small and moderately sized towns, both prosperous ones and old industrial ones in decline. Of the country's 30 largest cities, 18 (including the capital, London) had higher anti-Brexit votes than the national average, and three others had higher anti-Brexit votes than the regions in which they were situated. Of the remaining nine, six were old industrial cities and three were declining port cities. There was considerable regional diversity in the vote, the proportion voting for Brexit ranging from 59.21 per cent in the West Midlands to 37.98 per cent in Scotland. Comparison of voting in the referendum with national statistical data on the educational level of the population of the various regions shows a strong negative correlation ($r^2=0.5146$) between voting for Brexit and educational level. (The correlation is far stronger if Scotland and Northern Ireland are taken out of the account, both having poor educational levels but voting strongly against Brexit for specific political and cultural reasons.) Having reached a similar conclusion examining data at a more local level, Manley, Jones and Johnston (2017) showed that in fact educational level was more relevant than region as such. In other words, differential voting in different areas can be explained by differences in the educational level of populations. Educational level is in turn in good part a function of the economic activities dominant in a region.

The French presidential elections of 2017 revealed some similar patterns. Looking at the first round of the elections, where voters could choose among five candidates, the vote for Marine Le Pen, the leader of the xenophobic party, Front National (FN), was concentrated in smaller towns in both the prosperous, rural south west and the declining industrial north west (Renard 2017). Drawing on work by Hervé Le Bras, as yet unpublished but based on the latter's earlier analyses of FN voting (Le Bras 2015), Renard showed that size of town was more important than indicators of social distress in predicting FN strength; indeed, Le Pen's vote was negatively associated with these latter indicators. There were similar findings to UK and US research on education level.

A striking finding of Le Bras's work is that pessimistic future expectations were more important than current economic reality in predicting the FN vote. A very similar conclusion emerges from Philip Manow's (2018) work on voting for the xenophobic Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the German parliamentary elections of 2017. The AfD vote correlated highly with experience of unemployment in 2000, but negatively with current unemployment. This holds true despite the German situation being complicated by the different histories of the eastern and western parts of the country. In Germany as elsewhere voting for the xenophobic party was high in areas of manufacturing industry, but – in contrast with the UK and US – in the German case these are flourishing areas of high employment. Indeed, it was workers in secure jobs, not the precarious, who were more likely to vote for AfD.

Manow's finding does not so much refute the evidence from elsewhere on the "left behind", as clarify it. Evidence from France, the UK and US already showed that xenophobic voting was high in prosperous small towns as much as in depressed ones. The common factor was pessimism about the future, and perhaps worrying memories from the recent past. There can be many different reasons why people feel that their educational level or the activities characteristic of their area will not have a secure place in the future, whatever their present situation. Similarly, hostility to immigrants tends to be highest where there are very few of them, but their imminent arrival is feared, rather than in cities where there are already large numbers. As globalization changes comparative advantage across the world, people in locations characterized by "older" economic activities fear that these will no longer be competitive. Also, even when immigration controls are in place, the opening of the world to intensified international trade necessarily brings with it the movement of people, which disturbs the cultural homogeneity of certain areas. Anger is likely to become focussed on immigrants and ethnic minorities as the visible and ostensibly most easily attacked manifestation of the overall phenomenon.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE SERVICES ECONOMY

Partly a separate factor, partly connected to the economic reorganization consequent on globalization, is the general shift in employment from agriculture, manufacturing and mining towards various services activities. It had once been thought that, because many of these latter lacked strong locational requirements, they would be spread more evenly across territories than manufacturing and mining. This was expected to be especially true for high-technology activities, which could locate themselves more or less anywhere and had low space needs in relation to their added value. The reality has turned out to be very different, though again the picture is complex. Services that are delivered person-to-person and without payment at the point of delivery tend to be distributed according to population density. This is the case for many non-marketed citizenship services; schools, hospitals, care services, and police will tend to follow a straightforward population density pattern. Marketed personal services, such as restaurants, shops, hairdressers, and local transport serve local populations and will be partly determined by local demography, but also by the wealth of the local population. Wealthier areas will attract more and better quality of these services, exacerbating existing inequalities even as they create employment.

Finally, high value-added services sectors that do not have particular need for local markets have few logistical constraints, and can choose where they go. They tend to prefer high-quality locations, especially if they are primarily employing highly skilled people who need to be attracted. Capital cities, with their excellent transport connections, cultural amenities and access to government personnel, are especially favoured, as are other culturally rich or beautifully appointed cities. Firms in these sectors also often like to cluster, in order to foster the informal knowledge exchanges that characterize innovation and creativity. While this is also the case for some manufacturing sectors, their characteristically high space needs make them sensitive to the increases in land prices that accompany concentration. Services firms with low space to earnings ratios have low land-cost elasticities. Their clusters therefore become extensive. Footloose services moving to poorer, unattractive cities are likely to be of lower value-added activities, sensitive to local costs and not needing to attract scarce staff. Examples are warehousing (though with a large space need) and call centres. There is therefore a relationship between the differential location of sectors and income.

There is therefore a location multiplier at work, which becomes an inequality multiplier. Cities and regions that already possess advantages will attract the most activities with high-earning personnel. These in turn spend part of their income on local services, creating more local wealth. Local government benefits from property taxes on the services firms, which enables it to maintain and enhance the attractiveness of the city. This in turn attracts more firms seeking pleasant locations. A high proportion of the persons working in these services being highly educated, they are likely to produce children who also acquire a high level of education, boosting the quality of the local labour market and thereby attracting more firms needing highly educated workers. The opposite spiral affects cities that lack the amenities that attract high value-added activities. Young people, and especially well-educated ones, will leave the region altogether. Often the local economy stagnates; or it might, as in Germany, remain a strong industrial one, but with anxieties about a future in which manufacturing will become ever less important (for evidence of an association between income inequality and the regional location of high value-added services in the UK, see Crouch 2019.)

THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SECTORAL CHANGE

The political and cultural consequences of these growing differences extend further. The decline of employment in manufacturing and mining has also coincidentally weakened the power of employee interests, within both the economy and the polity. These sectors were the heartland of the labour movements of industrial society, generating trade unions and worker-oriented political parties. Outside public services, some parts of the financial and distribution sectors, unions have become weak, with knock-on effects on their associated parties and party fractions. In many economies these sectors have been heavily male activities; most services have a far more even gender balance in their work forces, though there is a tendency for women to be concentrated at the lower levels of organizational hierarchies. Just as the disruption of globalization seems to stimulate nationalism and resentment of immigrants and other foreigners, sectoral change might stimulate certain gender conflicts. The relatively recent prominence in the economy of women encourages many of them to assert political demands for rights, while some men, and indeed some women, resent the challenge to traditional gender differences. Xenophobia and masculism come together to form a kind of pessimistic nostalgia, which can be politicized as a powerful force, especially in societies where the same forces of globalization and sectoral change are challenging the relevance of past political traditions.

As Manow (2018) argues, the current rise of populism is not a uniform phenomenon; it affects countries with different economic circumstances in different ways. However, that only makes more striking certain similarities: the negative association between xenophobic voting on the one hand and city size, education level and sectoral dominance. Market forces in the post-industrial economy favour a small number of large cities, leaving large areas and many if not most smaller cities without any dynamic activities that can sustain wealth and income, retain the young, and give people a sense of local pride in their *Heimat*. Many inequalities among cities and regions are the consequences of past and present public policies; capital cities are often the result of centuries of state policy, as are many of the infrastructures and amenities that strengthen the attractiveness of flourishing cities. Therefore, attempts to address them also require public policy.

The geographical inequalities, even within countries, that globalization and post-industrialism together produce are enduring. Eventually diminishing returns might set in even for services activities, as land costs and labour scarcities reduce the attractiveness of today's favoured places. But that can take a very long time to emerge; meanwhile generations in other regions live out their lives contemplating at worst decline and at best an anxiety that current success is likely to be temporary. Left to global market forces and without imaginative local urban policy-making, a majority of towns and cities are being left in economic and cultural mediocrity. The concept of "glocal" helpfully expresses the way in which global pressures make it important for policy-makers to attend to what happens at local level (see, for example, Swyngedouw, Kaika 2003). There has to be local economic and social policy, not of a protectionist kind, but to enable as many areas as possible to find their way to viable economic futures, with the help of national and (in the case of EU member states) European authorities. It is only if diversity is accepted and encouraged that multiple means can be found to common problems.

It is not enough for such policies to provide generous social support for people who are unemployed or left in low-income occupations as a result of these processes, or to encourage firms and government organizations to locate back-office and warehouse activities in such places. Such measures do not facilitate local pride and confidence. Policy-makers at all levels need to identify new activities than can thrive, in particular provision of the infrastructure that will enable them to rival the already favoured places, including iconic cultural projects, provided these reach into the daily lives of the population and are not just isolated pockets of elite activity fenced off from the rest of the city (for examples of such policies see OECD 2006.) As Marc Saxer (2018) has argued, maintaining a high-quality local environment of which people can be proud requires considerable public spending. Success in such a task will not be achieved everywhere; there will always be sad areas that fail to find a place in the changing world. But combinations of imaginative national and local planning with entrepreneurship, and determined attention to the geography of dynamism can reduce their number and therefore the numbers of those who feel left behind.

The economic policy subsidiarity that this implies also has a cultural dimension. A globalized world needs citizens who are at ease with a variety of layered identities, able to feel loyalties and identities of varying strengths – to local community, town city, region, country, world region, common humanity – that feed on and reinforce each other, not set in zero-sum conflict. We are again reminded of the finding of much research that xenophobic movements are weakest in cities where large numbers of ethnic minorities and immigrants have been living for a considerable period. These are usually the cities finding a confident place in the modern economy (it is this which has attracted the immigrants), and where populations of all ethnicities have been able to get to know and appreciate each other. There is a double, economic and cultural, confidence. The link between forward-looking economic development in the hands of local people able to be involved in the future of their cities and avoidance of a retreat into a world of warring tribes was identified by the late US sociologist Benjamin Barber in his book *Jihad versus McWorld How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World,* published in 1995, six years before the massacre at the New York Twin Towers. His words have acquired considerably greater meaning during the intervening years.

References

B. Barber (1995), *Jihad versus McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Times Books).

C. Crouch (2019), *Inequality in post-industrial societies*, in "Structural Change and Economic Dynamics", 51, pp. 11-23.

N. Irwin, J. Katz (2016), *The Geography of Trumpism*, in "New York Times", 13 March, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/upshot/the-geography-of-trumpism.html.

H. Le Bras (2015), *Le pari du FN* (Paris: Éditions Autrement).

M. Muro, S. Liu (2016), *Another Clinton Trump Divide: High Output America vs Low Output America*, in "Brookings", 29 November, www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/11/29/another-clinton-trump-divide-high-output-america-vs-low-output-america.

D. Manley, K. Jones, R. Johnston (2017), *The Geography of Brexit – What Geography?*, in "Local Economy", 32, 3, pp. 183-203.

P. Manow (2018), *Die politische Ökonomie des Populismus* (Berlin: Suhrkamp).

OECD (2006), *Global Cities in the World Economy* (Paris: OECD).

C. Renard (2017), *Exode urbain et inégalités: les cartes du vote Front National*, in "France culture", 24 April.

M. Saxer (2018), *Linke Heimat*, in "IPG Journal", 5 March, http://www.ipg-journal.de/schwerpunkt-des-monats/heimat/artikel/detail/linke-heimat-2614.

E. Swyngedouw, M. Kaika (2003), *The making of "glocal" urban modernities*, in "City", 7, 1, pp. 5-21.

Abstract

The current rise of xenophobic populism has a distinct geography. With some exceptions it tends to be concentrated in regions that are outside the main growth activities of the modern economy. Attention has focused on old manufacturing and mining areas in decline, and therefore with relatively poor, working-class populations. However, voting for right-wing populist parties is also strong in certain prosperous areas, which despite their relative wealth, are outside the most dynamic sectors. Both types of area can therefore be covered by the term often used to describe the new populist heartlands – "left behind" – but with rather different implications. In the following we shall examine in turn these issues: the geography of populism; its relationship to the geography of economic sectors; and the kinds of public policy that are relevant to tackling emerging geographical inequalities.

Keywords

Xenophobia, populism, economic geography, left-behind, inequalities.

GLOBAL

NATION AND CIVILIZATION IN THE GLOBAL AGE

Hans Köchler
University of Innsbruck (Austria)
Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (Germany)
International Progress Organization
hans.koechler@uibk.ac.at

Social organization as framework of survival

In philosophical discourses on the *conditio humana* it has become commonplace to refer to Aristotle's dictum "ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον [...] ἐστιν" (Aristotle: 1, 1253a2). The Aristotelian definition not merely implies that the individual needs the group (community) for survival, it also means that the human being can only *advance* – or prosper – in a social context, whether in terms of language, art, science, or technology. All these areas of human activity constitute culture in the widest sense of the word[1].

In the history of mankind, we witness a succession of increasingly complex forms of social organization. These are never mere agglomerations of individuals simply by chance,

---

[1] For the distinction between "culture" and "civilization" see note 3 below.

but specific forms of cooperation with a purpose – of collective survival, and, over time, existence in the sense of "good life", namely of cultural refinement. Ultimately, one might say, life is all about self-realization in a community, by using synergy effects through a division of tasks – an organization of labour – in different groups and networks. Through all periods of history, many and diverse forms of organization evolved along these lines. One of the main constants in the development of society has indeed been an increase in complexity.

If we look at the "classical" form of social organization in antiquity, the Greek city-state (πόλις), we can identify the basic concept that shaped historical discourses on the state in the Western world: πολιτεία (*civitas*) as community of citizens. In the ancient era of the city-state, this meant, first of all, homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and culture in each πόλις. Furthermore, it signified a need for cooperation among a multitude of such entities, to face external challenges in particular. In that period of antiquity, the basic issue was the relation with the Persian Empire. Cooperation dictated by necessity, in order to face an existential threat, resulted in an awareness among those πόλεις, those communities of citizens, of a wider Greek community, a togetherness that was enabled and shaped by a common language, in spite of the many and diverse Greek dialects. One might say that, long before the idea of "nation" emerged in Europe, there was a kind of national "awakening" in this particular historical constellation[2].

Greek identity gradually evolved toward what we nowadays identify as "Hellenistic civilization"[3]. To a considerable

---

[2] Friedrich Hölderlin beautifully evoked the spirit of ancient Greece, mirrored – for him – in the Greek national uprising of the 1770s ("Orlov Revolt"), in the idealistic epistolary novel Hyperion oder der Eremit in Griechenland (1797) (Hölderlin 1958: 311-470).

[3] A note on terminology regarding the use of the terms "civilization" and "culture" in this text: we follow Samuel Huntington's definition of

extent, it was the result of the imperial conquests of Alexander the Great. In the wake of Alexander, the Greek language did reach a large area of the then-known world. In the Hellenistic period, after Alexander, Greek indeed became the κοινὴ γλῶσσα (common language)[4], the *lingua franca* all through the later Roman and early Byzantine Empire, in a vast region covering the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The common language was a decisive factor in the development of the ancient Christian world that later became identified with Western civilization.

In this historical context, "civilization" must not be confused with "nation". Greek civilization did comprise diverse cultural traditions and political entities. There was a form of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic co-existence in a "life-world" (if I may borrow from Husserl's philosophy)[5], shaped by Greek civilization essentially on the basis of the language. One might also speak of a kind of ancient "Greek Commonwealth", but in a civilizational, not a narrow legal-political sense.

The situation was similar to later constellations under the Roman Empire and subsequently in the Middle Ages, when Latin became the *lingua franca*, particularly in the scholarly

---

civilization as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species" (Huntington 1993: 24). This differs from the terminology in other languages such as German, where "civilization" and "culture" are distinct categories of human self-realization, the former relating to man's conquest of nature (in particular as described by the phrase "technical civilization"), the latter effectively denoting what in English is referred to as civilization in general (with cultures as "sub-civilizations").

[4] It is also referred to simply as "Koine" or as Hellenistic or Biblical Greek.

[5] Edmund Husserl introduced the term "Lebenswelt" in the later phase of his phenomenological research (Husserl [1936] 1962. See also Husserl 2008).

and legal fields. As was the case with Greek in the Hellenistic period, the language of the Romans was the dominant one due to imperial conquest. This aspect can be metaphorically highlighted in a Latin phrase that historians coined much later: *lingua Latina omnia vincit*. The language prevailed over so many local idioms also because the Roman Empire was victorious. It would be disingenuous to deny that there always has existed a connection between power and civilization.

As in the earlier Hellenistic period, it was the Roman civilization, influenced by the earlier Greek synthesis – or perception – of the world, that, in the form of the Latin language, exerted decisive influence in a vast geographic space. Again, in this case too, the dynamic was not in any way related to something we nowadays would describe as "nation". It was about a multitude of distinct ethnic and linguistic communities that existed at that time and in that particular area, and whose life-world – or conception of reality – was shaped and refined by the Latin language. In the Middle Ages, this influence continued in the Christian framework, which was essentially formulated and developed in the conceptual system of Greco-Roman civilization. It is indeed the Greco-Roman world that provided the λόγος, the basic notions and concepts in terms of metaphysics and science, for the Christian world view.

The role of the Latin language not only in Christian theology, but also philosophy and science, is undeniable. For us in the West, in Europe and the United States, it certainly makes sense to teach ancient Greek and Latin as part of the curriculum of higher education. In my opinion, abandoning it – in the United States and, later, also in many European countries – was a big mistake. It has meant a substantial loss of historical memory and led to an increasing alienation from our cultural roots because it has deprived us of essential hermeneutical skills[6].

---

[6] This applies not only to the most basic issues of etymology, but also to the loss of an awareness of what Gadamer called "*Wirkungsgeschichte*"

NATION SUCCEEDS CIVILIZATION

After a period of several centuries, the overarching civilizational unity (earlier Greek, later Latin), which I have just described, gradually receded into history. It was transformed into a multitude of increasingly assertive cultural communities that were essentially defined by language. It is to be noted that this transformation was not about cultural diversity as such. Diversity was an established fact in the commonwealth of the Latin world. The process was about organizational and political self-assertion of the different cultures that had existed under one civilizational roof, that of the Latin world. The evolution towards the modern nation-state – that, in the 19th century, succeeded the imperial order of the Holy Roman Empire in Europe – has been precisely described and analyzed by Benedict Anderson in his opus magnum (Anderson [1983] 2006).

In an cursory analysis of this development, three factors come to mind: *a*) The emergence of vernacular languages as crystallizing points of the life-worlds of many distinct communities that had, through the centuries, relied on Latin as the language of reference: It cannot be denied that up to the present day many of these then-vernacular languages are deeply embedded in a Latin framework in terms of vocabulary and grammar, with Italian being the closest to the Latin roots. *b*) The rapid development of scientific research in the course of the European Renaissance: one of the most consequential aspects of technical development in this era was the invention of the printing press, which suddenly made possible the large-scale distribution of texts in the vernacular languages. To a considerable, though often neglected, extent the "rebirth" of European civilization was the result of the encounter of the medieval Christian world with the

---

(reception history of ideas). See note 37 below.

Arab-Islamic civilization in Andalusia, which acted as catalyst – and, above all, conveyor of Europe's forgotten ancient Greek heritage (Assad, Zbinden 1960; Montgomery Watt 2004). *c*) A further factor, which is important in terms of the transformation towards nation and nation-state, is the emancipation from absolutist rule that for centuries had drawn its legitimation from what we describe in German with the term "*Gottesgnadentum*" – a doctrine that emphasizes the "divine right of Kings", or, more precisely in Latin, "*potestas Dei gratia*". This metaphysical justification of absolute rule was increasingly challenged with the arrival of Enlightenment in the course of the 18th century.

Accordingly, the emergence of the concept of the nation was intrinsically linked with the idea of sovereignty in the legal and political sense (Köchler 2013) as opposed to subordination of the people (individuals), as mere subjects, to the power of an absolute ruler who represents the divine will and order. In this regard, one may describe "nation" as a community of people sharing a cultural heritage that is essentially expressed in their language. Organizing their life and social relations in a state (nation-state), they distinguish themselves from other such communities. Alluding to the etymology of the Latin term "*de-finitio*", one can characterize this as a process of self-definition where the community "draws the border", or delimits its sovereign realm, vis-à-vis other such communities, also organized as states.

Similarly, Benedict Anderson, in his analysis of the origins of nationalism, characterizes nations as socially constructed (Anderson [1983] 2006: 39). He highlights the fact that people imagine themselves as co-existing with a number of equals (in terms of language and culture), most of whom they do not know personally. In our interpretation, the aspect of imagined community – or socially constructed identity – also applies to the concept of "popular will" in the modern theory of democratic representation (which has been adopted as quasi-official state doctrine in most of the Western world) (Köchler 1985). In a different theoretical setting (namely of idealistic essentialism), the notions of "*Volksganzheit*" (totality of the people) and, linked to it, "*Volkswille*" (popular will) were emphasized – in the period between the wars – in the state theory of Carl Schmitt ([1928] 1983) and Gerhard Leibholz (1929, 1966)[7] (who served as Judge at Germany's Constitutional Court after World War II).

As there is no such thing as "popular will" or "totality of the people" as an empirical reality, the construct of "representation" (*re-praesentatio*: literally, "again making present what is absent") serves an essential purpose. The underlying issue is how to legitimize the exercise of power in the context of modern democracy. The respective office-holder – whether member of the executive or legislative branch – is seen to "represent", and act on behalf of, the totality of the people, which is never physically present as such. This constructivist understanding of "nation" as a legal and political entity is necessarily based on the paradigm of *homogeneity*. The sovereign state is seen as unique form of organization of a particular nation in the sense of *Kulturnation*[8], i.e. as a community that has existed under one civilizational roof, so to speak, over an extended period of time. In this constructivist context, cultural diversity is not a fact within a particular nation, but exclusively between nations. It relates to the simultaneous existence of a multitude of such culturally homogenous nations as sovereign entities.

