

Isos kai Homoios in Greek Citizenship

Josine Blok*

Universiteit Utrecht

ORCID: 0000-0001-7383-002X

DOI: 10.54103/milanoup.292.c744

ABSTRACT:

This article investigates the semantic and institutional meaning of the Greek expression *isos kai homoios* and its idiomatic form *ep'isēi kai homoiei*. Widely used in various contexts, *isos kai homoios* features prominently in situations where a polis was dealing with justice and the inclusion of new citizens. The adjective *isos*, equal in measure, proclaimed equality in the law for all citizens, while *homoios*, of the same kind or form, allowed for diversity among them. While *isos kai homoios* applied to the same object meant 'equal in every respect', in the context of citizenship *homoios* gave room for growing divergence in prerogatives and honours. Although a generally valid concept, *isos kai homoios* applied in actual citizenship grants was a regional feature, mainly of south-west Asia Minor.

KEYWORDS: citizenship; civic equality; civic honours; citizenship grants; fairness.

In the later second century BCE, the small *polis* of Larbenoi in Caria decided to honour three judges and their secretary from Magnesia on the Maeander who had solved an internal *polis* conflict to great satisfaction.¹ The council and people decided to praise the whole *demos* of the Magnesians and crown them with a gold crown at the first athletic contest for the good disposition to and congeniality with the *polis* they had shown by sending such excellent men. Furthermore, they granted the Magnesian *demos* front seats in the theatre and a bronze statue on the most beautiful spot in the city. The judges and the secretary were praised for their righteousness and each crowned with a gold crown. They were proclaimed benefactors (*euergetai*) of the people and given citizenship (*politeia*) including

* My sincere thanks go to Irad Malkin for our ongoing constructive discussions, to the members of the European Network for the Study of Ancient Greek History for their response at our convention on *Inclusion and Exclusion* in Oxford, Sept. 2024, to Daniela Cammack for critical reading of the draft, and to Ineke Sluiter and Luuk Huitink for linguistic advice. All remaining errors are mine. Abbreviations of inscription *corpora* not in the *AIEGL* follow *PHI*.

1 *I. Magnesia* 101, ll. 1-62. The decree provided for a copy to be sent to Magnesia, where this stone was found.

for their descendants on fair and equal terms, tax exemption on everything they imported or exported, and partnership in everything else that the other citizens enjoyed. They also received first access to the council and *dēmos* after the sacrifices, front seats in the theatre, dinner at the *prytaneion* (*sitēsisi*) for life, and their descendants would have the same privileges.

And so the decree continued in a way familiar to all scholars working on such honorific decrees.² The decree from Larbenoi is one among hundreds of citizenship grants awarded by Greek *poleis* to outsiders in the later Classical and Hellenistic periods, providing us with a wealth of information on the principles and procedures for the inclusion of new citizens.³ Like in all inscribed honorific decrees, the vocabulary of these citizenship grants became highly formulaic.⁴

One such fixed expression consists of the adjectives ἴσος and ὅμοιος tied together by καὶ. This idiomatic combination is solidly attested in writing from the second half of the fifth century in Athens and on Crete.⁵ Its subsequent wide appearance in different Greek dialects and in a variety of forms, in multiple contexts in a wide spectrum of Greek texts, implies that it had been current in the Greek world for quite a while. In and of itself, therefore, it is not an unequivocal dating criterion; for instance, the clause ἐπὶ τῷ ἴσῳ καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ in the settlement-arrangement of Cyrene (Cyrenaica), inscribed in the fourth century, could either belong to the original foundation of the colony around 630 or reflect the later currency of the expression.⁶

This idiomatic expression ἐπὶ τῷ ἴσῳ καὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, in Attic ἐπὶ ἴσει καὶ ὁμοίῳ / ἐπ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίῳ and in Ionic ἐπ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίῳ, found in citizenship documents including citizenship grants such as the decree from Larbenoi, is particularly intriguing. With its feminine dative but lacking a feminine noun, it is conventionally translated into English as “on fair and equal terms”. Although catching the overall sense, this translation raises two, related issues that are the focus of this article.