The concept of the nation-state, modeled on representation, has become the foundation of modern international

---

[7] For an analysis of the fictional character of the notion of representation see Köchler 2009a.

[8] On the notions of "nation" and "state" see the author's 1993 lecture at the University of Bologna in Dunne, Bonazzi 1995.

law as a system of rules that govern relations between a multitude of sovereign actors on the basis of non-interference. This was also one of the essential elements – or achievements – of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The aspect of homogeneity is evident in one of the Westphalian Treaties' basic peace-making principles, *cuius regio, eius religio* ("whose realm, his religion")[9]. Diversity is relegated to the inter-national realm. This was how, after the Thirty Years War, the antagonists thought they could achieve durable peace, in an era that was characterized by religious disputes: as system of co-existence among sovereign nations. However, nationalism in the sense of an excessive emotional identification with one's own nation, existing as one unified state, also proved to be a risk to a stable order. The feeling of national belonging – what Anderson calls "deep horizontal comradeship"[10] – was the fuel of many inter-state conflicts, including the world wars of the last century.

DISENTANGLEMENT OF NATION AND STATE

The modern understanding of the sovereign state as "nation-state" gradually changed with the further rapid development of technology and the massive wave of globalization in the 20th century. In a structurally similar way to the paradigm change that resulted, *inter alia*, from the earlier separation of church and state (i.e. the end of "divine rule", *potestas Dei*

---

[9] The parties to the treaties (Treaty of Münster and Treaty of Osnabrück, 1648) eventually recognized the principle of the earlier Peace of Augsburg (1555) according to which each ruler has the right to determine the religion of his own state.

[10] Anderson explains that the sovereign state "is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality [...], the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson [1983] 2006: 7).

gratia)[11], the separation of nation and state heralded a new conceptual framework of political organization. This has meant an understanding of the sovereign state as community of citizens (πολίτες, *cives* [plural]), organized by law, whereby the respective community may consist of individuals with different "national"[12] identities in terms of culture, language and ethnicity. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between a uniform nation-state and a diverse "multicultural community state"[13]. There exists a lot of confusion about the concepts of "state" and "nation". The terms have become synonymous in modern English (particularly American) terminology[14]. (However, a certain differentiation was made between the notions in some of history's multi-ethnic and multicultural empires such as the Habsburg Monarchy)[15].

The development towards this conceptual distinction is essentially owed to economic interests, initially in the context of colonization and, subsequently, in the 20th century, of globalization. The dynamic of worldwide economic exchange, powered by rapid technological advances, created new social realities and, accordingly, organizational necessities. These

---

[11] On the separation of church and state in contemporary Europe see Köchler 2013.

[12] As earlier explained, we use the term in the sense of the German word *Kulturnation*. See also note 8 above.

[13] For details see Köchler in Dunne, Bonazzi 1995.

[14] This is also the case with the confusion between "citizenship" and "nationality".

[15] Whatever the underlying motives may have been, Austrian Emperors, in the late years of the Monarchy, addressed their solemn proclamations, related to matters of the Empire in its entirety, "An meine Völker!" ("To my peoples!" [plural]; not "To my people!" [singular]). (The British Library, in the respective archival entry, wrongly translates the phrase in the singular: https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/to-my-people-emperor-franz-joseph). On the underlying supranational conception of the state see Magris 1966.

have been most obvious in numerous free-trade regimes and particularly in the enormous increase of labor migration in the industrialized world. Again, as with the earlier emergence of the nation-state, a leap in technology triggered the change towards a post-nation-state reality.

This has not meant the end of the sovereign state as such. The state, whether uniform or diverse in its demographic composition, will always be the focal point of the exercise of popular will at the domestic and global level. Under the circumstances of today, the meaning of "nation-state" is more appropriately expressed in the concept of the "sovereign state" (Köchler 2013).

Especially since the second half of the 20th century, after World War II, the erosion of the traditional state system has appeared to become irreversible. Previously culturally homogenous nation-states have gradually become culturally diverse. The new status quo has meant the presence of ever larger communities with different "national" (ethnic, cultural) identities on the territory of the same state. A case in point is the steady increase of the Turkish migrant population in Germany since the 1960s[16]. Under these circumstances, social stability – and the viability of the constitutional and political order – can only be ensured if a clear distinction is made between nationality (in the sense of cultural identity, i.e. *Kulturnation*) and citizenship (defining the general legal status of a person on the territory of a given state). In regard to the immigrant population, this also requires a precise distinction between

---

[16] For an early assessment of the implications for the labour market and the state's social and political system in general see the speech of Josef Stingl, President of the German Labour Office, at the international meeting of experts on "Arbeitskräftefluktuation im Alpenraum" (Manpower Turnover in the Alpine Region), *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wissenschaft und Politik an der Universität Innsbruck, 12 October 1973, http://hanskoechler.com/AWP-Stingl-Arbeitskra eftefluktuati on-12-10-1973.pdf.

assimilation (to the prevalent culture) and integration (into the state system, as citizen)[17].

Undoubtedly and undeniably, the separation of the notions of nationality and citizenship changes the perception of the state – and of the position of the individual in the state – in a basic sense. It also implies a new understanding of "community" at different levels of identification: A person may be member of a cultural group (national minority), which, in turn, is constituent part of the state community of citizens – whereby the latter is neutral not only vis-à-vis religious identity, but also nationality. The distinction between *cultural identity* (as member of a nationality, national group) and political-legal identity or affiliation (as citizen of a sovereign state) is absolutely essential for the modern understanding of the rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*). Again, similarly to the equivocation of "nation" and "state"[18], there is a problem with modern English (American) terminology where, unlike as e.g. in German, "nationality" and "citizenship" are used synonymously[19].

In the face of the increasingly multicultural realities of today and at all levels (local, regional and global), doing away with the ambiguity of these concepts and separating "nation" and "state" will make peaceful co-existence easier. This will allow that no one is artificially subjected to an identity that is not his/her own – while all enjoy equal rights as citizens of the state. In this sense, the state embodies the sovereign status of *all* its citizens – as ("nationally" neutral) commonwealth of citizens. This also implies that no one will be forced under a yoke of "nationhood" in the sense

---

[17] For an analysis in regard to Turkish labour migration to Germany see Köchler 2012: 101-104.

[18] See note 13 above.

[19] In our terminology, used in this text, "nationality" (related to ethnic and cultural identity) is distinguished from "citizenship" (related to a person's legal status in a given state).

of *Kulturnation*[20]. State citizenship is one and the same for all, irrespective of each citizen's distinct cultural (national) identity. This is also what respect for diversity means in conformity with the modern interpretation of human rights.

In such a constitutional framework, the risk of *ghettoization* (of national groups as so-called sub-cultures) is relatively minor in comparison with social tensions and political instability in a context where everyone is expected to assume an imaginary, not merely imagined, national identity that may not be his/her own, but is based on a totally different cultural narrative or history.

TRANSFORMATION OF CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE VIRTUAL NATION

What does the "disentanglement" of nation and state mean in today's global era? Distinct national identities realize themselves in an "open space" within and beyond the confines of the traditional nation-state. This relates to: *a*) the multicultural reality at the intra-state (domestic) level (in terms of interaction between different cultural communities [nationalities] as constituent parts of the respective polity and on the basis of equality and mutuality), and *b*) the multicultural reality at the inter-state, and ultimately global, level. This dynamic reality is the result of: *i*) constant exposure of each community to influences from the entire globe (not only from within the particular state or region where the community is situated) and *ii*) the interlinking of groups with the same cultural (national) identity in other sovereign

---

[20] There exists no adequate English translation of this German term. In the context of this article, it does not mean "nation with a great cultural history" (*Langenscheidt German-English Dictionary*), but, more neutrally, "nation" as common denominator of a cultural community, as expression of its identity.

states. This is the specific trans-national[21] dimension of today's multicultural reality.

The developments described here are heralding the emergence of the virtual nation at the global level. "Nation" is not anymore exclusively defined on the basis of territoriality. A community's identity is shaped by constant interaction and competition with other national identities beyond borders. Similar to earlier historical developments, the dynamic of this interaction and interdependence is greatly intensified, or enhanced, due to technological developments, in particular in the field of information and communication. Unlike in the era of the classical nation-state where communities were largely shielded from outside influence – or could live in splendid isolation, so to speak – in the global era, collective identities realize themselves in the simultaneous presence of each other. Simultaneity has become a new feature of the dialectics of cultural self-comprehension, an important structuring principle of identity in today's globalized environment (Köchler 2015).

Cultural identity is not any more a static reality, its structure is similar to what we observe in the dynamic of consciousness in the philosophy of Fichte (1794/1795; Köchler 1974, 2009b: 369). Due to the interaction, indeed a permanent encounter, with other identities, each community is able to continually enrich its perception of the world, to more precisely define its value system and, ultimately, become more aware of itself. Thus, mutuality is another important principle of cultural self-comprehension (Köchler 1978). In this sense, "trans-cultural" hermeneutics has become an essential aspect of international relations in the global era.

The disappearance of traditional limits and restrictions of communication in the interaction between sovereign states is

---

[21] "National" in this composite term is to be understood in the sense of "state".

posing new problems for which most states are ill-prepared. Because of globalization, what Samuel Huntington described as "clash between civilizations" (Huntington 1996) has become a major risk also at the domestic level. The problem results from a potential incompatibility of cultural identities, and their value systems, co-existing on the territory of the same sovereign state. Interaction or dialogue among distinct and geographically distant cultures and civilizations is one thing; their co-existence in the local neighborhood – "under the same roof" – is an entirely different matter.

What can be the vision for the future under conditions of inter-cultural alienation and conflict, domestically as well as globally? Is there a way for a "creative" (necessarily non-hostile) development of cultural identity? A conceptually precise and politically consistent disentangling of nation and state, as suggested above, may offer a novel chance for self-realization of the multitude of cultural identities hitherto "enclosed" within the borders of the traditional nation-state. An example of such a post-nation-state identity is how Italian culture has been able to position itself in the global context. It is specifically referred to in terms of *Italicità* (as distinct from *Italianità*) – a "life-world", or perception of the world, through the Italian experience, not merely within the confines of the delimited territory of a state (the Italian Republic), and at a given point in time, but diachronically as well as globally (internationally) (Bassetti, Janni 2004). Similar transnational experiences in today's context are those of the *Francophonie* or the Hispanic community.

Due to the development of technology – mainly in the fields of transportation, information and communication – a dynamic constellation of complex and constant interaction between "virtual nations" has unfolded at the global level. This also has led to new forms of "hybrid" civilizations. Structurally, the situation at the beginning of the 21st century appears similar to that in the era before the emergence of the modern nation-state. There exists a novel kind of commonwealth of civilizations and cultures (representing humankind) in the virtual space of the "global village" (McLuhan [1964] 2001) – a realm beyond all geographical borders. This "commonwealth" is juxtaposed to a multitude of sovereign states as legal-political actors. Conventionally, though misleadingly, the latter are referred to as "United *Nations*"[22]. In most cases, these legal entities – polities – are multi-cultural or multi-civilizational in the very composition of their societies.

In spite of the enormous potential of the "virtual nation" – in the sense of emancipation of cultural identity (*Kulturnation*) from the particularities and limitations of the nation-state –, one cannot deny the importance of a "country of reference" for each of those identities. This relates *a*) to tradition, i.e. the origin of each cultural identity; it includes what, in Gadamerian hermeneutics, is described as *Wirkungsgeschichte* ("reception history" of ideas, Gadamer 2010: 305). It also relates *b*) to the geopolitical position, the actual power potential, of the respective state of reference. What Joseph Nye characterized as "soft power" (Nye 2004) cannot be completely, or artificially, separated from the realities of a state's "hard power".

---

[22] A more adequate term would be "United *States* of the World". The UN Charter is somewhat semantically inconsistent or ambiguous. It describes "states" as members of the "United *Nations*" and, in the Preamble, refers to the "peoples" of the United Nations. In referring to the preparatory body, the Charter mentions, in Art. 3, the "United Nations Conference on International Organization", which was an intergovernmental undertaking of sovereign states upon the end of World War II. It is obvious that the introductory phrase of the Preamble, "We the Peoples of the United Nations", refers to the citizens of the member states, not to the diverse ethnic or cultural communities of the world.

There appears to be a complex interdependence between both aspects in the global commonwealth of civilizations: On the one hand, the "virtual nation" draws its legitimacy from the history of the respective nation-state, and also from that state's actual power. Having acquired a life of its own in the global domain, it may, on the other hand, also have an impact on, or strengthen the position of, the respective sovereign state (the state of reference). This applies to *Italicità* in regard to *Repubblica italiana* as it does to *Francophonie* in relation to *République française*, to give only two examples.

Thus, in the course of globalization, a new form and shape of cultural identity has evolved, which is expressed in a complex interplay of two factors, globus & locus. The dynamic lies in the interaction of a (virtual) nation beyond borders ("globus") with the nation of reference within the borders of the respective sovereign state ("locus").

DIALECTICS OF DIVERSITY AND UNIFORMITY IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF CIVILIZATIONS

The above-described developments have undoubtedly strengthened cultural and civilizational diversity within and between states. This is what we earlier characterized as the aspect of simultaneity (Global Dialogue Conference 2009; Köchler 2015: 272). At the same time, globalization carries the risk of uniformity, and for the very same reasons that have enabled diversity: the world has become an open, virtually unlimited, space of exchange and competition in all domains – where a balance of power (whether in the sense of "hard" or "soft" power) is not always a guaranteed outcome.

In the interdependence, and mutual reinforcement, of the virtual (global) and state-related manifestations of cultural identity is indeed inherent a tendency towards uniformity. The "free flow" of information and communication has brought about a constant fluctuation and imbalance in the assertion and projection of identities. The particular cultural identity that is attached to the most powerful actors in the global interplay of forces may, whether intentionally or not, superimpose itself upon other cultural identities, in their domestic as well as global (virtual) dimension.

A case in point – since the second half of the 20th century – is the de facto civilizational hegemony of the United States and, connected to it, the English cultural commonwealth. All across our global village, the threat to diversity has become visible in the phenomenon that is commonly referred to as Westernization (or, more specifically, Americanization). The dominant culture (more generally, in terms of the West: civilization) serves as the informal standard-bearer, or "trendsetter", for a multitude of cultural identities inside and outside of the Western world, shaping and reshaping distinct cultural life-worlds[23] in regard to some of the most important and common aspects of our perception of reality, whether in the fields of social values, esthetics or life-styles, including fashion, entertainment, and food. One of the decisive factors of this remolding of identities has been the influence of the English language. Modifying the earlier-quoted phrase about the role of Latin in another era, one may now say: *lingua Anglica omnia vincit*. The most vivid illustration of this development in Europe is the fate of the *Concours Eurovision de la chanson* (Eurovision Song Contest/ESC). What was a celebration of diversity (in terms of musical style and the variety of European languages) when it was inaugurated in Lugano, Switzerland, in 1956, has by now largely become a display of Anglo-American uniformity, a pop show with songs almost exclusively performed in English.

---

[23] We use the term as defined and developed in Husserlian phenomenology. See note 5 above.

English has indeed become the *lingua franca* of globality. This is not due to some intrinsic quality of the respective culture. It is, more or less, the accidental result of the power, almost imperial role, of the "state of reference" (namely the United States, since 1945). In that regard, the constellation is not much different from what one has witnessed in earlier epochs in terms of the influence of the Greek or Latin language.

Due to the preponderance of the "English commonwealth" (not to be confused with the British Commonwealth), backed up by the technological strength and political, economic and military power of one particular state, we now witness a reverse trend as compared to the development analyzed by Benedict Anderson. The effects are particularly obvious in Europe. While, in the post-Enlightenment period, the continent's vernacular languages gradually emancipated themselves from the dominance of Latin, those languages – that became the nucleus of national identities and, subsequently, the nation-states – are receding again into a quasi-vernacular status vis-à-vis the dominant English language, similar to the fate of the above-mentioned ESC in the field of entertainment. This may lead to an impoverishment of the affected languages as regards terminology and grammatical as well as semantical sophistication. Scholarly research and discourses are increasingly conducted in English. The dominant language's concepts are more and more getting integrated into the respective "local" languages, and these "anglicisms" further shape perceptions of the world and social attitudes.

One notices an interesting effect of this development on the German language, if I may speak for a moment about my native tongue. Because it is less used for intellectual endeavors and scholarly purposes, the skills of speaking, pronouncing, and writing in high German are remarkably degrading. This is accompanied by a more frequent resort to local dialects within German, now again a kind of "vernacular" language at the global level, marginalized by the new *lingua franca*[24]. The less frequent use of the high language – *desuetudo* – not only in the realm of scholarship, but increasingly also in everyday life, has meant a considerable loss of refinement, and in particular a simplification – or trivialization – in terms of literature and the skills of people to write poetry. Problems may be similar in other languages, though to different degrees.

In conclusion: How should we evaluate, and react to, the undeniable threat to diversity at the global level? Four maxims – or imperatives – come to mind: *a*) each civilizational/cultural collective – as *Kulturnation* in the global space – should adopt a proactive, instead of a merely reactive, approach towards participation in the worldwide interchange of ideas, social perceptions and value systems as equal partner; *b*) Collective identities, as embodied in cultures and civilizations, should seek to gradually free themselves from the confines and constraints of the nation-state. They must avoid falling victim to an artificial kind of exclusivism, which has often meant passivity and a false cultural nostalgia or fascination with one's own uniqueness or indispensability. A constructive approach, positioning one's community on the global marketplace – or ἀγορά – of ideas, also appears to be the intention behind the emphasis on *Italicità* in distinction from *Italianità* (Cadeddu 2018). *c*) The juxtaposition – or simultaneous existence – of civilizational/cultural diversity at the local and global levels must not be allowed to lead to perpetual confrontation and conflict. Thus, it has become even more important to detach cultural identity issues from

---

[24] The trend is obvious even in the philosophical domain where, in the 1960s, German was still an international language. It is not the case anymore. Now, even literature on Heidegger – in spite of its de facto untranslatability – is frequently written in English.

those of the nation-state with its narrowly defined interests. *d*) Transformation of collective identities in today's global context – or "commonwealth of civilizations" – ultimately means that each *Kulturnation* (as virtual nation) must be prepared to constantly explain and, at the same time, assert and reassert itself in the face of all other such communities. Even more so than in earlier epochs, cross-fertilization of cultures will be an unintended consequence. One may also use the term "hybridization" to describe this dynamic process of cultural and civilizational identity. Through all of history, civilizations flourished and achieved their highest state through interaction with other civilizations (Chua 2007).

What the hermeneutics of civilizational identity will mean in the long term, especially in a context of global power politics, with an increasingly aggressive assertion of national interests by sovereign states, cannot really be predicted: namely, to what extent, and in what shape, new civilizations will emerge from the infinitely complex global interaction of collective identities – or whether diversity will ultimately give way to a kind of hybrid global civilization. As everything in history, the civilizational effort is an open-ended project.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This text is the keynote speech for the International Interdisciplinary Seminar "History, Global Identities and New Civilizations", organized by Globus et Locus, in cooperation with the Università degli Studi di Milano, which was held in Palazzo Feltrinelli, Gargnano del Garda (Italy), on October 18, 2019.

References

B. Anderson ([1983] 2006), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London-New York: Verso).

Aristotle, Πολιτικά 1, 1253a2.

M. Assad, H. Zbinden (eds.) (1960), *Islam und Abendland: Begegnung zweier Welten* (Olten-Freiburg i. Br.: Walter-Verlag).

P. Bassetti, P. Janni (eds.) (2004), *Italic Identity in Pluralistic Contexts: Toward the Development of Intercultural Competencies*, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IV, West Europe, 6 (Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy).

D. Cadeddu (ed.) (2018), *Italics as a Global Commonwealth* (Torino: Giappichelli).

A. Chua (2007), *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and Why They Fail* (New York: Doubleday).

J.G. Fichte (1794/1795), *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschsaftslehre*, § 1-3.

H.G. Gadamer (2010), *Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr).

Global Dialogue Conference (2009), *Responsibility Across Borders? Climate Change as Challenge for Intercultural Inquiry on Values*, Aarhus University, Denmark, 6 November 2009.

F. Hölderlin ([1797] 1958), *Gesammelte Werke* (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann), pp. 311-470.

S. Huntington (1993), *The Clash of Civilizations?*, in “Foreign Affairs”, 72, 3, pp. 22-49.

S. Huntington (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster).

E. Husserl ([1936] 1962), *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, *Husserliana*, VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).

E. Husserl (2008), *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution*, R. Sowa (ed.), Husserliana, XXXIX (Dordrecht: Springer).

H. Köchler (1974), *Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie: Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus* (Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain).

H. Köchler (1985), *Die Repräsentationslehre: Zum Problem des Idealismus in der politischen Theorie*, in H. Köchler *Philosophie, Recht, Politik: Abhandlungen zur politischen Philosophie und zur Rechtsphilosophie* (Vienna-New York: Springer), pp. 27-45.

H. Köchler (1995), *The Concept of the Nation and the Question of Nationalism: The Traditional "Nation State" versus a Multicultural "Community State"*, in M. Dunne, T. Bonazzi (eds.), *Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies* (Keele: Keele University Press), pp. 44-51.

H. Köchler (2009a), *A Theoretical Examination of the Dichotomy between Democratic Constitutions and Political Reality*, in H. Köchler, *World Order: Vision and Reality. Collected Papers Edited by David Armstrong* (New Delhi: Manak), pp. 122-131.

H. Köchler (2009b), *The Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue*, in H. Köchler, *World Order: Vision and Reality. Collected Papers Edited by David Armstrong* (New Delhi: Manak).

H. Köchler (2012), *Migration, Integration, Partizipation, chapter Siyaset ve Göç*, in Almanya ve Göç: 50. Yılında Almanya'da Türkler Sempozyumu. Sempozyum, 1-2 Kasım 2011, Berlin (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık-Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı), pp. 101-104.

H. Köchler (2013), *Das Verhältnis von Religion und Politik in Österreich und Europa: Die Idee des säkularen Staates*, in Forum Politische Bildung (ed.), *Informationen zur Politischen Bildung*, 37, Religion und Politik (Innsbruck-Vienna-Bozen: Studien-Verlag), pp. 5-17.

H. Köchler (2013), *Sovereignty, Law and Democracy versus Power Politics*, in "Current Concerns", 34, 22, pp. 18-25.

H. Köchler (2015), *The Philosophy and Politics of Dialogue*, in J. Seibt, J. Garsdal (eds.), *How is Global Dialogue Possible?* (Berlin-Boston-Munich: de Gruyter), pp. 267-281.

H. Köchler (ed.) (1978), *Cultural Self-comprehension of Nations*, Studies in International Relations, I (Tübingen: Erdmann).

G. Leibholz ([1929] 1966), *Das Wesen der Repräsentation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Repräsentativsystems: Ein Beitrag zur allgemeinen Staats – und Verfassungslehre*; 3rd enlarged ed., *Das Wesen der Repräsentation und der Gestaltwandel der Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: de Gruyter).

C. Magris (1966), *Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen österreichischen Literatur* (Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag).

M. McLuhan ([1964] 2001), *Understanding Media: The extensions of man* (London-New York: Routledge Classics).

W. Montgomery Watt (2004), *The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).

J.S. Nye, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs).

C. Schmitt ([1928] 1983), *Verfassungslehre* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot).

Abstract

In the history of mankind, we witness a succession of increasingly complex forms of social organization. These are never mere agglomerations of individuals simply by chance, but specific forms of cooperation with a purpose – of collective survival, and, over time, existence in the sense of “good life”, namely of cultural refinement. Through all periods of history, many and diverse forms of organization evolved along these lines. By showing the historical development of such organizations from the antique Greek to the modern nation-state and beyond, this essay will discuss the relationship between “nation”, “state”, “civilization” and “cultural identity” with regards to the contemporary process of globalization.

Keywords
Civilization, nation, state, cultural identity, global age.

HISTORY, MODERNITY AND GLOBAL IDENTITIES

Alain Touraine
École des hautes études en sciences sociales (France)
touraine@ehess.fr

Introduction

We are no longer certain of the existence of sociology. In most cases, what is called sociology is actually re-analyzed as part of urban studies, economic history, studies of religious behavior and institutions, and so on. Economics and philosophy are embarrassingly stronger neighbors.

I myself must confess that during the first part of my professional life I was more aware of studying industrial societies than writing sociology per se. I was trained as a historian and I dealt mostly with oral testimony, surveys and interviews in particular, but without a clear image of what was specifically sociological in my work rather than social, economic or simply historical. Later on, when I spent a good number of years in Latin America, would I have said I was a Latin Americanist or a sociologist? Every time I tried to identify myself intellectually, I limited myself to being critical of the functionalist and structuralist tendencies in sociology, as well as of certain ideological political orientations in general.

It is only after 1973, when I became conscious that we were, in our part of the world, departing from industrial society and now living in an open market, that I became preoccupied with defining what sociology meant, that is to say, to define it as a body of analytical instruments for studying the relations between social actors.

ON SOCIETIES, PAST AND PRESENT

The basic components of modern societies are the following: *a*) a general type of relationship between societies and their environment (agriculture, trade, industry or communications); *b*) a general opposition between capital owners and dependent workers; *c*) the representation by each general type of society of its own creativity and of its members' basic rights. The main principle of sociology is the interdependence of these three basic elements.

It is true that each of these three basic elements seems to impose its own specific determinations on social actors. But, on the contrary, sociology exists as a demonstration of the interdependence of these three basic elements. I suggest that it is only in "non-modern" societies that the principle of structuralist anthropology can be used as the basic elements of social analysis. Modern societies are, in more practical terms, societies which devote a very large part of their investments to productive – scientific, technological or economic and social – activities. This is why I have always given a central place to the concept and defense of modernity in my work.

In a general sense, this has involved the identification of recognizable blocs of historicity in which certain components exist in necessary interdependence.

What we can call the "first" stage of modern societies was defined in one part of the world by the establishment of a direct link between the sacred world and the human world: this is monotheism. In other parts, early stages were defined by empires or by categories of purity, such as castes in India.

In the western world, as well as in places like Japan, a second stage links sacredness and political power, for which the paradigmatic political institutions were absolute monarchies (see Kantorowicz 1957). Political categories are central during this stage, which is also a period of discoveries and conquests.

The third stage is what we call industrial society, which is defined by a massive increase in labor productivity, mechanization and class struggle at the social level.

During the last 10 years I have published – in French – a series of books: *La fin des societés*, 2013; *Nous, Sujets humains*, 2015; *le nouveau siècle politique*, 2016; *Défense de la modernité,* 2018, all by Le Seuil; and my new book, *La société de communication et ses acteurs*, which was planned to be published in September 2020, will be postponed to spring 2021 as a consequence of the corona virus epidemic. It is in this book that I seek to provide an answer to the question of what kind of society are we entering now, beyond industrial society.

The primary characteristic of the new society is that it is a society of "communication" and no longer one of production. Particularly important for this definition is the work of Manuel Castells, the Spanish and American sociologist who spent the first decade of his career in Paris, and who is now minister of Universities in the Spanish government.

The second characteristic feature, on which there seems to be general agreement, is that this new society is not based on nation-states or cities, but rather on global systems. Today the United States and China are major global systems (India is now maybe becoming a third). Britain is trying now to become a more autonomous partner in the American global system. The European Union is ultimately also a member of this system, its weakening by Brexit and illiberal states notwithstanding. The systemic relationship between Russia and China is not yet clear. Among the most important contributions to the understanding of this process of globalization is the work of the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, from Munich and LSE.

The third characteristic of this new type of society is that its social actors must be "total", not in the sense of "totalitarian" but in the sense of not only being active in the political and economic fields, like in industrial society, but also in the cultural – or more concretely, mediatic – domain. It is even more important for social actors to control and modify the attitudes, projects and representations held by people in societies of communication than to control the capital of a central bank or to parade its military power publicly.

In industrial societies the main actors were generally considered to be social classes. In distinction, in societies of communication, the main actors represent more total categories, as those of "women" or "migrants" do in western countries today.

A very important consequence of this shift is that the correspondence between systems and actors, as two sides of the same coin, no longer corresponds to our reality.

The definition of these main actors, combined with a definition of the basic elements of this society, is being the object of my forthcoming book.

THE TIME OF WOMEN

The modern world was built on Greek intellectual foundations, which were revived by the 17th century rationalism of such thinkers as the Italian Galileo, the Frenchman Descartes and the Englishman Newton. The main Greek idea was to separate and protect reason (*nôos*), as the basis of science, from courage (*thumos*) as the quality of warriors, and from human needs and passions (*epithumia*) of biological, emotional or sexual order. One of the main consequences of this was to give an inferior status to women, whose existence was seen as dominated by human needs such as reproduction, upbringing and care for the young and the elderly. For this reason, women were not citizens of the polis.

It was obviously impossible, five centuries before the common era, to demonstrate such claims as false. But today, neuroscientists, with the help of experimental studies and brain imaging, can prove to us that male and female brains are not different due to the fact that a brain (male or female) is a fully integrated system. The well-known American neuroscientist of Portuguese origin, Antonio Damasio, in a now famous book, analyzed what he called *Descartes' error* (1994). This refers to the fact that, today, we know that the human brain does not separate reason from emotions and feelings – this is of fundamental importance if we consider that we live today in a "society of communication", for which reason and feelings are in permanent association.

The passage from the objective of "rationalization" to that of "influence" not only imposes equality between men and women, but even gives a certain advantage to the latter. Not only do women spend statistically more years in study, but some economists have predicted that the countries where there is a proportionally significant part of scientific and technological studies being done by women, will one day lead world. In short, societies of communication will depend upon far more diversified types of workers and managers than industrial society, a space to be filled by women.

What sociologists should emphasize regarding women's liberation is that it is not something that can be "given" by men, but which must be conquered by the women themselves for the sake of the whole population, to bring our cultural representation of women into line with what we now know scientifically.

Women's experiences and demands are a central component of societies of communication for two main reasons which are intertwined to the point of inseparability. The entrance of women into the world of culture out of their historic relegation to the order of nature, represents an historic shift in the way in which societies conceive of the limit between society and its natural environment. This shift – in the western historical context – corresponds to the end of the ideal of rational production (the "one best way" of Taylor) as the dominant cultural interpretation of human activity, and the integration of rationality and feeling as necessary and unavoidable dimensions of communication.

When we pass from industrial societies to societies of communication, we enter into a type of society structured around communication, as opposed to production, and which represents a more advanced stage of modern social evolution.

SOVEREIGNISTS AND MIGRANTS

The second important actor, or more precisely object of social conflicts and political choices, is a category we generally refer to by the category of "migrants". Their importance does not only come from their often-dramatic situation, for example around the small Italian island of Lampedusa, or on the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea, and forever immortalized in the image of the drowned child Alan Kurdi. In my opinion, the significance of this phenomenon does not only lie in the brutal fact that poor populations which have always been victims of destitution, negative discrimination and foreign domination, are now facing new extreme forms of social exclusion. Nor is it the fact that the relatively well-protected populations of Europe refuse to welcome them, especially in small countries, out of fear of loosing their fragile identities. It is the fact that this question has become a central issue in political debate and decision-making. This is undeniably the case in the regimes that identify themselves as "illiberal", a term which obscures the racism and xenophobia which underpin their discourse.

Such mobilizations against refugees and migrants were, during recent years, a real danger here in Italy, and are still strong both there and in other countries, such as France. These sovereigntists (or, in American parlance, "defenders of white sovereignty") oppose, first of all, the formation of globalized empires or systems of domination, while concentrating their discourse and actions against migrants and foreign voices. Their calls can come from powerful presidents, or from poor populations which feel threatened by the cultural differences of some refugees.

What makes this problem important is that it has the potential to transform itself into the main debate and political conflict in most European countries, as well as many other parts of the world. It is already one of the most aggressive features of the so-called far right-wing "populist" movements which have replaced the more politically and ideologically elaborated "social movements", which were typical of industrial societies.

The refugees and the poor can easily and have always been used as scapegoats. The next round of national elections will be dominated by this opposition between sovereigntists and defenders of migrants.

REVOLUTION OR SUBJECTIVATION?

Modern societies have always been ambivalent about human creativity (refer to the story of Faust). Subjectivation, in short, is the capacity of humans for self-creation, of humans to consciously transform their own conditions of life and representation of themselves.

In industrial societies, cultural and economic optimism went along with social pessimism and aggressivity. “Class struggle” was the name of the division between the productive forces of industrial society and progress, and the exploitation of labor at its heart. In the 20th century, class conflict was transformed into people’s dictatorships. Today, we live in an anti-authoritarian but defensive political culture.

In societies of communication, we cannot rescue mankind without rescuing its natural environment, the “ecological crisis” risks forcing us into a purely negative vision.

In one sense, the ecological crisis reminds us of the wave of fear which covered Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries in response to the rise of epidemics, so brilliantly studied by my friend Jean Delumeau, who recently passed away, and which culminated in the period of the plague.

While some people may want to go back to pre-industrial and even to pre-Neolithic societies, the human sciences including sociology must on the contrary defend the environment as the set of necessary conditions of the existence of life *tout court*, and many different ways of life, here on earth. A more global view of human life is indispensable. Ecology represents a fundamental stage in the process of the humanization of nature. The humanization of nature – by opposition to the naturalization of humans, which anti-modern ecology defends – refers to the recognition of nature as a condition of the survival of mankind. Protecting nature is important because of the fact that we, humans, depend upon it. To save the conditions of human life – our lives – means to mobilize other human beings in defense of the environment, and to do so they must be convinced that the environment does indeed represent the conditions of their own lives, indeed all lives. The danger is so present that we feel the necessity of controlling our own activities and patterns of consumption to be able to survive. But it is not a matter of controlling, but of creating new, conditions. Our fear is so intense that it penetrates all levels of our experience, individual, social and cultural.

While the central notions of industrial society were production and class conflict, the central notion of our society is subjectivation. Whilst in industrial society we defended our rights in social life, that is as workers, in the new societies of communication we defend our rights in all aspects of experience including the environment, as subjects, that is to say as carriers of human creativity and the capacity to transform our conditions of life and ourselves. The language of subjectivation in societies of communication – and this is a thesis that I have defended now for quite some time – is that of fundamental human rights.

It is for this reason that the humanization of nature which ecology proposes can only be articulated through the language of a universal respect for the fundamental rights of man: liberty, equality and dignity. Because each of us is threatened by death and because each of us must protect ourselves, as well as the world, the language of fundamental human rights is crucial.

This supposes the combination of universalism (the Enlightenment) and multiculturalism, instead of the two being opposed to protect the vestiges of the old decaying system of western domination. It also supposes not only the continued liberation of women, but the emergence of women liberators.

In societies of communication, politics will be founded on fundamental human rights, not the other way around. Ethics will prevail over politics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This text is the keynote speech from the conference held in Milan on January 23, 2020. I want to express my gratitude to Professor Davide Cadeddu and President Piero Bassetti for inviting me to speak at this conference, and to Globus et Locus and the University of Milan for receiving us. I would like to express my gratitude also to Nicolas Jara Joly, a young British, French and Chilean sociologist, for his assistance with this text.

REFERENCES

U. Beck (1992), *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage).

U. Beck (1999), *World Risk Society* (Cambridge, UK-Malden, MA: Polity Press-Blackwell Publishers).

U. Beck (2016), *The Metamorphosis of the World: How Climate Change is Transforming Our Concept of the World* (Cambridge, UK: Polity).

M. Castells (1996), *The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. I (Cambridge, MA-Oxford, UK: Blackwell).

M. Castells (1997), *The Power of Identity, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. II (Cambridge, MA-Oxford, UK: Blackwell).

M. Castells (1998), *End of Millennium, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. III (Cambridge, MA-Oxford, UK: Blackwell).

A. Damásio (1994), *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Putnam).

J. Delumeau (1978), *La peur en Occident (xive-xviiie siècles). Une cité assiégée* (Paris: Fayard).

J. Delumeau (1983), *Le péché et la peur. La culpabilisation en Occident (xiiie-xviiie siècles)* (Paris: Fayard).

E.H. Kantorowicz (1957), *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

A. Touraine (2013), *La fin des societés* (Paris: Le Seuil).

A. Touraine (2015), *Nous, Sujets humains* (Paris: Le Seuil).

A. Touraine (2016), *Le nouveau siècle politique* (Paris: Le Seuil).

A. Touraine (2018), *Défense de la modernité* (Paris: Le Seuil).

A. Touraine (2021, forthcoming), *La société de communication et ses acteurs* (Paris: Le Seuil).

Abstract

The first stage of modern societies was defined in one part of the world by the establishment of a direct link between the sacred world and the human world: this is monotheism. In other parts, early stages were defined by empires or by categories of purity, such as castes in India. In the western world, as well as in places like Japan, a second stage links sacredness and political power, for which the paradigmatic political institutions were absolute monarchies. The third stage is what we call industrial society, which is defined by a massive increase in labor productivity, mechanization and class struggle at the social level. Now we are entering in a new "society of communication" which is no longer based neither on production nor on nation-states and cities, but rather on global systems. In this new type of society, the social actors must be "total", that is they must be active in the cultural – mediatic – domain as well as in the political and economic fields. While in industrial societies the main actors were generally considered to be social classes, and the central notions were production and class conflict, in societies of communication the main actors represent more total categories, as those of “women” or “migrants” do in western countries today, and the central notion is subjectivation, which language is that of fundamental human rights.

Keywords
Modernity, society of communication, social actors, subjectivation, human rights.

THE HAPTIC AND THE PHATIC IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Arjun Appadurai
Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (Germany)
New York University (USA)
aa133@nyu.edu

We live in a world where the senses have both expanded and shrunk. Like so much else in our times, we live with the paradox of simultaneous shortage and excess. Our bodies are under siege from new viral epidemics, from the flood of new foods, diets, and surgical forms for shape-shifting. For people, hunger, disease and dangerous conditions of work as well as horrendous forms of sanitary infrastructure make their bodies and their homes equally targets of invasion. For the middle and upper classes, they deal with impossible levels of atmospheric carbon, invisible forms of digital radiation from new tech devices and dangerous fantasies of bodily glamor and enhanced forms of fake vitality and energy, ranging from Viagra to cocaine.

At the same time, we are constantly persuaded to think that we are on the edge of various tech utopias promised by the Internet of Things, by biometric identification systems, by robotics, by artificial intelligence and virtual technology innovations. Embodied reality is always on new frontiers of enhancement. Our eyes are helped to see better, our ears are made more sophisticated learning machines, our sense of smell is constantly teased by more fragrances, our sense of taste is perennially offered new combinations of flavor and sensation. For more privileged elites, eternal life is on offer through cryogenics, in vitro technologies aim to beat the natural stages of the reproductive cycle, space travel promises exit from the destroyed planet earth for a hefty price. We are told that our cities and our houses will be smarter than ourselves and that all social life will be wired for greater health, wealth and happiness.

Of course, minorities, refugees and the homeless throughout the world know that these promises are a cruel joke on them. They live in worlds composed of broken promises, lost dreams and vulnerable bodies. For these groups, their senses are more often the object than the subject of haptic technologies. They are fingerprinted, monitored, carded, restrained, and choked by the screens, turnstiles, cameras and sensors of hostile states and corporations. The terror of drone attacks for civilians in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan to US drone attacks is the extreme case of the total separation of the senses of the drone operator from the bodies, homes and shelters of victims. Touching without being touched, seeing without being seen, hearing without being heard is the triumph of drone technology, but it is an element of all technologies of surveillance, espionage and war in our times. Haptic technologies are the key to the sponsored terror of our times. And in this sort of terror, what is sacrificed is the phatic comforts of the everyday, the small communications of the gaze, of touch, of words without obvious communicative value, the murmurs of the social and the sociable. These murmurs without a lexicon are the living tissue of a social world drowning in the noise of propaganda, advertisement, self-promotion, hate speech, and fake news, all of which belong to the world of words intended to have meaningful content. With the growth of social media, which depends on the explosion of haptic technologies, the phatic world is under severe threat. But let us take the long view of the haptic and the phatic outside the context of digital technology, in social orders which have long used haptic techniques to diminish phatic communication. India – and India's Hindu practical world – have long used touch to oppose being in touch. So, I turn to India in the next two sections.

The touch of caste

The widespread enthusiasm for Isabel Wilkerson's book (2020), which argues that race in the history of the USA is best seen through the lens of the Indian caste system, tells us something useful. The lesson of the reception of this book is that many Americans, both black and white, cannot understand the remarkable persistence of the racial discrimination at the heart of three hundred years of American history, in spite of giant strides in political, legal and social norms. This imperviousness of race and racism lead Wilkerson to invoke the caste system of India to account for the obduracy of race-based humiliation and violence in the USA. Many, including myself, have argued that this argument is built on a limited and stereotypic view of the complexities of Indian history and society, and that the book does not make up its mind about whether the stereotyping of caste in India is just a heuristic to discuss race in the USA or whether it is a genuine comparative argument. Be that as it may, I would like to suggest that there is a deep difference between the haptic economies of these two societies. These differences have been most richly elaborated by Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai (2012), Aniket Jaware (2018), Sundar Sarukkai (2009), and P. Thirumal (2020), who in their various works have shown how touch in the Indic world belongs to a radically different economy than that of the modern West. My overall argument in this essay is built on their published work.

While there are important differences between these scholars, they together open a radical interpretive possibility in which a form of Brahman anxiety about touch impels them to avoid touching others or being touched by others, especially by the lowest castes, who are designated as Untouchables. The paradox here is that the truly Untouchable in this cosmology are the Brahmans, who strive for the status of superior Untouchables by making Dalits a sort of displaced and inferior version of their own untouchability. In this sense touch is not the same as contact, in Sarukkai's formulation. Contact is relational, whereas touchability is about permanent bodily properties. In the hierarchy of contact, Dalits are lowest, but in the hierarchy of Untouchability, Brahmans are highest. They are supremely Untouchable subjects, while the impure castes can be touched by anyone, any time, for any purpose. In short, Brahmans determine the conditions of their touchability, while the unclean castes only endure theirs. This is a radical move in the study of touchability in the study of caste because it also suggests that the skin (the epidermis) is not everywhere the same thing and that the space between skins is not a universal material fact either. In this new view of caste, sociability and touch, the haptic dangers of social life put Brahmans at permanent risk of social catastrophe, since touching can never be entirely avoided in a world of human exploitation.

This is also the reason that the most important Untouchable for the most orthopraxy Brahman is him or herself. Whether when eating, bathing, menstruating, cooking, having sexual intercourse, giving birth or dying, the deepest risk for the Brahman man or women is the gossamer thinness of the social skin in which the most intimate enemy is the bio-moral self. Whatever the success of remaining untouchable to others lower than herself, the Brahman can never flee his own – however transient – slavery to her own blood, semen, fecal matter, sweat, hair and saliva. These substances can all come and go, but they can never be permanently deleted and unlike other social beings, they cannot be policed or isolated beyond a point. Thus, the Untouchable Brahman self is the paranoid supplement of the Sacred Brahman self and touch is the property that endangers Brahmans permanently, while it also provides the moral basis for the distancing, humiliation and distancing of all lower castes, especially Dalits.

This new angle on what Louis Dumont (1970) called "Homo Hierarchicus", allows us to see that in Indic social ontology, the body is already conceived as a haptic technology, as a set of interacting surfaces, screens, interphases, codes and algorithms geared to maximizing social value for its most privileged operators, in this case, Brahmans and to some extent other upper castes, while treating those lower in the ranked system as touchers who do not control the means of touchability. Put another way, in the Indic world, the body has long been primarily a haptic technology for the circulation of social messages and for the reproduction of an asymmetrical information order. And this haptic technology has always opposed the benefits of phatic communication. So, while there are many technical definitions of what phatic communication is, here is one that captures its spirit very well: "speech to promote human warmth: that is as good a definition as any of the phatic aspect of language. For good or ill, we are social creatures and cannot bear to be cut off too long from our fellows, even if we have nothing really to say to them" (Burgess 1964).

As a cosmocentric system, caste in India may be defined as averse to any general endorsement of phatic communication. It is emphatically uninterested in the promotion of social warmth, especially between superiors and inferiors. And since everyone in in the caste system, upper and lower caste, richer and poorer, man and woman, elder and younger, regards himself as superior to someone else and inferior to some or many, social warmth is not only not welcome, it is dangerous, since it might well promote other sorts of intimacy which endanger the haptic order of caste. Thus, the sort of small talk, talk without a purpose, talk which exists only to promote social warmth and mutual acknowledgement, is only indulged with care. It can occur only in the most intimate of private circumstances (such as the private moments between husband and wife) or in the most crowded and volatile of public spaces, such as streets and train compartments where minimum social acknowledgement has to be indulged temporarily, and ideally only with strangers, and that too in the circumstances of transience.

Since phatic communication is strictly circumscribed in caste ideology and practice, and on the other hand the Indic body is itself a primary piece of haptic ideology, we can begin to see how touching is more or less divorced from feeling, and thus the popular Americanism about "touch-feely": moments, encounters or behaviors make no sense in the Indic cosmos. In this perspective, touching is a tool for the regulation of feeling.

INTERNET SOCIALITY AND VIOLENT PUBLICITY

This tension between the haptic and the phatic is currently challenged by the growing use of social media, apps and mobile telephony especially among youth in India. Here the world of the touchscreen has become a means for dating, texting, and related versions of bypassing social norms about sexuality and pornography. It can also serve to bypass the norms that prohibit socio-sexual con tact between higher and lower castes. An important and widely praised recent book, *The Next Billion Users*, by Payal Arora (2019), notices that young Indian men and women use social media, including chat and dating sites, Facebook, Orkut, Twitter and many others, primarily for the pursuit of romantic and sexual explorations without the dangers of face to face encounter. In this sense, she argues that play is much more important than work for the poorer global populations of places like India, Brazil and South Africa, than work. But there are many difficult reports that show that digital affordances are increasing the capacity of various groups, especially those that see themselves as privileged upper castes, to discuss caste related issues in a hybrid mode, which is public insofar as they can talk to strangers, but private insofar as it is bound to their own caste. This is sometimes also the case for Dalits and lower castes. In this sense we can propose that the haptic technologies of screen, platform, web and network in fact reinforce phatic distance and allow castes to further enclose themselves in their own concerns rather than those of others outside their caste boundaries. This is reminiscent of what Louis Dumont (1970) called the shift from "structure to substance", meaning that castes were increasingly not involved in relations with one another but were more involved in mobilization and dialogue within their own boundaries, although the geographical and demographic boundaries of such exclusive dialogue have greatly increased. Still, we are forced to conclude that touch technologies militate against touchability as a feature of wider social life. The phatic is not enriched by the haptic.

There are even more troubling features of the contradiction between technologies of touch and moralities of distance and untouchability. Internet porn sites are on the increase, pornographic films are massively available by digital means, and worst of all, grotesque acts of sexual and political violence are increasingly captured (and sometimes performed) for viewing by others. In this regard, the prohibitions against touch in the Hindu world never applied to sexual violence against social inferiors or non-Hindus, and this is also a function of the fact that, as Sundar Sarukkai observes, touch and contact do not mean the same thing in Hindu India. Thus, the often filmed or photographed rapes and lynchings by upper caste Hindu men of Dalit and Muslim women and men, are parts of the logic of what we may call touch without contact, which is a product of the growing impunity of Hindu men in the current Hindutva political order. Sexualized violence, and the immunity and impunity that accompany it throughout India, but especially in North India, are directly enabled by the power of haptic technologies to become delinked from genuine social contact, or the sort of phatic communication which constitutes the murmur of the social heart in any society.

Indeed, the growing consensus among scholars who seek to think in new and radical views about the links between caste humiliation, bodily violence and the moral paranoia about touch and touching that animates the highest castes – especially Brahmans – is that the exclusion of Untouchables is a social proxy for their deeper disgust about the sensorium. This disgust about the sensorium, which the upper castes also experience in and through their senses – is certainly about the wrong kinds of look, touch, sound or smell that the senses can bring to them, thus unsettling their haptic equipoise. It is in fact, deeper and more difficult to resolve. It is a disgust about the irreducibility of the body to being a mere shell for the eternal, the non-corporeal and the transcendent. The body is always dragged back into its urine, its feces, its semen, its sweat, hair, nails and menstrual blood, all of which are built to exit the body, only to grow and return forever. The Untouchable, in his role of scavenger is the slave who saves, for he ceaselessly tries to carry away this abhorrent filth, becoming him or herself a sort of moral infrastructure, more important than all castes, or any castes, but the key to their constant effort to resist the haptic intimacy of their own bodily leavings. This is where Hegel's ideas are helpful insofar as they remind us of the powers of the Slave, however humiliated and broken he/she might be. The Dalit is a SLavior, the Slave who Saves…

As Mary Douglas reminded us in her classic study *Purity and Danger* (1966), dirt is not filth, it is disorder, it is "matter out of place". But having been deeply influenced by this book when I first read it, I wonder now what that place is, which condemns all those who handle the diaspora of these effluvia to endless humiliation? What place are they pushing undesirable matter out of? The standing answer is that this is the place of purity, that undivided space of cosmology and sociology in which Brahmans come closest to the gods because of their ability to accumulate purity and offload impurity to lower castes. But is this really a purity economy or is it in fact better seen as sense-free economy, in which the winner who takes all is the one who has the fewest, the most transient, the least staining dealings with his or her own senses?

Taking leave of the senses

I now offer a suggestion that might infuriate many of my colleagues who work on Indic cosmology. I suggest that we have mistaken the Brahman terror of the senses for Brahman disgust for the body. This is not to deny that the caste order is built on millions of do's and don'ts about how to pass bodily impurity on through some form of social infrastructure and hold on to every ounce of bodily purity, acquired either by the luck of birth or through the play of contingency.

Hence, we can re-state the question of the place of touch and touchability from the starting point of the Brahman terror of the senses.

In making this case, I build on several recent essays by P. Thirumal (2020, 2021) which are also in dialogue with other authors such as Sarukkai and Guru. Here is a quotation from a 2020 essay by Thirumal:

> Perhaps, it may be appropriate to say that modern knowledge has to be treated as the other of tradition as the Brahmin body refuses to be cut open to establishing a desacralised connection between finite body and finite thinking. The Brahmin body exists in multiple temporalities (from the mundane, austere and spiritual states), whereas the space of the classroom (of reflective mood) exists in a homogeneous and empty time. This is reflective of a larger process, of the coappearance of capitalism and Brahminic supremacy, of multiple temporalities and homogeneous empty time. Scholars have to look at the close nexus between the shared haptic practices (working of the Brahmin sensorium) and multiple temporalities. This nexus points at cultural meanings and social constraints that accompany "perception" via practices. Are these practices to be considered as constraints on instituting modern thinking and learning environments? In turn, how does this absence of free learning environments debilitate access to these institutions for Dalit Bahujans?

In his rich analysis of the sensorium of higher education institutions in India, Thirumal points to the fact that the environment of these spaces is not hospitable to inhabitation by Dalit bodies and that this inhospitability is due to the fact that the law can force them to accept Dalit students but cannot oblige them to change their sensory economy. This sensory economy, which has to do with sight and sound, listening and smelling, is a design for insulating Brahmans, as archetypes of pure thought, from Dalits who are seen as inert matter, which can never constitute genuine thinking subjects. The darkness, dullness and inertness of Dalit matter (in the form of Dalit persons) is seen as a threat not primarily to the purity of the Brahman body but to the anti-sensory ontology of Brahmanic ideology which sees itself as thought incarnate. To incarnate thought requires the sensorium to be evacuated from the sensorium as a whole and what the Dalit body signifies is the sensorium as such. In my interpretation of Thirumal's argument, the Dalit presence can enter the premises of higher education but it cannot really inhabit them, for it represents the fullest form of the sensorium as such, that is, of those faculties which allow the gross body of the Brahman to invade and corrupt his subtle body of which the subtlest form is thought itself. The enemy of the Brahman project is the sensorium – the faculties of smelling, touching, tasting, seeing and hearing – and not those substances, such as sweat, excrement, saliva and menstrual blood which are the most aggressive users of these portals into the pure habitations of Brahman thought. The Dalit is a social personification of the sensorium and thus he offends Brahmanic order by incarnating the materiality of all sociality. Since Brahmans are themselves trying to escape the bonds of both sociality and materiality, they are entrapped by their own construction of Dalits as solely and exclusively bodies of matter, which should not matter to Brahman bodies. But politics, law and exposure to such religions as Christianity and Islam have made it impossible for Brahmans to argue that Dalit bodies do not matter, either as persons or as matter. But they do have the awesome power to impede thought, to which, as matter, they are fundamentally opposed.

This power explains the constant effort to distance, demonize, humiliate and exorcise Dalits from the social world. This Dalit power is the social object of the Brahman terror of the senses, and this is what creates the entire of Brahman orthopraxy which takes the phenomenological form of the obsession with purity. The radical dis-recognition of Dalits by Brahmans is due to their being seen as the enemies of thinking itself – regarded as a Brahman monopoly – and any effort by Dalits to think is thus not to be encouraged. The Brahman terror of the senses is about the ubiquitous fear of being unable to think. And all the Brahman practices of purification, including and especially self-purification, are calculate to free the space of thinking from the sensorium, without looking, listening, smelling, tasting or touching. The constant effort to discipline and censor the Dalit body expresses this interminable war of Brahmans with the sensorium.

This Brahman effort to escape and repress the sensorium could appear to be a small variation on the Puritan denial of the body with its Biblical roots and Cartesian philosophical support. But it is an entirely different phenomenon. In this ontology, the sensorium is not the route to bodily pleasures, desires and seductions, but is rather the primary gateway to sociality, which is the primary object of Brahman terror. The foundational wish of Brahmans is to escape all sociality hence Brahmans have always feared and admired ascetics, world-renouncers, sadhus of all types, including fakes. And this begins to offer us a deeper insight into the issue of touch and touchability in Indian haptic life.

R.S. Khare, in an important study of Dalit intellectuals in Lucknow published in 1984, pointed out that the major civilizational image which opened the possibility of an alternative to Brahman hegemony was the image of the Indic renouncer, who in many ways posed a counter-image of power, purity and otherworldliness by renouncing sociality altogether, at least in principle. Dalit thinkers in the early 20th century in the Hindi heartland proposed genealogies for Dalits which claimed descent from the great renouncers of ancient India such as the sage Valmiki. By so doing they posed the anti-sociality of the ascetic to the excessive social bonds of the ordinary Brahman. This was an intellectual move of great daring and originality but it lacked the social force of Ambedkar's later effort to mobilize Dalits, which was practically much more consequential in the Dalit fight for dignity in Indian politics and society.

This view of the sensorium, as both a gateway and a proxy for sociality itself, gives us a new angle on the constant need of Brahmans to humiliate, violate and distance Dalits. The power of Dalits is their ability to exists at that social edge on which sociality meets its opposite, where matter is completely divorced from thought (and can thus be totally implicated with dirt, waste, filth and pollution) but where this sort of matter also becomes free from all sociality through its radical distance from the Savarna social order. This is the limiting point at which untouchability and renunciation almost become identical. I say "almost" because the Dalit body is never allowed to escape into asceticism and remains through the brute power of the Brahmanic order enmeshed in sociality and its most demeaning demands. Still, the Dalit remains a source of envy and a secret admiration for the Brahman due to his proximity to total renunciation of the social. It is only through constant abuse and humiliation that the line between Dalit materiality and total renunciation can be maintained. Pure sociality is also purely phatic – it needs few or no words. Hence haptic distancing for Brahmans is the condition of possibility for their wish to evacuate the phatic element from all their social transactions. Untouchability is the concrete haptic technology for the denial of sociality. It is exemplified by Brahmans but holds for all Savarnas to some degree.

OUT OF INDIA

By way of conclusion, I return to the comparative dimension of the relationship between the haptic and the phatic in the era of globalization. Can we see a general trend in which the rise of haptic devices is accompanied by a numbing of phatic communication, which I called earlier the murmur of the social heart? I mentioned earlier the rise of drone warfare, where expertise in haptic weapons divorces the drone operator from the agony of his victims. But there are other examples. Think of tattooing as a gang technique for inscribing social separation from others. Think of biometric ID's, which make scanning body parts the basis of entry into restricted spaces. Think of the taser which provides the means of haptic pain and coma. Think of Derek Chauvin's knee on George Floyd's neck. These are all the touches of death and destruction for those who are regarded as racially or biologically inferior by those who regard themselves as the most untouchable of all.

I referred earlier to the fact that the Indic body is effectively regarded as a haptic technology or affordance. Variations on this cultural sensibility are now widespread in our pervasively digitalized world, as technology everywhere has seized the haptic faculty, severed it from the bodily sensorium and made the body itself a sort of prosthetic, designed for screens, cameras, tapping and being tapped, a fibrous optic of its own type. Yes, other kinds of touch remain, the touch of mothers, lovers, children, friends. But that kind of touch, which is the core of the very sensorium of phatic communication, is being crowded out by the regime of the techno-haptic. This is a clear and present danger not just to touch as it used to be, but to sociality itself, except in those forms which are friendly to screens, profiles and big data. In the precious solidarities of ordinary life, there is a serious threat of the replacement of all feeling by the empire of touch.

References

P. Arora (2019), *The Next Billion Users* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

A. Burgess (1964), *Language Made Plain* (London: English Universities Press).

M. Douglas (1966), *Purity and Danger* (London, New York: Routledge).

L. Dumont (1970), *Homo Hierarchicus* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).

G. Guru, S. Sarukkai (2012), *The Cracked Mirror* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

A. Jaware (2018), *Practicing Caste: On Touching and Not Touching* (New York: Fordham University Press).

R.S. Khare (1984), *The Untouchable as Himself* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

S. Sarukkai (2009), *Phenomenology of Untouchability*, in "The Economic and Politiucal Weekly", 44, 37, pp. 39-48.

P. Thirumal (2020), *Dominant Bodies and Their Ethical Performances Violence of Caste Embodiment in Higher Educational Institutions*, in "The Economic and Political Weekly", 55, 3, pp. 36-40.

I. Wilkerson (2020), *Caste: The Origins of our Discontents* (New York: Random House).

Abstract

Touch is a universal faculty which lets humans explore intimacy, danger and other aspects of their sensory worlds. In India, the regulation of touch is the key to the maintenance of a highly hierarchical, unjust and humiliating social system. Today, the spread of haptic technologies further complicates the relationship between human beings, machines and the paradoxes of intimacy.

Keywords
Touch, purity, caste, hierarchy, intimacy.

GLOCAL

NEW GLOCAL FORMS OF FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION

JEFF HYMAN
University of Aberdeen (UK)
j.hyman@abdn.ac.uk

INTERPRETATIONS OF PARTICIPATION

Debates about the meaning and significance of participation by employees have circulated since the development of mass industry in the 19th Century. Since this time, there have been few genuinely new developments, but rather, variations on themes. One principal theme concerns the efforts of employers to use financial participation (FP) in the form of profit-share bonuses to maintain control at times of labour strength by diverting workers away from collectivisation and activism. This mixture of promise and threat (join a union and miss out on profit shares) was explored and analysed by the late Harvie Ramsay in his seminal 1977 "Cycles of Control" paper. Parallel participative action among policymakers also took shape by adopting a shift from direct legislated proscription to accommodation with collective labour by recognising trade unions, encouraging industry-wide collective bargaining and introducing systems of joint consultation, and subsequently, improving conditions of work under the influence of Elton Mayo's human relations prescriptions. In Western society, incorporation of workers and unions, employment protective legislation and progressive welfare policies have virtually eliminated mass dissent. In recent years, though capitalism has not been under threat from labour, the ascendancy of neo-liberal doctrine with emphasis on removing obstacles to the operation of an individualised free labour market has encouraged employers to adopt unitarist rather than pluralist participative policies. From this perspective, recent developments in FP have emerged from the initiatives of employers (and their political supporters) rather than from workers.

Nevertheless, a second principal stream of industrial democratic participation derives from radical ambitions of workers and their supporters to assume control over capitalist forms of production in moves toward socialist society. These ambitions were envisaged, for example, through the ideas of G.D.H. Cole (1957) who promoted guild socialist concepts of societal transformation and Eduard Bernstein's theories of democratic socialism. Though more modest interpretations point to popular ownership through worker cooperatives and employee-owned companies in an otherwise undisrupted market economy, industrial democracy is usually associated with broader arguments over the direction and control of economic activity, stretching back to the alienating effects of mass industry and calls for worker control over the means of production. Though these arguments were described some years ago as "curiously antiquated, merely a quaint slogan of historical interest" based on defunct or impotent political movements (Blumberg 1968: 1), 50 years later, interest in forms of worker control remain vibrant, motivated by a complex of new and prevailing challenges. Practically, interest has been elevated through recognition of the domination and negative effects of competitive profit-seeking on civic democratic processes, specifically by transnational enterprise

(Hines 2000; Streeck 2016); declining workplace influence and welfare of workers and their representatives (Kalleberg 2018; Pettinger 2019) through the "betrayal of modern work" (Ciulla 2000); weaknesses and failures of privatisation; the impact of unrestrained economic activity on local and planetary environments; and the global consequences of the failure of large corporations to act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in line with the 2015 Paris agreement. Conceptual critiques of contemporary capitalism are also evident, for example by Streeck (2016), Adler (2019) and Piketty (2020), the latter two arguing strongly for participatory (Piketty) and democratic (Adler) socialism to counter what has been variously termed "wreckage economics" (Fleming 2017), "the cancer stage of capitalism" (McMurtry 1998) and "rapacious neoliberal capitalism" (Cumbers 2020).

One problem concerns that of definition. What exactly is financial participation and what distinguishes it from the more generic participation? Take collective bargaining, usually seen as a form of participation but one legitimate objective of collective bargaining is to reach agreement jointly with employers over pecuniary issues, principally pay and pensions, but also other substantive issues, such as levels of redundancy pay or payment for training. Where it continues to be conducted, collective bargaining has largely been decentralised in recent years: at the instigation of employers, sectoral and national bargaining is far less prominent in Anglo-Saxon countries but also in European countries like France. Hence, bargaining has become more localised (and reductive), but the initiative has come from employers, often led by transnational corporations (TNCs) keen to maintain local control over costs by offering terms and conditions applicable at local establishment levels, rather than determined by national or sectoral conditions. In this sense, this movement too could be seen as a new form of FP.

GLOBALISATION AND PARTICIPATION

The global economy has developed and been sustained through interplay of linked factors. These include: the political dominance of neo-libel economic doctrine promoting barrier and regulation-free trade; the growth and power of transnational corporations (TNCs), which can dictate domestic (usually deregulatory) policy in countries where they enjoy privileged status, including prime sectors such as petrochemicals (Wenar 2017), mining (Klein 2007), agri-business (Vijay et al. 2016) and finance (Tooze 2018); and the underpinning and profit-maximising dominance of financialisation over physically productive enterprise (Grady, Simms 2019). Consequences of this "libertarian dystopia" (Standing 2019) extend from the growth of inequality between and within countries (Dorling 2019), lubricated by the facility of global corporations to avoid national tax regimes, to the failure by enterprise to pursue environmental obligations laid down in the 2015 Paris Agreement, a failure which adversely affects the health and well-being of the most vulnerable groups, communities and countries (Klein 2019: 252-258). Employee and community exclusion or suppression is evident in close and often injurious relationships between politics and commerce which help to preserve and consolidate the power of TNCs. In India, for example, a delegation from the independent New York based *International Commission for Labor Rights* found that there had been violations of company law at Suzuki-owned carmaker MSIL, denial of union rights and actions by the police "that transgressed its powers in ways that amount to gross and inappropriate interference in industrial disputes, and yet failed to protect industrial peace when it should have" (2013: 2). Moreover, the Commission found that the local State "both through its actions and its failure to act, violated several important, internationally recognised principles of trade union rights" (2013: 24). Further, major corporate donors in the USA have been instrumental in pressurising government for subsidies for oil exploration and extraction, disabling the Environment Protection Agency and in persuading former President Trump to withdraw from the Paris climate Accord (Michaels 2020: 193-198). This background is vital in explaining the intent of conventional company-sponsored financial participation programmes to suppress employee influence at work, which has either diminished or even become embedded into dominant unitarist profit-seeking ideology, in what political commentator Rafael Behr has termed a process which excludes the masses while drawing them into complicity with their exclusion. The reality is that, in the absence of rigorous political support, employees and trade unions in conventional enterprises can draw upon limited resources for effective participation in strategic decision-making. This article aims to examine and challenge the roots of employee weakness and to explore the actuality and potential for financial participation and worker emancipation in both commercial organisations and those not primarily driven by profit-seeking to shift to sustainable commercial operations.

WHAT RELEVANCE FOR FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION?

Financial participation has diverse and contrasting origins. At one extreme, it aims to provide a principal axis for worker control: "a system of governing firms in which direct control over them is redistributed […] out of the hands of the capitalists and into the hands of their workers" (Archer 1995 in Gunderson 2019: 39). On the other, it derives directly from neo-liberal doctrine by rewarding individual employees with monetary allocations drawn from corporate profits or a promise of minority ownership in their organisation through equity allocations. This market derived model has been ascendant throughout the past 30 years of global neo-liberal economic domination backed by virtually universal governmental endorsement and limited opposition from communities and trade unions institutionally diminished and enfeebled by years of austerity, growth in precarious work and political hostility toward regulating free-market activity. During the same period, TNCs have consolidated their economic grip, including over national governments. Nevertheless, warning signals are evident, as these same organisations have continued their social, environmental and climate-damaging activities, at the expense of workers (faced with insecurity, limited employment rights, adverse working conditions and growing inequality), local communities (many of which experience the "neighbourhood" pollution effects of production activities, or the risk of relocation or capital flight) and the planet in which greenhouse gas emissions and environmental contamination continue to proliferate. Confronting these developments, progressive arguments are being expressed for participative arrangements which provide for those affected to exercise control over organisations whose activities are causing so much damage.

Nevertheless, participation remains very much contested terrain, not helped by the failure to adequately define the concept or if defined, done so in a very imprecise manner. Carole Pateman's early identification (1970: 67) of three forms of participation, ranging from "pseudo", through "partial" to "full", acts as a useful guide to unravel the complexities and potential – and limitations – of current participative practice. With the premise that participation must be participation in something, namely, decisions (1970: 68), it is surely correct to dismiss management's enthusiasm for what it terms "involvement" (or "voice") as pseudo-participation, offering little more than HR-flavoured attempts to entice workers into acceptance of managerial sovereignty and as an incitement to contribute willingly to organisational objectives. Examples of pseudo-participation include contemporary practices of individual employee appraisal systems and performance-related pay (PRP); teamworking; high performance work systems and associated “lean” delivery; empowerment and engagement, as well as diverse exercises in management communication (Hyman 2018). We can see that contemporary forms of management-induced financial participation readily fall into this instrumental unitarist perspective which offers minimal employee agency to exercise decision-making beyond task level. PRP rewards individual or teamed employees for meeting management targets (Laaser 2016) and by stimulating the level of individual task contribution as assessed by immediate managers, endorses the individualist ideology of *homo economicus* (Fleming 2017). Encouraging individual contribution and reward has been prefigured by decline in union influence and shifts to decentralised local management of employees, though with strategy and finance determined and controlled by head office, few opportunities are presented for local employee initiative. This, combined with increased use of outsourcing, offshoring and extended sub-contracted supply chains, very much represents the reality of the management “thinking globally, acting locally” mantra (Bartlett, Ghoshal 2002).

Employee equity schemes, which offer limited allocations of shares to employees or allow staff to purchase company shares at discounted cost are also used to cement unitarist values and loosen collective ones or are deployed cynically to lubricate privatisation schemes, with the heady rentier promise of windfall gains. With the bulk of equity owned and controlled by institutional investors, whose only allegiance to their investments is conditional on securing and maintaining short-term profits, even aggregated employee shareholdings would be insufficient to influence strategic corporate decisions. Share schemes provide for no individual equity-holder influence over corporate decisions (Baddon et al. 1989) and moreover, are usually treated by employee beneficiaries as a welcome bonus to be disposed of speedily in return for cash (Baddon et al. 1989). Further, while offering no positive decision-making agency to employees, such schemes can potentially damage employee interests. First, by aligning employee interests with those of the organisation, prospective or actual collective strength may be diminished. Second, these equity schemes pass the risk, assumed in economic theory to be that of owners, to employees, whose livelihood, earnings and savings can be compromised through firm failure. A tragic example was provided by rogue energy company Enron, whose employees had obediently responded to director appeals to purchase more stock in the apparently successful company for their retirement, only to see the company collapse, along with their jobs, salaries and pensions. The same directors, aware of the company's impending difficulties, had quietly disposed of their shareholdings well in advance of the event (McLean, Elkind 2004). In terms of offering any decision-making to employees, whether local or more broadly, all these pseudo-participative schemes can be readily rejected. Indeed, the powerlessness inherent in the individualism underlaying these initiatives can be demonstrated by the huge rise in work-related stress illness found in contemporary organisations (Wilkinson, Pickett 2010).

Partial participation allows the subordinate party with the scope to influence a decision but not determine the outcome. In the organisational context, this usually allows for some collective labour influence, traditionally exercised through trade unions, but markedly less so in an era when union membership and institutional influence across the world have been in decline, with increasing dominance by capital over labour leading to a divided and fragmented labour market (Grady, Simms 2019). Examples of partial participation include collective bargaining, works councils and European Works Councils for transnational concerns operating in Europe. Though these processes of social dialogue may exert some influence on organisational decision-making (van Houten, Russo 2020), impact derives from collective organisational strength, with government support and employer attitudes being strong influences. Nevertheless, conditions favourable to participative contribution have been weakened in recent years, and specifically among powerful transnational organisations where nationally or regionally based employee fora provide for no meaningful access to distant head-office decision-makers located, for example, in the USA or Japan. Whereas pseudo-participation is identified by management initiative, partial participation usually originates from mobilising collective employee interests, with support from sympathetic (social-democratic) political parties. From the specifically financial perspective, a variety of forms might be identified, including nationalisation of social assets and collective wage-earner ownership, of which the best known is the Swedish Meidner Plan, which aimed to secure social ownership of productive enterprises through accumulating pooled employee equity held in trust by trade unions within a broader solidaristic pay policy (Boreham, Hall 2005). Undermined through the coordinated opposition of private sector and conservative interests, the direction of the country's political economy became more market focussed leading to replacement of a social-democratic government by a conservative one, under which the Plan's radical aims were progressively diluted and subsequentially abandoned.

Full participation, sometimes called industrial democracy, is defined by Pateman as a “process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions” (Pateman 1970: 71) and examples include worker cooperatives, fully employee-owned enterprises and remunicipalised organisations. By producing within and serving local communities, these organisations are also likely to be local in character and thereby have potential to exert a positive impact on the immediate environment through lower transport and delivery costs and greater sensitivity to pollution issues; combined with their democratic, inclusive structure they are often promoted by advocates as viable alternatives to globalised concerns (Hines 2000; Livesey 2019). Though the “newness” of these approaches is debatable, there is little question that growing awareness of the threats that globalisation pose to planetary, national, community and worker interests is leading to growing attention among some policymakers, academics and activists to these more localised processes.

WORKER COOPERATIVES

The International Labour Organization (ILO 2011) defines cooperatives as an “autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise”. The UN Secretary-General adds support, advising that “as values-driven and principles-based enterprises, they work towards the well-being of all their members and focus on the development of the communities in which they operate” (UN 2017). Coops are prevalent in many countries, with over 200,000 throughout the EU, employing some 4.7 million people (North, Scott Cato 2018) and more than 120,000 in Latin America and the Caribbean, where a fifth of coops are in rural undertakings such as agriculture and forestry.

Though cooperatives can be established among different constituencies (e.g. consumers, producers) our chief interest as a financially participative alternative to conventional organisational profit-seeking is in worker cooperatives in which all members enjoy formal equal decision-making rights. Nevertheless, as potential generators of economic transformation, worker coops face both conceptual and practical objections. The Webbs, early chroniclers of socialism and trade unions, contended that rather than acting as a progressive force, worker coops act in the selfish interests of members and thereby inhibit working class aspirations, and that members lack management expertise or are inhibited from exercising it and are likely to act as isolated islands of self-interest (Ackers 2010). Alternatively, hierarchical control over work as experienced in conventional enterprise is maintained (Edwards, Wajcman 2005: 129). Economically liberal critics also argue that diverting from optimal profit-seeking to satisfy member pay or security can jeopardise performance and to remain viable they may need to rely on government subsidies, though these critics appear less energised by the massive subsidies on offer to many conventional enterprises and notably fossil fuels (Klein 2019: 88). Another critique is that worker coops are highly sensitive to economic fluctuations and without access to external capital, face threats of collapse or degeneration into standard profit-centred business. Trade unions may also face dilemmas in their support for worker coops as their functions can be compromised between upholding sustainable or profitable operations and protecting employee interests (Pendleton 2005). "Self-exploitation" may occur, for example, by workers who deny themselves adequate rewards in protecting the mutual interests of the institution, safeguarding job security over member salaries (Pérotin 2012). Sacrificial denial may even extend to member safety, as Pencavel (2002) discovered in his research into Pacific Northwest plywood mills where he found considerably higher accident rates in coops compared with conventional mills: "the workers in the co-op are more inclined to compromise on safety in their desire to meet production targets" (Pencavel 2002: 36). Indeed, worker coop experience in the USA has been patchy, occasionally revived during periods of economic crisis or restricted to limited small scale artisan ventures or niche areas, raising the rhetorical question of "how do you start up a cooperative steel mill or auto plant" (Logue, Yates 2001: 7). A recent survey found only about 400 worker coops in the USA in 2017, with an average size of nine members and annual turnover of about $600k (Palmer 2019). Local, yes, but hardly on a scale to cause too much anxiety among the multinational elite.

Negative contentions about worker coops have, however, been challenged. Pérotin (2012, 2018) asserts that survival rates favour coops over conventional firms of equivalent size and that they perform equally as effectively. Olsen (2014) and Logue and Yates (2005) also dispute high attrition rates for coops, whilst Pérotin (2018) points out that coops are found in all sectors, including capital intensive ones. The most recognisable counter to the marginality thesis is of course the Mondragon Group (MG), based in the Basque region of Spain, with some 82,000 workers occupied in manufacturing and services. Described by the "Guardian" newspaper in 2012 as a "stunningly successful alternative to the capitalist organization of production", in more recent years the harsh realities of operating cooperatively in an internationally competitive marketplace have been increasingly exposed. The origins of Mondragon were strictly localised, through the initiative of an anti-fascist priest to manufacture kerosene stoves in the Basque region in the aftermath of World War II. The coop was successful, financed by a worker-owned credit union, and expanded into manufacturing household appliances under the FAGOR trade name. Over time the coop has diversified into finance, retail and education. By 2012, manufacturing alone comprised some 120 separate businesses. Governance of the coop is through participatory self-management based on one worker, one vote.

Nevertheless, there have been critiques which correspond to earlier doubts of self-isolation (Kasmir 1996; Altuna-Gabilondo 2013), self-exploitation (Kasmir 2016) and shifts to cost-conscious management techniques when confronted by competition (Cheney et al. 2014). The Mondragon coop developed international outlets and by 2018, had 141 overseas subsidiaries, with a workforce of some 14,400. Internationalisation undoubtedly diluted the cooperative ethos. Kasmir (2016) identified three tiers of workers, full coop members in the Basque region, temporary workers in Spain and employed wage-earners in overseas subsidiaries, who had no cooperative rights with low pay and poor working conditions (Errasti 2015). Errasti examined 11 Chinese subsidiary greenfield companies. Unions were not recognised and there were no other representative bodies for workers and management practice owed more to Taylorism than to cooperativism. In 2013, FAGOR faced severe cash-flow difficulties and support was terminated by the Mondragon Central Council, leading to some 5,600 redundancies, mainly in the overseas subsidiaries. Though some blame for the failure can be attributed to international adventurism (Errasti et al. 2017), critics also point to the deregulatory economic policies introduced by the conservative Spanish government (Gil 2013), a factor which has compromised cooperative and worker-owned movements across the globe (Harnecker 2009; Klein 2007).

Reliance of cooperativism on political backing is strongly demonstrated in Latin America, especially in agriculture. In Venezuela, following legislative support and strong endorsement by past-President Chávez and as part of promoting a socialist counter to American-driven neoliberalism and foreign oil dependence, numbers of cooperatives swelled from less than a thousand in 1998 to over 30,000 ten years later, representing 14 percent of the labour force (Harnecker 2009). Promotion and safeguarding cooperatives became a fundamental organising policy tool of a new social economy driven by community-level enterprise (Buxton 2019). The governments of Chavez and then Madura faced increasing American pressures to liberalise the economy, leading to internal strife, economic collapse and orchestrated demonstrations. Coops became under pressure to maximise revenue rather than focus on community objectives, in other words to behave "like capitalist enterprises" (Harnecker 2009: 316-317). The country was experiencing US-led economic sanctions until the very end of the Trump regime.

Cooperatives in other Latin American countries have also flourished under broad socialist government policy, but when more conservative regimes take control, often backed by business and external political interests, social and community enterprises become vulnerable to reversion to capitalist operations or market surrender. Globalisation has impacted on cooperative behaviour when powerful buyers pressurise domestic coop suppliers to impose price cuts which force them to reduce cooperative principles in order to survive. Burke (2010) presents the case of Brazil-based AmazonCoop supplying an international "socially responsible business", pressures from which led to fragmentation of the cooperative ideal. Burke concludes that the coop's internal behaviour is dominated by the imposed profit motive which "continues to top the list of priorities" (Burke 2010:

49). Bolsanaro's accession to the Brazilian presidency has been marked by implementing extreme free-market policies which have impacted negatively on indigenous cooperative farming and agricultural communities, the environment and trade unions to the benefit of soy and palm oil plantation owners, cattle farms and overseas interests. Under these constraints, notwithstanding support from international agencies such as the UN and ILO and various NGOs, it is difficult to see how coops can reach out from the minority sectors which they have occupied for the past 100 years and thereby provide genuine and widespread participative practice. When coops do engage more internationally, act as suppliers to large companies, or move beyond the boundaries of their niche markets, their participative ideologies are often forced to confront and respond to competitive and political realities.

EMPLOYEE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Employee ownership (EO) is a contested and elastic term, as demonstrated in a UK government commissioned report, *Nuttall Review of Employee Ownership* (2012), which defined EO as a "significant and meaningful" stake in a business, with 25 percent or even lower, being regarded as both significant and meaningful. As shown above, many successful businesses operate employee share ownership schemes, but these are employee-owned to a very limited degree. Gunderson (2019: 39) identifies a broad range of "worker decision-making powers" extending from pseudo-participative notification of decisions to full majority representation on decision-making bodies. There are fully employee-owned enterprises, often created by retiring original owners, but like coops, these tend to be in a minority in any specific sector and also highly vulnerable to hostile market conditions, leading to failure or reversion to conventional management if employee-owners harbour fears of losing jobs and savings. Without easy recourse to outside finance, many employee-owned companies are located in less capital-intensive service and professional sectors, rather than manufacturing (Stern 2020).

Nevertheless, ownership does not necessarily confer control. The best-known employee-owned business in the UK is the John Lewis Partnership, a retail and supermarket chain with some 90,000 "partners". Each partner receives a bonus cash share of annual profits, averaging about 10-15 percent of pay. There is a system of representative councils and open communication systems. Pateman (1970) identified the company's representative processes as examples of pseudo-participation, as partners have no meaningful control over strategic decisions. Similar views were expressed by Ramsay (1980), accusing the company of paternalism and of manoeuvring representatives toward apathy and triviality. A detailed early study led by Alan Flanders confirmed that partners do not share the same power resources as management and decision-making "was basically the normal one of management deciding what it wanted to achieve, and preparing the ground in such a way that orders issued were likely to be obeyed" (Flanders et al. 1968: 177). In a more recent study of the Partnership, Cathcart (2013) warns that tight economic conditions could undermine democratic principles and practice, a prediction confirmed by recent developments: management decided to increase pay ratios between senior and junior partners from 25 times to 75 and responded to sales slumps in 2020 by unilaterally axing its pay bonus and announcing plans to close some of its stores.

REMUNICIPALISATION

Nationalisation of the means of production and exchange to establish public control through joint management over key sectors was a popular policy in post-World War II Europe, guided by the principle of providing "a new contract between state and citizen" to offer equality, opportunities and social justice (Bew 2016: 389). Many commentators offer unfavourable judgements on the success of nationalised sectors in providing effective services or the promised participatory style of strategic management. The case for nationalisation has further been undermined by globalisation, leading states to become "located in markets, rather markets in states" (Streeck 2016: 22). Dauvergne (2018: 33) argues that governments "have become indebted" to big business as they see benefits in reducing state intervention. In many countries, under neo-liberalism, nationalisation has been dismantled and replaced by privatisation, often benefitting TNCs. Former chair of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan welcomes globalisation as "policy decisions in the US have been largely replaced by global market forces […]. The world is governed by market forces" (Greenspan in Pettifor 2019: 33). However, privatised performance has equally been questioned for failing to provide efficient or cheap provision of services, as evidenced by the costs of competitive healthcare in the USA and inefficiencies in essential services such as water and sewage in the UK (Cumbers, Becker 2018; PSIRU 2014). Privatisation is also associated with loss of jobs (some 600,00 in Germany between 1989 and 2007), work intensification and loss of income and job security through outsourcing and loss of union presence and influence.

Hence, alternatives to privatisation are being advocated and adopted. Zaifer (2019) suggests practical alternatives to privatisation, such as cooperatives, to make “public assets more responsive to the needs of the general populace”. An alternative approach is through remunicipalisation, a process in which privatised essential services are returned to the local public domain, often following popular demands or referenda. There has been rapid growth in remunicipalisation initiatives across both mature and developing economies. For example, worldwide in the water sector there were two reported cases in 2000, increasing to 267 by 2017, 304 in energy and 835 in total across seven essential services and with nearly half in Germany (TNI 2018). The number had increased to 1408 by October 2019 (Kishimoto et al. 2020). Many of the initiatives were stimulated by civic opposition to privatisation or as a consequence of inequitable provision by privatised services (Cumbers, Becker 2018). Other reasons were a preference for local democratic governance and accountability or through environmental concerns to ensure compatibility with Green New Deal aspirations for expressing local interests with self-sufficiency as an alternative to unaccountable globalisation. Though remunicipalisation projects are “spatially diverse and highly variegated” (Cumbers, Paul 2020: 3) by sector, alliances, mobilisation and coalitions and of “every ideological shade” (Cumbers, Paul 2020: 9), most have introduced “greater public transparency, citizen representatives on the boards and citizen-led bodies” (Petitjean 2017: 26). Trade unions have usually been at the forefront of deprivatisation campaigns leading to remunicipalisation (Terzic 2017). In their overview analysis of 1408 cases, Kishimoto et al., (2020: 24) indicate that employment conditions were at least maintained and in 158, markedly improved. There was more protection and better conditions than in the private sector with “involvement of trade unions […] critical on that front”. There was also “clear evidence of the introduction or improvement of democratic mechanisms in at least 149 cases, ranging from increased accountability, transparency and information disclosure to establishing participatory governance" (Kishimoto et al. 2020: 25). Nevertheless, there is still little known about the actual democratisation processes with one problem being the variability and diversity of projects and of experience. Cibrario (2020: 178) argues that there is still little evidence of the roles played by unions: "concrete challenges, workplace stories and lessons learned from completed or on-going private-to-public transition experiences remain largely under-researched and at times misunderstood". Though union experience is varied, at this stage at least, it seems to occupy traditional union roles i.e., maintaining membership, securing recognition and negotiation over pay and conditions. Though mentioned, there is little evidence of unions pioneering 'new, progressive and worker participation practices" (Cibrario 2020: 188).

As globalisation and transnational enterprise begin to experience new economic and popular civic challenges, it is clear that remunicipalisation is likely to grow and with it, local influence over institutional and procedural arrangements. At present though, experience is limited to specific sectoral pockets and in terms of financial participation, there is little that is new. Trade unions are often strongly involved, often in cooperation with civic groups, in establishing deprivatised concerns, but thereafter their role, valuable though it is, is what might be expected with any progressive employer.

Discussion

We have seen that financial participation, in diverse and contested interpretations, has been around for a long time. Innovations in the past 30 or so years have come about in conjunction with the rise of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, which rejects regulatory protective provisions, whether by law or by procedure. The main impact has been an emphasis on individualising the employment contract, encouraging privatisation, engineering free trade and reducing the state's protective role. As a consequence, employment conditions have deteriorated markedly. Easily disposable workers join the ranks of precarious labour, with little or no legislated protection or they become unemployed when companies relocate to lower cost locations. For those who maintain employee status, HRM has emerged from the shadows of its previous subservient administrative role to become the enabler of a range of individual incentivising – or penalising – techniques. To maintain competitiveness, HR practice in multi-centred establishments has been localised, but not to the benefit of workers: collective bargaining, where it still exists, is conducted defensively by unions with little influence, often in competition with parallel production facilities, and with scarcely any knowledge of available corporate finances easily manipulated through systems of transfer costing (Chang 2014: 428). Management techniques are applied which bypass unions altogether, notably through performance-related pay and basic salary determined according to supervisory perceptions of individual contribution, divisive procedures which both tend to act to the detriment of women. Bonus and employee share schemes are introduced and maintained by management, even in the ostensibly employee-owned John Lewis.

The other major development has been the rise of financialisation which imposes short-term profitability demands on productive enterprise. We can take an example of how this affects even professional employees, whose participative integrity is founded on the autonomy conferred by their professional associations. The "Guardian" newspaper (April 2016) described how the biggest pharmacy chain in the UK, once recognized as a paternalistic but progressive employer, switched to an overtly performance-driven culture following its acquisition by an overseas private equity group. The new business model was described as aiming to "stretch company finances and staff as far as they can go – then extract profits". Following the buy-out, staffing was cut, with pharmacists increasingly required to "self-check" and to meet imposed performance targets. Reported accounts indicate that pressure on pharmacists to meet targets are "relentless": "if you miss any target they (managers) want to know the nth degree why". Another complained that the company had changed from "family-run professional firm to Big Brother, a giant profit-seeking monster […] there's such a culture of fear". One pharmacist insisted: "the pressure to meet targets was relentless […] area managers ringing on a daily basis […] told continuously that he was letting the store down". Concern for professional discretion and autonomy among pharmacists was apparent: "if my bonus is dependent on the business targets I've been set, you are taking away […] my ability to practice my profession for the patient". Indeed, in a survey of 624 of the company's pharmacists, 60 percent were concerned that commercial incentives and targets compromised the health, safety or well-being of patients as well as the professional integrity of staff.

The intention for this article was to identify new forms of glocal financial participation and as we have seen, developments that have emerged have been consistent with employer and political ambitions to liberalise product and labour markets, both of which emphasise competition rather than offering universal rights to protect labour and community. In consequence, innovative forms of FP in recent years have largely stemmed from management emphases to identify and reward individual employee contributions to management-determined objectives with policies often foreshadowing the erosion of labour rights. Pluralistic participation assumes both shared interests and collaboration among employees and while resource allocation differences with employers are jointly determined under pluralism, this process has consequently been eroded through concerted management efforts to reinforce their control through adopting and reinforcing unitarist frameworks. While global corporation activity is often devolved and decentralised, this rarely serves local interests as different establishments under common ownership may be forced in competition with one another and finance available to resource FP is obscured and controlled by inaccessible senior management. In consequence, there is little evidence of direct local benefit either to employees or local community, notwithstanding imaginative corporate social responsibility campaigns aimed to inform and pacify community concerns (Dauvergne 2018). In commercial organisations (and indeed, public sector ones, forced under privatisation threats to follow private sector efficiency and cost-cutting regimes), collective FP lies dormant.

Away from profit-centred commercial sectors, there has been some encouragement for cooperatives, but as we have seen, these too are often forced by circumstances to operate along market-driven lines or face withdrawal of support or hostility from unsympathetic governments, as has been experienced in many Caribbean and Latin American countries (ITUC 2020). Remunicipalisation has become more common among previously privatised service sectors and there is no doubt that through more democratic governance both employees and communities have benefitted. We would argue that remunicipalisation and cooperatives should be given state protection and financial support for local development, especially in the global south where local communities face multiple deprivations in consequence of (often illegal) multinational agri-business forest-clearing and mining activities, for example in Brazil. Deforestation in that country virtually halted in the ten years from 2000 as a consequence of national and local protection plans supported by overseas funding and on the ground, coalitions of environmental NGOs, unions and indigenous representatives (Boucher et al. 2013).

These findings demonstrate that any advances in employee-centred FP, indeed, in participation generally, are dependent upon socially progressive ideas and political support for "distribution and access to socially and economically important goods, services and opportunities" (Boreham, Hall 2005: 223). While political support is less in evidence, progressive ideas are in currency. There is no space here to review the potential of UBI for financial provision, though arguments for these inclusive and social justice programmes have been increasingly raised during the Covid pandemic (Moraes, Frier 2020). In arguing for the "just society", Piketty (2020: 1003) presents a comprehensive reform programme including "sharing of voting rights […] between workers and shareholders' in establishing a just wage, more equal distribution of economic power, and a deeper involvement of workers in shaping the strategy of their employers". He recognises "how intimately the structure of inequality is related to the nature of the political regime" (Piketty (2020: 1016) and that resolution of the power imbalance on which inequality rests will require "major changes to existing political rules" (Piketty 2020: 1017). But national politics subservience to and dependence on global financial and economic interests allows no room for democratic manoeuvre. Hence, Piketty argues for strict political campaign and donations rationing in order to help promote "participatory and egalitarian democracy" though how the necessary changes could receive national and international backing remain problematic. Business policy academic Paul Adler (2019: 155) also recognises the essential role of the state and its failure to combat the excesses of

Friedmanite neo-conservatism in the USA: “without a radical change in our country’s broader political-economic structure, these local experiments [in worker cooperatives etc.] alone cannot yield the change we need”.

The two extreme crises presented by the Covid pandemic and global heating could provide the stimulus for major economic and social change. Arguments are being presented to subordinate competitive economic growth, whose rationale is drawn from neoliberal economic thinking, to sustainable growth. Control and accountability of corporations need to be extended beyond those of foot-loose equity-holders and senior executives to employees, communities and nation-states. For this to occur, principles and practices of corporate governance through economic democracy should be developed and – crucially – observed through formal state, and even international, regulatory action. Though trade unions are in a historically weak position, in contrast to employers, they are taking more concerted action than employers in proposing means to combat global heating. Many are giving full support to Green New Deals, which envisage local action against carbon emissions and other forms of pollution as well as encouraging national energy self-sufficiency (Pettifor 2019).

In our forthcoming book (Baldry, Hyman 2021), we argue that unions should have a critical role in meeting the challenges of sustainable commercial activity, sustainable employment and reducing inequality in accordance with the Paris Accord. We argue that to combat the existentialist emergency presented by the climate emergency, unions need to be involved as equal partners alongside national and local government, employer organisations, policy specialists and community groups in developing national sustainable recovery programmes. Nevertheless, unions face internal as well as external challenges. Richard Hyman (2011: 27) has clearly identified a key issue facing the labour movement worldwide, namely "to reconceptualise solidarity in ways which encompass the local, the national, the European and the global. For unions to survive and thrive, the principle of solidarity must not only be redefined and reinvented: workers on the ground must be active participants in this redefinition and reinvention". Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2020: 16-17) further assert that "just as unions stress the benefits of employee participation for social cohesion and economic participation, so it is necessary to protect and enlarge the spaces for deliberative democracy at every level of the trade union movement, and to strengthen the two-way communicative links between the different components of a complex, multi-level and multi-faceted system of worker representation".

The original 1930s New Deal owed its success partly to the support of collective labour. Similarly, during war-time emergencies, unions were effectively incorporated into central decision-making bodies (Adler 2019: 119; Middlemas 1980: 278; Wilson 2016). Moreover, there is a strong case for unions to be involved in plans to switch to green sources of energy, based on negotiated agreements to provide secure employment and skills training for those displaced from fossil-fuel sectors and by deindustrialisation. Also, workers are likely to live in communities most affected by atmospheric and other forms of pollution and unions alongside community groups must be offered full disclosure on hazards and the authority to intervene in production processes to ensure a clean local environment. We also argue that in order to participate as partners in strategic decision-making, there should be parity representation of employee nominees on the most senior bodies, i.e. boards of directors, a system practiced in a number of North European countries, though often with only minority presence on supervisory boards and fewer on executive boards. While only partially successful in addressing worker contributions to key decisions, Piketty (2020: 499) argues that these approaches have "somewhat shifted the balance of power between shareholders and employees and encourage more harmonious and ultimately more efficient economic development". European Works Councils were established some 25 years ago to provide information and consultation arrangements for cross-national issues for employees working in TNCs but despite revisions, their impact on corporate governance has been limited. A more robust system could offer effective contributions from representatives to integrate alongside worker director co-determination, establishment consultation and collective bargaining. This multi-tiered approach should offer opportunity for national and central representatives to contribute to environmental, economic and financial issues at both local and organisation-wide levels. But, as ever, with FP, these developments must be led and regulated by national and potentially, international policy-making bodies such as the EU. While multilateral organisations like the UN and its labour agency, the ILO, can make proposals, these are rarely binding on their constituents.

We can see participation as an ideal state for embracing the local with the global, which would emerge from engagement with radical political and economic movements or as a practical but limited ambition addressable under reformed regulatory mandates, which provided the principal impetus for equitable but vulnerable advances in post-war years prior to the ascendancy of Friedmanite economic liberalism. A prime question concerns the intentions and capacities of labour movements. Traditionally associated with reformist political parties, both labour and socialist movements have been progressively undermined over the past 30 years by aggressive neo-liberal radicalism, buttressed by the wealth and power of those organisations to have most benefitted from fundamentalist market policies and who have done little to address the existentialist threat of the global heating to which they have most contributed. In this time, there have been only limited expressions of worker-initiated FP. The climate emergency will not be resolved by the market. A Green New Deal could offer the template and regulatory means for a re-invigorated focus by the parties most affected by commercial activity to jointly address fundamentalist environmental issues through empowering them to participate in their resolution.

REFERENCES

P. Ackers (2010), *An industrial relations perspective on employee participation*, in A. Wilkinson, P. Gollan, M. Marchington, D. Lewin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Participation in Organizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

P. Adler (2019), *The 99 Percent Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

L. Altuna-Gabilondo (2013), *Solidarity at work: the case of Mondragon*, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, http://www.unrisd.org/thinkpiece-altuna.

L. Baddon et al. (1989), *People's Capitalism: A Critical Analysis of Profit-Sharing and Employee Share Ownership* (London: Routledge).

C. Baldry, J. Hyman (2021, forthcoming), *Sustainable Work and the Environmental Crisis* (London: Routledge).

C. Bartlett, S. Ghoshal (2002), *Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press), 2nd edn.

J. Bew (2017), *Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee* (London: Riverrun).

P. Blumberg (1968), *Industrial Democracy* (London: Constable).

P. Boreham, R. Hall (2005), *Theorising the State and economic democracy*, in B. Harley, J. Hyman, P. Thompson (eds.), *Participation and Democracy at Work* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

D. Boucher, S. Roquemore, E. Fitzhugh (2013), *Brazil's success in reducing deforestation*, in "Tropical Conservation Science", 6, 3, pp. 426-445.

B. Burke (2010), *Cooperatives for "fair globalization"? Indigenous people, cooperatives and corporate social responsibility in the Brazilian Amazon*, in "Latin American Perspectives", 37, 6, pp. 30-52.

J. Buxton (2019), *Continuity and change in Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution*, in "Third World Quarterly", 27 August.

A. Cathcart (2013), *Directing democracy: competing interest and contested terrain the John Lewis Partnership*, in "Journal of Industrial Relations", 55, 4, pp. 601-620.

H.J. Chang (2014), *Economics: The User's Guide* (London: Penguin).

G. Cheney, I. Cruiz, A. Peredo, E. Nazareno (2014), *Worker cooperatives as an organizational alternative*, in "Organization", 21, 5, pp. 591-603.

D. Cibrario (2020), *The labour dimension of remunicipalisation*, in S. Kishimoto, L. Steinfort, O. Petitjean (2020), *The Future is Public: Towards the Democratic Ownership of Public Services* (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute), pp. 177-190.

J. Ciulla (2000), *The Working Life* (New York: Three Rivers Press).

G.D.H. Cole (1957), *The Case for Industrial Partnership* (New York: St Martin's Press).

A. Cumbers (2020), *The Case for Economic Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity).

A. Cumbers, S. Becker (2018), *Making sense of remunicipalisation: theoretical reflections on and political possibilities from Germany's Rekommumalisierung process*, in "Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society", 11, 3, pp. 503-517.

A. Cumbers, F. Paul (2020), *Remunicipalisation, mutating neoliberalism and the conjuncture*, Adam Smith Business School University of Glasgow Conceptual Working Paper, Global Remunicipalisation Project.

P. Dauvergne (2018), *Will Big Business Destroy Our Planet?* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

D. Dorling (2019), *Inequality and the 1%* (London: Verso).

P. Edwards, J. Wajcman (2005), *The Politics of Working Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

A. Errasti (2015), *Mondragon's Chinese subsidiaries: Cooptalist multinationals in practice*, in "Economic and Industrial Democracy", 36, 3, pp. 479-499.

E. Errasti, I. Bretos, A. Nunez (2017), *The viability of cooperatives: the fall of the Mondragon Cooperative Fagor*, in "Review of Radical Political Economies", 49, 2, pp. 181-197.

A. Flanders, R. Pomeranbz, J. Woodward (1968), *Experiment in Industrial Democracy* (London: Faber & Faber).

P. Fleming (2017), *The Death of Homo Economicus* (London: Pluto Press).

B. Gil (2013), *Moving towards eco-unionism: reflecting the Spanish experience*, in N. Räthzel, D. Uzell (eds.), *Trade Unions in the Green Economy* (London: Routledge), pp. 64-77.

J. Grady, M. Simms (2019), *Trade unions and the challenge of fostering solidarities in an era of financialisation*, in "Economic and Industrial Democracy", 40, 3, pp. 490-510.

R. Gunderson (2019), *Work time reduction and economic democracy as climate change mitigation strategies*, in "Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences", 9, pp. 35-44.

C. Harnecker (2009), *Workplace democracy and social consciousness: a study of Venezuelan cooperatives*, in "Science & Society", 73, 3, pp. 309-339.

C. Hines (2000), *Localization: A Global Manifesto* (London: Earthscan).

J. Hyman (2018), *Employee Voice and Participation: Contested Past, Troubled Present, Uncertain Future* (London: Routledge).

R. Hyman (2011), *Trade unions, global competition and options for solidarity*, in A. Bieler, I. Lindberg (eds.), *Global Restructuring and the Challenges for Transnational Solidarity* (London: Routledge), pp. 16-27.

R. Hyman, R. Gumbrell-McCormick (2020), *(How) can international trade union organisation be democratic?*, in "Transfer", 26, 1, pp. 1-20.

International Commission for Labor Rights (2013), *Merchants of menace: repressing workers in India's new industrial belt* (New York: ICLR).

ILO (2011), *Promoting co-operatives: a guide to ILO recommendation 193* (Geneva: ILO).

ITUC (2020), *ITUC Global Rights Index* (Brussels: International Trade Union Confederation).

A. Kalleberg (2018), *Precarious Lives: Job Insecurity and Well-Being in Rich Democracies* (Cambridge: Polity).

S. Kasmir (1996), *The Myth of Mondragon: Cooperatives, Politics and Working-Class Life in a Basque Town* (New York: SUNY Press).

S. Kasmir (2016), *The Mondragon cooperatives and global capitalism: a critical analysis*, in "New Labor Forum", 25, 1, pp. 52-59.

S. Kishimoto, L. Steinfort, O. Petitjean (2020), *The Future is Public: Towards the Democratic Ownership of Public Services* (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute).

N. Klein (2007), *The Shock Doctrine* (London: Penguin).

N. Klein (2019), *On Fire: The Burning Case for a Green New Deal* (London: Allen Lane).

K. Laaser (2016), *"If you are having a go at me, I am going to have a go at you": the changing nature of social relationships of bank work under performance management*, in "Work, Employment & Society", 30, 6, pp. 1000-1016.

F. Livesey (2017), *From Global to Local* (London: Profile Books).

J. Logue, J. Yates (2001), *The Real World of Employee Ownership* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

B. McLean, P. Elkind (2004), *The Smartest Guys in the Room* (London: Penguin).

J. McMurtry (1998), *The Cancer Stage of Capitalism* (London: Pluto).

D. Michaels (2020), *The Triumph of Doubt: Dark Money and the Science of Deception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

K. Middlemas (1979), *Politics in Industrial Society* (London: André Deutsch).

J. Moraes, C. Freire (2020), *Locally Universal: Universal Basic Income Policies in the Post-Pandemic World-Order*, in "Glocalism. Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation", 2, pp. 1-21.

P. North, M. Scott Cato (2018), *Towards Just and Sustainable Economies* (Bristol: Polity Press), pp. 1-12.

G. Nuttall (2012), *Sharing success: the Nuttall review of employee ownership* (London: Dept. of Business, Innovation and Skills).

E. Olsen (2014), *The relative survival of worker cooperatives and barriers to their creation*, in T. Kato (ed.), *Advances in* *the Economic Analysis of Participatory & Labour-Managed Firms*, 14, 83-107.

T. Palmer (2019), *State of the sector: US worker cooperatives in 2017*, in “Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership”, 2, 3, pp. 190-201.

C. Pateman (1970), *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

A. Pettifor (2019), *The Case for the Green New Deal* (London: Verso).

L. Pettinger (2019), *What’s Wrong with Work?* (Bristol: Polity Press).

J. Pencavel (2002), *Worker Participation: Lessons from the Worker Co-ops of the Pacific Northwest* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).

A. Pendleton (2005), *Employee share ownership, employment relationships and corporate governance*, in B. Harley, J. Hyman, P. Thompson (eds.), *Participation and Democracy at Work* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 75-93.

V. Pérotin (2012), *The performance of worker cooperatives*, in P. Battilani, H. Schröter (eds.), *The Cooperative Business Movement 1950 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 195-221.

V. Pérotin (2018), *What do we really know about worker co-operatives?* (Manchester: Co-operatives UK).

O. Petitjean (2017), *Remunicipalisation in France: From addressing corporate abuse to reinventing democratic, sustainable local public services*, in S. Kishimoto, O. Petitjean (eds.), *Reclaiming Public Services* (Amsterdam: TNI), pp. 23-33.

T. Piketty (2020), *Ideology and Capital* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

PSIRU (2014), *Public and private sector efficiency: a briefing for the EPSU Congress*, University of Greenwich, May.

H. Ramsay (1977), *Cycles of control: worker participation in sociological and historical perspective*, in "Sociology", 11, 3, pp. 481-506.

H. Ramsay (1980), *Phantom participation: patterns of power and conflict*, in "Industrial Relations Journal", 11, 3, pp. 46-59.

G. Standing (2019), *Plunder of the Commons: A Manifesto for Sharing Public Wealth* (London: Penguin).

S. Stern (2020), *Redesigning the CEO: how employee ownership changes the art of leadership*, in "Ownership at Work", March.

W. Streeck (2016), *How Will Capitalism End?* (London: Verso).

L. Terzic (2017), *Remunicipalisation in Germany and Austria: What does it mean for employees?*, in S. Kishimoto, O. Petitjean (eds.), *Reclaiming Public Services* (Amsterdam: TNI), pp. 81-92.

A. Tooze (2019), *Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World* (London: Penguin Books).

TNI (2018), *The future for democratic water: resistance and alternatives*, https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-future-for-democratic-public-water-resistance-and-alter natives.

UN (2017), *Report of the Secretary-General, "Cooperatives in social development"*, General Assembly, A/72/159.

G. Van Houten, G. Russo (2020), *Enquête sur les enterprises en Europe 2019 – Les pratiques sur le lieu de travail qui permettent de libérer le potential des salaries* (Luxembourg: Cedefop and Eurofound).

V. Vijay, S. Pimm, C. Jenkins, S. Smith (2016), *The impacts of oil palm on recent deforestation and biodiversity loss*, in "PLoS ONE", 11, 7.

L. Wenar (2016), *Blood Oil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

R. Wilkinson, K. Pickett (2010), *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone* (London: Penguin).

M. Wilson (2016), *Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press).

A. Zaifer (2019), *Constructing a substantial alternative to privatization: Promoting democratic control and social commitment*, in “Science & Society”, 83, 4, pp. 495-521.

Abstract

Invited to peek into the mysterious and arcane academic glocal universe, I became intrigued by the range and depth of disciplines, theoretical perspectives and topics which the subject can embrace. Nonetheless, my impression is that, as ever in the economic world, power relations rest at the centre of globalisation-localisation and attendant debates. And so, it is with participation, which can be analysed at different levels and through different prisms, but my interests in these debates rest on the specific but essential question of organisational participation. Its elemental nature has taken on greater significance as the world faces existentialist crises as a consequence of unrestrained commercial activity made through decisions which directly affect working people and their communities, but over which they exercise little control.

Keywords

Financial participation, glocalisation, worker cooperatives, employee-owned enterprises, remunicipalisation.

WHAT THREAT?
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST "GENDER IDEOLOGY"

Judith Butler
University of California Berkeley (U.S.A.)

The idea of gender ideology emerged in the 1990s when the Roman Catholic Family Council warned against the idea of "gender" as a threat to the family and to biblical authority[1]. Although one can trace its origins in the Family Council documents, it has travelled in ways that track the political power of the Vatican as well as its newly formed alliance with the Evangelical Church in Latin America. One could approach the topic by offering an academic argument that disputes the claims made about gender, and that would surely be important (Butler 2019b). But such an academic task goes only part of the way in trying to understand why gender has become such a polarizing term, inciting rage and fear across many communities. The reasons for that incitement are surely various, and sometimes rooted in local struggles, but they also are linked, especially through internet petitions and newsletters that construe "gender" as a

---

[1] For the Family Council Statement from 2004, see http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html. See also Case 2011, 2016. Parts of this discussion are taken from my forthcoming essay (Butler 2019a).

threat to the family, the distinct values of masculinity and femininity, society, the Church, and civilization itself. It appears that the proposition that gender is a social construction lead to a conviction that individuals could choose their gender or live in ways that are unconstrained by marriage and heterosexuality. That inference, however, assimilated the doctrine of social construction to an unbridled view of personal liberty, and there are many reasons to be suspicious of that reduction. Among those who propagated such views as Joseph Scala who published a book in Argentina and read by Catholic communities and then was widely distributed by the Evangelical Church attacking "gender ideology" (Scala 2010). It warned against the voluntarist and destructive character of the concept of gender which was then condemned as inimical both to religion and to science. In subsequent years, gender has become an issue in several major elections in Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, France, Switzerland, and Germany, and it is now intensely contested in Hungary (where gender studies was abolished as a field) and throughout the Balkans.

In all of these contexts, gender is understood as a single "ideology" that refutes the reality of sexual difference and that seeks to appropriate the divine power of creation for those who wish to create their own genders. Personal choice is understood to have taken the place of divine creativity. In other regions, such as Germany, gender ideology or, indeed, gender studies, is regularly characterized as totalitarian, suggesting that it prescribes gender roles and suppresses personal liberty (von Redecker 2016; Hark, Villa 2015). In Brazil, the very idea of the nation, of masculinity itself, is understood as threatened by a "gender ideology" characterized as a dangerous cultural import. In all of these cases, there seems to be no interest in what the complex and conflictual field of gender and sexuality studies actually includes, its regional variants, its guiding methodological debates. Whether it is "gender" as a term or "gender ideology" as a spurious reference to "gender studies" it is summed up by a phantasm that deflects from the fact that hardly anyone who opposes this matter has read texts within the field or considers their arguments. Indeed, the position against gender seems to be a position against reading more generally. In Switzerland, I was once accosted by a woman who let me know that she prays for me, and when I asked why, she explained that gender was "diabolical" and that she hoped I would find redemption for my responsibility in circulating the term or the theory or the phantasm. When I asked whether she had ever read my work, she exclaimed that she would never read any book on gender! As I was trying to ask whether she felt fine about dismissing a book she had never read, she was already moving swiftly out the door.

The furor began some years ago when the Pope's family council, then directed by Joseph Ratzinger, warned that gender theorists were imperiling the family by questioning the notion that appropriately Christian social roles could be derived from biological sex. It was in the nature of sex for women to do domestic work and for men to undertake action in public life. The integrity of the family, understood as both Christian and natural, was said to be imperiled by this gender ideology. The arguments were starkly pre-feminist, which is perhaps one reason why the first objection on the part of the Catholic Church to the concept of "gender" was considered odd, even amusing, by feminists who did not then anticipate the implications of the opposition. Ratzinger made public his concern at the Beijing Conference on the Status of Women in 1995, and then again in 2004, as head of the Pontifical Council on the Family, in a Letter to Bishops, underscoring the potential of "gender" to destroy feminine values important to the Church and the natural distinction between the two sexes (Vatican 2004). As Pope Benedict XVI, he went further in 2012, maintaining that such "ideologies" deny the "pre-ordained duality of man and woman", and thus deny "the family" as "a reality established by creation". Because, he argued, man and woman are created by God, those who seek to create themselves deny the creative power of God and are mislead by an atheistic set of beliefs. By 2016, Pope Francis, despite his occasionally progressive views, continued the line developed by Pope Benedict: "We are experiencing a moment of the annihilation of man as the image of God". He specifically included as an instance of this defacement "[the ideology of] 'gender'". He was clearly outraged that, "today children – children! – are taught in school that everyone can choose his or her sex… And this [sic] terrible!". Then he made affirmative reference to Benedict XVI and claimed, "God created man and woman; God created the world in a certain way…and we are doing the exact opposite" (San Martín 2017). It would appear from this perspective that humans have taken over the creative power of the divine. Pope Francis has gone further to argue that proponents of gender are like those who support or deploy nuclear arms and that their target is creation itself. This suggests that whatever gender is, it carries enormous destructive power in the minds of those who oppose it – indeed, an unfathomable and terrifying destructiveness. It is represented as a demonic force of destruction pitted against God's creative powers. This is one reason that gender is understood as exercising demonic powers – "a diabolical ideology".

Perhaps it was renewed papal support of the fight against gender in 2015 and 2016 that encouraged bishops throughout the world to escalate the anti-gender ideology campaign into an international project, one that crosses hemispheres, affecting elections in Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica, and recently playing a significant role in the election of right-wing Jair Bolsonaro as President of Brazil. His inaugural speech in early January of 2019 contained a commitment to eradicate "gender ideology in the schools" and he vowed to resist "ideological submission" (Presidency of the Republic of Brasil 2019). Since being elected, he has sought to eradicate sex education in schools and replaced it with a curriculum that enforces the idea of binary gender difference. In October of 2018, Hungary not only eliminated gender studies from the list of approved master's programs but forced the Central European University, known for its international gender program, to relocate to Vienna in part because of its sponsorship for western academic projects such as feminist and gender studies (Peto 2018).

After the successful legal battle for gay marriage in France in 2013, a backlash took place the following year. A prominent course curriculum in France called *ABCD de l'égalité* offered students a way to think about the difference between biological sex and cultural gender, and it was rescinded after strong public accusations that gender theory was being taught in the primary schools. Pope Francis met with one of the organizers of the effort to withdraw the program. Argentina, the Pope's country of origin, is the country with the most progressive laws on gender freedom, allowing any person to choose to change gender without medical authorization. In 2014, and in reaction to its progressive Gender Identity Law passed in 2012, *La ideología de género* published by Jorge Scala started to circulate among Christian communities, both Catholic and Evangelical, in Argentina and, in its Portuguese version, in Brazil. In the Spanish region of Andalucia, the ultra-conservative Vox party has recently petitioned the center-right Ciudananos Party to combat what they call "the jihadism of gender". They oppose singling out men who commit violence against women and trans people and call for an opposition to "intra-familial" violence rather than gender-based violence, pointing out that men can be victims too.

The aim of this movement is not simply to eliminate the word "gender" or even to outlaw the so-called theory of gender, but to undermine the justification for a wide range of policies. The alliance of right-wing Catholics and Evangelicals has a clear platform: they oppose feminism, LGBTQI rights, especially gay marriage and trans legal and medical rights, single mothers, gay parents, and more. My wager is that as neoliberal economic policies devastate the work lives and the sense of futurity for many people who face contingent labor and unpayable debt, the turn against "gender" is a way of shoring up a traditional sense of place and privilege. It also draws the line between public and private, walling off the family and its patriarchal privilege from the market, where humiliation and dispensability have become the norm. Both the nationalist and traditionalist investment in prohibiting gay marriage, gay and lesbian families and adoption rights, trans and *travestis* rights, single parent adoption and access to reproductive technology, gender inequality, and the concept of "gender" itself follows from the fact that the heteronormative family is now being defended, sometimes violently, as the sole defense against devastating market forces. The anti-gender ideology movement has taken hold in the wake of gay marriage legislation, arguing that religion ought to be the arbiter of marital arrangements and that "progressive" legislation ought not to undermine the heterosexual family with its distinct, natural, and hierarchical roles for women and men. Opposing or reversing inclusive trends in family law, demanding new laws that prohibit forms of procreation or adoption outside the traditional family form as well as changing genders assigned at birth, or affirming the equality between men and women all work to this end.

Consider that the defense of the natural and normative character of the heterosexually organized family, linked with the insistence that reproduction requires heterosexuality and the privileged power of the father within the family, becomes an especially intense political issue where state-funded social services to families have been decimated and dependency on Churches has increased for basic services to those abandoned by the state. I say "abandoned" by the state, but in such cases, many understand themselves to be saved by the Church. How does that saving dissimulate and continue the conditions of abandonment? Although not a model for Church interventions cross-regionally, the evangelical Church in the US gained much of its power in the wake of the decimation of state funds for AFDC, as Melinda Cooper has shown (Cooper 2017; see also Halley, Rittich 2010). As asset appreciation becomes the source of wealth, and massive cuts in wages, secure employment, and social welfare follow, and as unions and their bargaining powers are increasingly subject to destruction, criminalization, or disregard, the heteronormative family assumes, or reassumes a crucial role. It is not just, as Cooper argues, that the family becomes the central site and mechanism for the transmission of wealth, but that family dynasties become popular ideals, and family fortunes, like the one that is currently running our country, become exemplary modes of wealth accumulation. The funds the state expended on welfare, including securing payments to mothers and children – in the US, especially African American communities – became figured by neo-conservatives as a drain on the state, and an inappropriate intervention into the family through legal and economic instruments. The withdrawal of state support, with the help of Bill Clinton, abandoned poor families, destroying whatever safety net might have once existed. In its place was instated the idea of responsibility that drew both on individualism and its Christian variants.

My point is that what I am calling "abandonment" is the very phenomenon championed, as we know, by neo-conservatives and neo-liberals as sound fiscal policy, that is, a policy that regards as appropriate the withdrawal of the state from private, moral, and social matters. In the US and elsewhere, the authority of the Evangelical Church has stepped in, as it were, not just to give moral order to the family without which the economy cannot function but to aid and abet free market economics as it intensifies precarity for increasing numbers of people. The complex alliance between the spread of Evangelicism and the support for neoliberal economics is one that I cannot explain at length in these pages, but Bethany Moreton (2010) has persuasively argued that in the US context, white Christian women who constitute the driving force of the evangelical movement understand quite clearly that "family values are in indispensable element of the global service economy, not a distraction from it" (Moreton 2010: 5). Indeed, the evangelical church is itself part of free enterprise, or what some call Christian enterprise, and that the convergence consistently claims to be the only alternative to socialism or communism or to elites on campus. Thus, the centrality of Walmart as a "populist multinational". Just as family values are indispensable to the service economy, so faith-based welfare networks are indispensable to the withdrawal of government from the mandate to provide social services to those in need, from the basic ideals of social democracy.

Some have argued that it was the legal advances of the LGBTQI movement that spurred the anti-gender ideology movement, especially the right to privacy that struck down anti-sodomy laws, but also the legalization of gay marriage.

Both have been understood as triumphs of an elite, secular, and nihilistic set of social movements galvanized in part by college campuses and compliant corporations. These new rights are themselves the sign of the destruction of culture, humanity, sexual difference, or religious authority. The battles against women's rights, trans rights, and the rights of LGBTQI people more generally is regarded as the effort to save civilization, the natural order, the divine order, and in its suppression of freedoms moves closer to the full embrace of authoritarianism. The authoritarian strains of the states that adopt the anti-gender ideology position are sometimes mixed with fascist trends – another paper would be required to explain the difference and the connection. Yet, the confusion of discourses is part of what constitutes the fascist structure and appeal of at least some of these movements. One can oppose gender as a cultural import from the North at the same time that one can see that very opposition as a social movement against further colonization of the South. The result is not a turn to the Left, but an embrace of ethno-nationalism. The social movement of gender rights and freedoms is itself positioned ambivalently: some human rights frameworks are arguably culturally imperialist, but some queer and trans movements are clearly part of an anti-imperialist struggle on the Left. When the anti-gender ideology advocates see themselves as energized by anti-imperialism, they drawing upon the very energies of movements they seek to defeat.

Significantly, the radical changes in economic life, including the loss of basic structures of social welfare produce a heightened sense of precarity and fear among populations who are then told that it is "gender ideology" that is breaking apart the family, destroying heterosexuality as a natural law, threatening both God's creative powers and civilization itself. Clearly, the effort to fortify the heteronormative family through more autocratic moral and religious mandates seeks to stop queer alternatives to the family, single mothers, assisted reproductive technology to those out of wedlock, trans rights, all because *a*) they challenge collectively the heteronormative fantasy that sustains the idea of the nation, one that often depends upon a doubling of the two fathers (familial and state masculine leadership), but also *b*) relieves the state of having to provide financial assistance to dependent women and children. We should not underestimate the assault on family dependency entitlements by neoliberal policies. Fathers have to be hauled back into the family as an alternative, whether through legal constraints or religious requirements. The defense of the place of the father within the family against assaults by "gender" facilitates the state decimation of public programs and social services, the transfer of such services to faith-based initiatives and enterprises (and their profits), at the same time that it seeks to prevent further legal progress for feminism and the LGBTQI movement, both of which are considered destructive in nature, if not outright demonic. Devils, apparently, must be expelled, burnt in effigy, or imprisoned, but they cannot be accommodated. And they surely don't deserve rights.

I would suggest that we understand the historical formulation of neoliberalism and financialization (the imperative to increase assets at the expense of securing fair wages) not as the cause of the anti-gender ideology movement, but as part of the complex scene of heightened conflict where nationalism, racism, and heightened militarism ally with anti-gender ideology propaganda. The focus on the figure of the father in its familial/political over-determination is part of this constellation, especially in its relation to fascism. My wager is that the more fully social services are decimated in favor of private contracts and outsourcing, the more that national wealth is determined by movements within global capitalism that culminate in dispossession and precarity, the stronger the two Churches become, supplying as it were the moral complement to dispossession as well as its rationale. First, the precarity is one that the Church can ameliorate, exchanging basic goods for ideological exposure, but also, perhaps more fundamentally, through a process that seeks to mandate and instill the singularly moral character of heterosexual marriage social and the destructive character of all other sexual formations. In other words, the strategic abandonment of populations in need, together with the refusal to guarantee decent wages or working conditions facilitates the role of the state to license and protect the maximization of assets without limit. The specific feature of financialization that seems important here is that finance is based on speculation on future outcomes, and it always carries the risk, if not the certainty, of a new crisis (Brown 2015). It may well be, as some have suggested, that the relation between financialization and crisis is structural. Under these conditions, what sense of future and stability can there possibly be, especially for those who have no power to engage in so-called asset appreciation? Something is clearly destroying the sense of future for many people, but how we name that "something" has never mattered more.

And yet, the new alliance of Christianity and fascism proclaims that one main cause of this chaos, this threat to futurity itself, is gender understood as a threat to social structures, to the nation, to communities, their histories and their futures. For conservative Catholics and Evangelicals, the instability and chaos that must be fended off is that which challenges the normative character of the family, but that argument does not take into account the abandonment of families by the state when wages cannot be secured. The problem is not just that men cannot make the living they require to sustain a family, but that women and young and old people everywhere are subject to increasingly precarious work conditions, foreclosed horizons, and exposed to a moral message that they are individually responsible for conditions that have undermined their very capacity to work and act. Those who are gender minorities – gender non-conforming or trans – are subject to these precarious conditions even more intensively, as is the case for queers of color in Bahia, Brazil[2].

When gender and sexual "freedoms" are regarded as destabilizing and destructive, we have to ask, from what perspective does this seem true? And what other kinds of destabilizations in society are being registered as the fault of gender? Perhaps gender is an overdetermined site where a host of such fears collect and register in such a discourse in the form of a fearful phantasm? Is it sexual freedom that has created this pervasive sense of precarity, or is it rather that the normative family emerges as the sign and the supplement of radical economic abandonment? Is the tacit understanding that the family must be restored to absorb the blows of the economy, or that any challenge to the necessary and normative structure of the family will expose the population to a yet more severe precarity? Once the family in its normative version becomes installed as the only possible safeguard against chaos and destruction, then it is freedom that is attacked in the name of preserving a social order that is, paradoxically, under attack by other means. The state requires the Church to oppose gender freedoms in order to reinstall and naturalize modes of masculine authority in the family and the state, but also to empower the state to follow financialization as if it were the name for a bright future, even as it systematically exposes populations to precarity

---

[2] For crimes of violence against LGBTQI people in Bahia, see https://grupogaydabahia. com.br.mony.

whose political support it requires, condemning them to a life whose sense of futurity is constantly under threat.

References

W. Brown (2015), *Undoing the Demos. Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books).

J. Butler (2019a), *Anti-Gender Ideology and Mahmood's Critique of the Secular Age,* in "Journal of the American Academy of Religion", 87, 4.

J. Butler (2019b), *The Backlash against "gender ideology" must stop*, in "NewStatesman", 24 January, https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/01/judith-butler-backlash-against-gender-ideology-must-stop.

M.A. Case (2011), *After Gender the Destruction of Man? The Vatican's Nightmare Vision of the Gender Agenda for the Law*, in "Pace Law Review", 31, pp. 802-817.

M.A. Case (2016)*, The Role of the Popes in the Invention of Complementarity and the Vatican's Anathematization of Gender*, in "Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers", 565.

M. Cooper (2017), *Family Values* (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books).

J. Halley, K. Rittich (2010), *Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law*, in "American Journal of Comparative Law", 58, pp. 753-775.

S. Hark, P.I. Villa (eds.) (2015), *Anti-Genderismus: Sexualität und Geschlecht als Schauplätze aktueller* (Bielefeld: Transcript).

B. Moreton (2010), *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

A. Peto (2018), *Attack on Freedom of Education in Hungary. The case of gender studies*, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2018/09/24/attack-on-freedom-of-education-in-hungary-the-case-of-gender-studies.

Presidency of the Republic of Brazil (2019), *In inaugural speech, Bolsonaro calls for support to rebuild the Country*, http://www.brazil.gov.br/about-brazil/news/2019/01/in-inaugural-speech-bolsonaro-calls-for-support-to-rebuild-the-country.

I. San Martín (2017), *Pope Francis: Ideological colonization a "blasphemy against God"*, in "Crux", 21 November, https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2017/11/pope-francis-ideological-colonization-blasphemy-god.

J. Scala (2010), *La ideologia de Genero* (Madrid: Sekotia).

E. von Redecker (2016), *Anti-Genderismus and right-wing hegemony*, in "Radical Philosophy", 198, https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/anti-genderismus-and-right%E2%80 %91wing-hegemony.

Abstract

The idea of gender ideology emerged in the 1990s when the Roman Catholic Family Council warned against the idea of "gender" as a threat to the family and to biblical authority. In subsequent years, gender has become an issue in several major elections all over the world. Gender is understood as a single "ideology" that refutes the reality of sexual difference and that seeks to appropriate the divine power of creation for those who wish to create their own genders. Today the defense of the natural and normative character of the heterosexually organized family, linked with the insistence that reproduction requires heterosexuality and the privileged power of the father within the family, becomes an especially intense political issue where state-funded social services to families have been decimated and dependency on Churches has increased for basic services to those abandoned by the state. Significantly, the radical changes in economic life, including the loss of basic structures of social welfare produce a heightened sense of precarity and fear among populations who are then told that it is “gender ideology” that is breaking apart the family, destroying heterosexuality as a natural law, threatening both God’s creative powers and civilization itself. In this paper, I would suggest that we understand the historical formulation of neoliberalism and financialization (the imperative to increase assets at the expense of securing fair wages) not as the cause of the anti-gender ideology movement, but as part of the complex scene of heightened conflict where nationalism, racism, and heightened militarism ally with anti-gender ideology propaganda.

Keywords

Gender, ideology, neoliberalism, financialization, social welfare.

GLOCALIZATION: SELF-REFERENTIAL REMEMBRANCES

Roland Robertson
University of Pittsburgh (USA)
University of Aberdeen (UK)
r.robertson@abdn.ac.uk

What follows is not so much a substantive contribution to the theme of glocalization per se, even though there is some of that, but rather it consists in a contextualization of this theme from a self-referential perspective and a considerable amount of speculation concerning the differential pursuit of matters glocal. To put this a different way, I discuss glocalization, as well as glocality, within the context of binaries and antinomies that have been deployed in social science. At the same time, I briefly glance at what I call calculated avoidance of "the glocal". It will be seen that over the years there has been much less of the latter compared with the present, but that it is well-worth noting the strong residue of a kind of embarrassment about directly invoking the global-glocal connection. This, I claim is well-worth exploring, largely because it is my belief that accomplishing this will greatly enhance the significance of the global-local relationship, particularly at a time when the latter is so salient. Its salience is to be vividly witnessed in the current wave of populism and populism's connection with the rise of the new forms of authoritarianism.

My first conscious encounter with the word and idea of glocalization was an indirect result of the intellectual concern that I had strongly developed with globalization in the 1970s and particularly the 1980s. It should be said in this respect that there were a number of binaries, and antimonies, in social scientific discourse in the 1960s and 1970s that undoubtedly had a strong bearing on my thinking about globalization and subsequently glocalization. These included such conceptions as universalism-particularism, cosmopolitanism-localism, center-periphery and others. There were also older pairings such as transcendence-immanence and sacred-profane. In any case, the genealogy inspired by such binaries and/or antinomies was undoubtedly in my mind as I began to enter what turned out to be, what might well be described as, the glocal fray. However, it should be emphasized that in the present context the latter formulation is somewhat misleading. I say this because at that time I genuinely thought that I was using the word glocalization before anybody else had used it. However, I was wrong for, in fact, Erik Swyngedouw had used this concept very cogently around the same time. I actually learned this much later, in 2001 (Robertson 2014: 27; Swyngedouw 2004).

The phrase glocal fray that I have just invoked is particularly relevant for the simple reason that tussles over glocalization and associated terms have been the hallmark of debates around this topic. More specifically, appreciation of the vacillation between positive and negative attitudes to this theme is vital to the comprehension of the subject at hand. In fact, comprehending the bumpy career of the idea of the glocal is of great relevance in the understanding of concepts in general. Having said this I should emphasize strongly that the glocal is now rapidly gaining ground in various countries and disciplines.

The beginning of my own direct involvement in the theme of glocalization can be dated to a paper I gave at a conference in Darmstadt, Germany in 1992 (Robertson 1995; see Robertson 2004, 2014); although I had very briefly invoked it in my book that was published in the same year (Robertson 1992). Of particular importance in the present context is the fact that the conference in question was entitled “Global Civilization and Local Cultures”. It was advertised and promoted via the highlighting of a pictorial image of the local being erased by the global. This seemed to me at the time to be particularly German and the paper that I presented constituted my original attempt to overcome the latter. In any case, regardless of this “Germanic” tendency it was clear to me that this erasure of the local by the global was not satisfactory for a potentially world-wide readership.

It so happens that shortly before I began to compose the present article I was also, virtually simultaneously, being interviewed by the editor-in-chief of the journal “Theory Culture & Society”, Mike Featherstone (2020). During the course of this, I had occasion to mention how important was the fact that during my upbringing I had become increasingly enthusiastic about the discipline of geography; particularly, but not exclusively, human geography. At that time geography was not highly valued, at least in the British educational system, whereas now it is a pivotal subject in most educational systems across the world. This realization neatly fitted with what has long been my ongoing interest in the paintings and life of Johannes Vermeer. Indeed, my interest in geography may in a subtle way have influenced my interest in Vermeer himself. In fact, a recent biography of Vermeer makes much of his geographical location with regard to adequate appreciation of his art. It is well known that his paintings have much to do with the Dutch city of Delft; despite the fact that Delft appears in only five of his paintings. One of these, entitled *The*

Geographer, illustrated the wider world that was, so to speak, enveloping and invading Delft.

The Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC) was founded in 1602 when a number of other European trading companies were entering Asia. The VOC was, during the seventeenth century, so prominent in Delft that it was common knowledge there that there was a strong connection between Delft and East Asia (Testot 2020: 216-217). In fact, tens of thousands of Dutch people worked for the VOC, including three of Vermeer's cousins. In the concluding chapter of his biography of Vermeer, Brook (2008: 217-230) based his thinking about him on the well-known statement by the English poet, John Donne, "No man is an Island, entire of himself". Indeed, Donne emphasized the geographical layers of man's location in continents and in the world as a whole. He also remarked that any one person's death diminishes him, precisely because he or she is involved in mankind as a whole. In any case, Brook remarked that when Donne spoke in 1623 it was because it was the first time in human history that, not merely was Donne himself not an island, no other human being was. "No longer was the world a series of locations so isolated from each other that something could happen in one and have absolutely no effect on what was going on in any other". The idea of a common humanity was emerging, and with it the possibility of a shared history (Brook 2018: 221).

Brook's biography of Vermeer is one of an increasing number of books published during the present century that claims the author was adopting a global perspective and/or that the subject in question was of significant global relevance. At the same time Brook is, like many others, emphasizing the view of the global from the perspective of a local location. My argument in this respect is that extensive highlighting of the notion of "the global" is largely a product of our time, meaning that we now live in a fast-globalizing world and that we almost inevitably think globally. Paradoxically, this is why we now find so much anti-global sentiment. Here it should be pointed out that the latter is at the very core of populist thinking. In fact, this conflation of the local and the global is, very ironically, at the center of what we now call glocal analysis; but not, it should be very strongly emphasized, in the same manner, nor for the same motive.

Another highly relevant person from the "intellectual world" that deserves mention here, not least because he is one of my favorite novelists, is Joseph Conrad. He warrants attention because in his novel entitled *Victory* (Conrad 1915) he states the following: "I am the world itself, come to pay you a visit". In fact, this declaration is in the frontispiece of a recent biography of Conrad by Maya Jasanoff (2017) called *The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World.* In this book Jasanoff characterizes Conrad as a stranger in strange lands, an author writing at what she calls the dawn of globalization. It is more accurate to say that Conrad writes about glocalization rather than the globalization that is often said to be accelerating around the beginning of the twentieth century. By this I mean that Conrad's image of the world is constrained by the particular places that he is living in or visiting at any given time. In any case Jasanoff centers her characterization of Conrad on connectivity as the defining feature of globalization. However, even though this is a very common practice she errs in confining globalization in this way. Simply put, she omits the crucial factor(s) of culture and/or consciousness. Instead, she concentrates entirely on Conrad's extensive travels in many parts of the world and also dwells on the partitioning of the country of Conrad's birth, namely Poland. Jasanoff's image of Conrad centers upon his being a striking reminder of an age when writers usually worked on a very limited geographical scale, whereas

Conrad's arena spanned the entire globe. In a sense this was his major claim to fame. In sum, Jasanoff fails to give her attention to the cultural dimension of Conrad's travels. This is a common error among many scholars of globalization – and, of course, glocalization.

It is appropriate at this point to mention the pivotal significance of Japan in my thinking about glocalization. However, before directly detailing this I should bring into consideration the manner in which Japanese Zen Buddhism flowed from Japan to Brazil. A volume, *Zen in Brazil: The Quest for Cosmopolitan Modernity* (Rocha 2006), was given to me by the author on the occasion of my visit as an invited speaker to the University of West Sydney. Rocha says early on that Brazil is a very rewarding site for an examination of the ways in which "global flows acquire local forms, and consequently how multiple modernities have emerged" (Rocha 2006: 3). Rocha's approach is both historical and anthropological. This is the way in which she attempts to embrace the transnational flows of Zen in Japan into Brazil. Even though she does not specifically use the concept of glocalization hers is most definitely a glocal approach. More generally, she is examining the connections between Japan and Brazil using a glocal methodology. I say this because it is at the core of what otherwise might be called glocal and it does not fall into the category of what I have previously called calculated avoidance. I shall deal with the latter tendency more fully at a later stage, emphasizing at this point that the phenomenon of calculated avoidance was for long a dominant characteristic of glocalization.

Rocha's book may usefully be compared with – better, brought into line with – Gary Okihiro, *Island World: A History of Hawai'i and the United States* (2008). The general thrust of the latter is the study of what the author calls Oceanic islands, defined as small, young, isolated, simple and influenced by a limited range of environmental factors. Among other themes in his book, Okihiro attempts to situate islands such as the Hawai'ian Islands and the Okinawa Islands in comparative perspective, to conceptualize what he calls a "black Pacific". Moreover, and I quote, he "articulates [...] the intersections of land and sea and their biotic communities, of the Atlantic and Pacific, of Hawai'ians and Europeans, Africans, American Indians, and Latina/os, and it transgresses sites of nation, discipline, subject, and, at times, even narrative form" (Okihiro 2008: 5). Okihiro situates much of what he says about the island world within the context of what he calls Oceana and the Polynesian triangle.

I had been writing about globalization and related matters since the late 1960s, although globalization as such was not to become vital and central to my teaching and writing until the late 1970s or early 1980s. Here it should be emphasized that the idea of glocalization was not considered at all, certainly not by me, during this period. It should be said however that comparative sociology was well developed by that time; but this focus hardly ever touched upon inter-societal relations, nor did it involve matters outside the frame of the international. The latter had become the more or less separate discipline of international relations (in fact, the latter did not become truly developed until the early 1920s).

During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s I wrote numerous pieces and presented many papers on the topic of globalization and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on glocalization. Many of these were published as articles in edited books and in a large number of countries. Of particular relevance in the present context, and with respect to glocalization, is a paper that I gave at Syracuse University in 1999. Subsequently the proceedings of this series in which my paper was given were published as *Globalization and the Margins* (2002). The significance of this was that it was announced by the editors, Richard Grant and John Rennie Short, as being based largely on my own work on glocalization, specifically my article entitled *Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity* (1995). It should be noted that this succeeded my *Globalisation or Glocalisation?* (Robertson 1994) that was published in the very first issue of an Australian journal, "The Journal of International Communication". Contrary to the claim of at least one author this article was significantly different from my article of 1995. Moreover, it was based upon a paper previously given at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in Miami Beach, Florida, in 1993 (the latter has never been published as such, but will appear shortly in a new, Polish edition of my *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* – Robertson 1992).

By 1999 I moved from Pittsburgh, USA to the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, where shortly thereafter I was to found the Centre for the Study of Globalization. The theme of glocalization played a rather large part in the affairs of the latter. While there, I collaborated considerably on the topic of glocalization with Richard Giulianotti. In fact, we jointly published eight or more articles together (mostly listed in Giulianotti, Robertson 2013). By far the majority of these concern the application of the idea of the glocal to the theme of sport. It should be emphasized in this respect that sport is a particularly prominent arena for the use of glocal approaches, combining as it does a great concern with, on the one hand local – indeed often, "hyperlocal" – teams or clubs and, on the other hand, international – better, global – teams.

In the late 1970s I began what became my numerous trips to Scandinavia, starting with Sweden in 1978 (I was to return to Sweden a number of times between then and the present). This was to be followed significantly later by engagements in Finland, Denmark and Norway. As will be seen towards the end of this paper I was, during this period, beginning to become increasingly conscious of the great significance of archipelagoes, peninsulae and islands to the idea of the glocal. I should emphasize that during my visits to Sweden I became acquainted with Ulf Hannerz, who was, and still is, one of the outstanding global sociologists of our time. Being an anthropologist he had, almost by definition, a great interest in local matters (e.g. Hannerz 2004). My visits to Sweden were quite often sponsored by the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study based in Uppsala. In Uppsala I was fortunate enough to become acquainted with social scientists from various countries.

I first went to Italy in the 1980s and once I had been there I became virtually obsessed and, more relevantly, it more than consolidated my increasing interest in glocality. Inter alia, among the cities that I visited for academic purposes were Rome, Florence, Trento, Rimini, Milan and, within Sardinia, Nuoro (I also visited Italy, including Sicily, separately strictly for vacations). It was in Nuoro that I was to undertake the teaching of a series of annual short courses usually on tourism. The latter enhanced my accelerating interest in matters glocal, largely because Sardinia is an island.

The decades of the 1980s and 1990s was the period when I became rather closely acquainted with Japan and learned thereby much that was to influence my ideas about glocalization. I first visited Japan in 1986 for a rather extended stay, during which I visited about eight or so cities, and there were two critical intellectual circumstances that were to have a great effect in shaping my thoughts on globalization and glocalization. On the one hand, I had great difficulty in conveying the idea of globalization to my Japanese audiences. Time and again, “globalization” was translated into Japanese as “internationalization”. I should say here that my principal book on globalization (Robertson 1992) was not to be translated into Japanese – and then only in part – until later in the decade.

Meanwhile, I had become acquainted with the Japanese notion of *dochakuka,* this broadly meaning in English, indigenization. This Japanese term was, unbeknown to me at that time, widely used in business circles in Japan and to some extent in the USA. However, upon my attending a conference in Tokyo in 1996 entitled "Globalization and Indigenous Culture" where my own contribution was entitled *Comments on the "Global Triad" and "Glocalization".* Ironically, I used the concept of glocalization without any apparent problem for my audience. Moreover, upon visiting Japan again at the beginning of the new century, I read in an English language Japanese newspaper ("Japan Times") that a new word had entered Japan. The word in question was no other than glocalization (even though the latter had apparently been used there in business circles for a number of years). This ostensibly new word was said to enable the Japanese populace to protect their own culture. My last visit to Japan was to the Center For Glocal Studies, Seijo University in Tokyo and the University of Fukui. In Fukui itself to talk and specifically about glocalization (Robertson 2019). During the period of my frequent visits to Japan, mainly in the 1990s, I also had occasion to visit South Korea on at least two occasions (see Robertson 2003).

I turn now to a particularly striking aspect in the genealogy of glocalization. To be more specific I am concerned here with the ways in which the word glocalization has been puzzlingly omitted. First, I invoke the volume published in 1996 and edited by Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake entitled *Global/Local.* The puzzle concerns the glaring omission, particularly in retrospect, of the seemingly obvious word glocalization. I know that some of the contributors to this volume were familiar with my writing on this concept. In any case, quite apart from this, there remains the issue as to why the authors came so precariously close to using the word but veered away from actually using it. For example, the editors introduce the volume by stating that they are tracking the global/local. Arif Dirlik's chapter is entitled *The Global in the Local*; Dana Polan's chapter is entitled *Globalisms Localism's*; Paul Bove's chapter is entitled *Global/Local Memory and Thought*; while Ping-hui Liao's chapter has the subtitle *Global/Local Dialectics*.

My next exhibit of "delinquency" is much more recent. It is Vanessa Ogle (2015) *The Global Transformation of Time: 1870-1950*. In an otherwise extremely impressive volume, Ogle's first chapter is entitled *National Times in a Globalizing World* and the rest of her book implements this program without ever mentioning the obvious word, glocalization. One should note in this respect that this volume was published about twenty years or more after the word glocalization, and the processes to which that referred, was first announced (much of it was, of course, talked about and applied in the intervening years). Moreover, much is said in this book about the local standardization of time, and one might well say here, in invoking this volume, that it virtually cries out for the use of the specific term glocalization.

Well before the early 2000s I had become increasingly aware of the significance of the history of global thought. If one were to pinpoint the clear starting point for the not unproblematic merging of history and the study of the global/local it might well be the article by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright entitled *World History in a Global Age*, in the "American Historical Review" (Geyer, Bright 1995). My principal argument in review of this piece was that the authors had drastically misunderstood the nature of intellectual work on the global by social scientists generally – or, more specifically, the theme of globalization. As not a few others had done, they presented an image of globalization as a process that resulted in the world as a whole becoming normatively integrated. This view was, of course, one to which I strongly objected and was indeed a major aspect in my rejective intervention (Robertson 1998).

Among the many books by historians involving use of the global perspective the most significant, in my view, have been written by Jurgen Osterhammel. The latter's first significant contribution, at least in English translation, was *Globalization: A Short History* (Osterhammel, Petersson 2005). Also, and much more importantly, Osterhammel was to publish the magnificent *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Osterhammel 2009). Even though he does not explicitly mention glocalization in the latter it is particularly clear from his pages on space – what he calls "spaces of interaction" – that he is definitely conscious of the empirical phenomena that have been dealt within the frame of glocalization. Osterhammel was also to make an important contribution to the book *The Prospect of Global History* (Belich, Darwin, Frenz, Wickham 2016). The latter resulted from a conference entitled "New Directions in Global History" that took place at the University of Oxford in 2012. Osterhammel's chapter is particularly relevant and significant not least because its title was *Global History and Historical Sociology*. Of all the historians involved in the development of globe-oriented history Osterhammel surely deserves very high praise. His work has been, not merely well informed about sociology generally, but particularly about up to date work in the field of globalization, as well as exhibiting knowledge of the significance of the idea of glocalization, if not using that precise term.

It is rather ironic that the "flag" of globalization – and to some extent glocalization – has been kept flying more by historians than by other disciplines, apart from sociology (see Colley 2013). It is more than worth mentioning that global history or, as John Darwin (2016) puts it, "the appeal of global history will lie in its capacity to enhance our knowledge of the 'local'". He goes on to say: "To an extent that would astonish historians of a generation or two ago, the global and the local have converged – to the intellectual benefit of both" (Darwin 2016: 183). While none of the contributors to the volume at issue mentions glocalization there can be no doubt particularly in view of Darwin's statement that it has a strong connection and that it is highly relevant to this book. Indeed, this volume *The Prospect of Global History* (2016) constitutes a crucial point in the meeting of history and the transnational field of global studies (Steger, Wahlrab 2017).

In drawing these "remembrances" to a conclusion I should briefly convey my thinking concerning the countries or regions that have been most, as it were, welcoming to the theme of glocalization – at least in my own experience. This involves a kind of sociology-of-knowledge stance. As might well be clear from the preceding it is Japan, Italy and to some extent Scandinavian as well as British countries that have been the most receptive. I should stress that this generalization is by no means based on a rigorous survey. Rather it results from an intuitive consideration of what I have written, institutions that have welcomed me, colleagues with whom I have collaborated, and fruitful correspondence. In a sense, to quote in part from the title and theme of a book that I have mentioned before, it is occasions involving some kind of marginality that I have in mind. I speak specifically of Grant and Short, *Globalization and the Margins* (2002). I mention Japan and Italy in particular because these are the countries where my books and/or articles have been most translated, as well as invitations received to give papers at conferences.

What Italy and Japan have in common is that they are peninsulas and, in a special sense, islands. The same is true of Britain and of Scandinavian countries (as far as Britain is concerned there are a few names that deserve particular mention in connection with glocalization among them Paul

Kennedy – 2010 – and John Tomlinson – 1999). I should say, however, that this short list of countries is by no means exhaustive with respect to those whose "citizens" have promoted or shown enthusiasm for ideas concerning the glocal. One has to ask the question why is this so? My basic proposal in this regard is that these are regions where people are not inclined to regard their peripherality or marginality in a negative way. They take it for granted. Members of these countries or regions, on the whole, tend to embrace their own glocality and do not find this at all uncomfortable. In fact, it is part and parcel of their everyday identity. It would be impossible here to investigate this conclusion in anything like a rigorous manner. However, it would certainly form the basis for a serious research program. I would add to these thoughts one other important consideration, namely the significance of the imagining of "faraway" countries. I have in mind here what I have previously said about the relations between Holland and East Asia, as well as the connections between Japan and Brazil, not to speak of the thoroughly rounded set of islands bearing the name of Hawaii.

I should add that I have, in a very significant sense, come full circle in this regard. I speak initially with respect to my place of birth, Norwich, a medieval city in East Anglia, England. East Anglia is a kind of peninsula of England, jutting out into the North Sea. During my teen years I lived in various parts of England and travelled quite frequently to Scotland, where I was eventually to reside for about ten years. On two, more or less separate, occasions I had emigrated from the UK to the USA and that is where all my immediate offspring live at this moment.

When I was in and eventually became a citizen of the USA from 1967-1970 and 1974-1999, I resided in the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and when I was there initially it felt like being on an island. This was because Pittsburgh was about five hundred miles from the nearest coast, while the city itself is at the junction of three large rivers (Ohio, Allegheny and Monongahela).

As I approach the end of this entry it would be appropriate to invoke the words of Peter Burke (2009: 105) when he states that heterogeneity applies mainly to what he calls the local level while at the global level we find considerable narrowing of this. And finally we might well add to this a quote from the work of the late British sociologist, John Urry. Urry bases his statement on his reading of my own book of 1992 (Robertson 1992). He states that "globalization-deepens-localization-deepens-globalization and so on" (Urry 2003: 84). He goes on to say that the "global-local develops in a symbiotic, unstable and irreversible set of relationships, in which each gets transformed through billions of worldwide iterations dynamically evolving over time" (Urry 2003: 84).

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the considerable support that I have had from my wife, Judith Velody. I have also benefitted from correspondence and acquaintance with my dear friend, Franciscu Sedda (2004, 2014).

References

J. Belich, J. Darwin, M. Frenz, C. Wickham (eds.) (2016), *The Prospect of Global History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

T. Brook (2008), *Vermeer's Hat: The Seventeenth Century and The Dawn of the Global World* (London: Profile Books).

P. Burke (2009), *Cultural Hybridity* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

L. Colley (2013), *Wide-angled*, in "London Review of Books", 35, 18, pp. 18-19.

S. Conrad (2016), *What Is Global History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

M. Geyer, C. Bright (1995), *World History in a Global Age*, in "American Historical Review", 100, 4, pp. 1034-1060.

R. Giulianotti, R. Robertson (2013), *Sport and Globalization*, in D.L. Andrews, B. Carrington (eds.), *A Companion to Sport* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell), pp. 41-60.

R. Grant, J.R. Short (eds.) (2002), *Globalization and the Margins* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

U. Hannerz (2004), *Foreign News: Exploring the World of Foreign Correspondents* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

M. Jasanoff (2017), *The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a Global World* (London: William Collins).

P. Kennedy (2010), *Local Lives and Global Transformations: Towards/world Society* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

K. Kobayashi (2016), *Taking Japan Seriously Again: The Cultural Economy of Glocalization and Self-Orientalization*, in R. Robertson, D. Buhari-Gulmez (eds.), *Global Culture: Consciousness and Connectivity* (Farnham: Ashgate), pp. 193-210.

V. Ogle (2015), *The Global Transformation of Time: 1870-1950* (London: Harvard University Press).

G.Y. Okihiro (2008), *Island World: A History of Hawai'i and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

J. Osterhammel (2009), *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

J. Osterhammel, N.P. Petersson (2005), *Globalization: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

R. Robertson (1992), *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage).

R. Robertson (1994), *Globalisation or Glocalisation?*, in “The Journal of International Comunication”, 1, 1, pp. 33-52.

R. Robertson (1995), *Glocalization: Time-Space Homogeneity-Heterogeneity*, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash, R. Robertson (eds.), *Global Modernities* (London: Sage), pp. 25-44.

R. Robertson (1998), *The New Global History: History in a Global Age*, in S. Lash, A. Quick, R. Roberts (eds.), *Time and Value* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 210-226.

R. Robertson (2003), *The Conceptual Promise of Glocalization: Commonality and Diversity*, in “Art-e-Fact”, 4, http://artefact.mi2.hr/_ao4/lang_en/theory_robertson_ en.htm.

R. Robertson (2009), *Interview with Professor Roland Robertson*, D. Arnaut (ed.), in “IDEIAS: Revista do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas”, pp. 283-293.

R. Robertson (2014), *Situating Glocalization: A Relatively Autobiographical Intervention*, in G.S. Drori, M.A. Hollerer, P. Walgenbach (eds.), *Global Themes and Local Variations in Organization and Management: Perspectives on Glocalization* (New York: Routledge), pp. 25-36.

R. Robertson (ed.) (2014), *European Glocalization in Global Context* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

R. Robertson (2019), *Revisiting Glocalization in Japan*, edited by T. Uesugi, M. Ozawa (Tokyo: Center for Glocal Studies, Seijo University).

R. Robertson (2020), *Whither Globalization? An Interview with Roland Robertson*, edited by Mike Featherstone, in “Theory Culture & Society”, 37, 7/8, pp. 160-187.

R. Robertson, K.E. White (2004), *La glocalazzazione revisitata ed elaborata*, in F. Sedda (ed.), *Glocal: sul presente a venire* (Roma: Luca Sossella Editore), pp. 13-41.

C. Rocha (2006), *Zen in Brazil: The Quest for Cosmopolitan Modernity* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press).

F. Sedda (ed.) (2004), *Glocal: sul Presente a venire* (Roma: Luca Sossella Editore).

F. Sedda (2014), *Forms of the World: Roots, Histories, and Horizons of the Glocal*, in R. Robertson (ed.), *European Glocalization in Global Context* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

M.B. Steger, A. Wahlrab (2017), *What is Global Studies? Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge).

E. Swyngedouw (2004), *Globalisation or Glocalisation? Networks, Territories and Rescaling*, in "Cambridge Review of International Affairs", 17, 10, pp. 25-48.

L. Testot (2020), *Cataclysms: An Environmental History of Humanity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

J. Tomlinson (1999), *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)

J. Urry (2003), *Global Complexity* (Oxford: Polity).

R. Wilson, W. Dissanayake (1996), *Global Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary* (Durham: Duke University Press).

Abstract

This intervention is comprised of a sketch of the ways in which I have encountered the concept of glocalization, as well as glocality, during the past thirty-forty years. In one sense this means that it is extra-autobiographical. In saying this I have strongly in mind the not infrequent maxim that all good sociology, as well as anthropology and other social sciences, are at

the same time extra-autobiographical. As will be seen in what follows this relationship between the autobiographical and the extra-autobiographical is part and parcel of the intellectual image that is presented here. My first conscious encounter with the word and idea of glocalization was an indirect result of the intellectual concern that I developed with globalization in the 1980s or, perhaps, even before then. It should be said in this respect that there were a number of binaries that were prominent in social scientific discourse in the 1960s and 1970s that undoubtedly had a strong bearing on my thinking about globalization and later glocalization. These included such conceptions as cosmopolitanism-localism and various others of that nature. Even less obvious were such distinctions as transcendence-immanence and sacred-profane. The genealogy inspired by such binaries were undoubtedly in my mind as I began explicitly to enter what might well be called the "glocal fray". Moreover, I was to learn after I first used the concept of glocalization in 1992 that an anthropologist, Eric Swyngedouw, had used this concept around the same time as myself; both of us inspired by Japanese business discourse. As the 1990s wore on more and more people joined in the debate with varying degrees of hostility and enthusiasm, more frequently the former than the latter. In tracing this history, I shall obviously speak about the changes in, and fortunes of, the better-known concept of globalization as well as the "lesser" concept of localization. Being a sociologist – more appropriately now, a transdisciplinarian – I shall also focus upon the increasingly significant branch of social/natural science that addresses such issues as climate change, biodiversity and the debate about the Anthropocene. This paper is being composed during the tragic and global phenomenon of the Covid-19 pandemic. The latter surely exhibits glocal characteristics in the large.

Keywords

Glocalization, glocality, globalization, glocal fray, social sciences.

Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation is a peer-reviewed, open access and cross-disciplinary journal that aims at stimulating increasing awareness and knowledge around the new dynamics that characterize glocal reality.
A journal on glocalism, which corresponds with the very concept of being glocal and is recognized in a global-academic context, can only be available online.
After ten years of life, though, the editors have decided to select, collect and publish on paper some articles that are more representative than others, in order to summarize and show the richness and depth which distinguished the activity of *Glocalism* so far and which will mark its future issues online at https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/glocalism

Piero Bassetti is president of the association Globus et Locus and editor-in-chief of *Glocalism*

Davide Cadeddu is professor of political theory at the University of Milan and executive editor of *Glocalism*

ISBN 979-12-5510-078-2 (print)
ISBN 979-12-5510-080-5 (PDF)
ISBN 979-12-5510-082-9 (EPUB)
DOI 10.54103/milanoup.154