The first issue is the semantic meaning of the expression ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, and in particular of the form ἐπ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίῳ. The translation “on fair and equal terms” works and sounds well in English but is not strictly correct: ἴσος

2 The scholarship on benefactors of the *polis*, both its own citizens and outsiders, and the honours they received in return, is immense; after the classic Gauthier (1985), recent contributions include a.o. Domingo Gyax 2016; Domingo Gyax and Zuiderhoek 2021; Futás 2024; Müller 2014a; Müller 2023; Mack 2015; Miller 2016; Liddel 2016; Forster 2018; Horster 2025.

3 On the procedures in Athens, Osborne 1981-1983, in Hellenistic cities, Savalli 1985.

4 For Athenian decrees, Henry 1983, 122: “the various component items of the formulation are fairly standardized, but they may be combined in a variety of ways”.

5 Hdt. 6.52; Thuc. 1.27, 1.145, 4.105; *IG* I³ 41, l. 43 (*AIUK* 4.2-3), Athens' settlement for Hestiaia of ca. 446 (ἐπὶ ἴσει καὶ ὁμοίῳ); *IC* IV 78 = Gagarin, Perlman, *Laws of Crete* G78 a decree of Gortyn on Crete (450-400).

6 *ML* 5, ll. 27-28; the vast debate about the date of this inscribed text is of no further relevance here.

is not simply “fair” and ὅμοιος is not simply “equal”.⁷ Conversely, the English lexeme “fair, fairness” means “honesty, impartiality, equitableness, justice” but not “equal, equality”.⁸ So, what does ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος mean exactly?

The second issue is the institutional meaning of this expression. “Fair” (as in “on fair and equal terms”) is an open norm; it values the arrangement as in accordance with the sense of justice of all concerned. But it does not define the “terms” underpinning this valuation, for instance in the legal sphere. A “fair” distribution can imply equal parts, but it also can take difference in merit or in contribution to the whole into account. In the decree from Larbenoi, as in many such decrees, its institutional meaning is likewise ambivalent. How will the new citizens be equal (*isos*) to the other citizens, if they are in fact elevated above the others by their many privileges, a situation that will continue for their descendants? How “fair” is this?

In this article I examine what the idiomatic expression ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος and the specific form ἐπ’ ἰσῇ καὶ ὁμοίῃ may tell us about Greek citizenship in general and the inclusion of new citizens in particular. After investigating the linguistic background and the overall usage of the expression, I focus on its meaning in the context of citizenship, and next on grants of citizenship, where, from the fourth century onward, we find the expression in abundance.

1. What does ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος mean?

Isos means “equal”; it refers to equality in size, strength, and number,⁹ as by default it has to do with quantity. The notion of quantity can also work metaphorically: when someone seems *isos* to the gods, the person seems beautiful, radiant, and strong *to the same measure* as a god, but in nature he or she is not a god. *Homoios* means “similar”, “like”, and “the same”; it expresses congruence in kind or form,¹⁰ having by default to do with quality.

7 LSJ *s.v.* ἴσος II.2, concerning conditions etc., gives “fair, just”, with reference to Dem. 18.284, but there the meaning “fair, just” is not appropriate; it is simply “equal” (and correctly translated as such in the Loeb-ed.). For persons, LSJ in II.3 gives “fair, impartial”, ἴσος apparently implying equal treatment of both sides. For ὅμοιος, LSJ *s.v.* ὅμοιος: “like, resembling, similar” and see below. On the differences between ἴσος and ὅμοιος, David 2011.

8 OED *s.v.* Fairness: honesty, impartiality, equitableness, fair dealing. <https://www.dictionary.com> (consulted 17 Sept. 2025): Fairness: the state, condition, or quality of being fair, or free from bias or injustice; even-handedness. Fair: free from bias, dishonesty, or injustice. Synonyms for “fairness” are candour, civility, decency, decorum, equity, honesty, humanity, impartiality, integrity, legitimacy, moderation, propriety, rationality, righteousness, suitability, tolerance, truth, veracity. The Dutch equivalent of “fair” is “eerlijk”, which belongs to the semiotic field of “honest” related to “honour” (eer).

9 LSJ *s.v.* ἴσος.

10 LSJ *s.v.* ὅμοιος.

The difference between the two adjectives is well illustrated in geometry, for instance in the works of Euclides.¹¹ Here, *isos* applies to measure, for instance the equal lengths of two lines; *homoios* applies to form, to objects of the same shape but not necessarily of the same size, for instance two spheres of different size. When two objects are *isos kai homoios*, they are perfectly equal, because they are the same both in size and in form. As Michael Fried puts it: “The essential distinction between ‘equality’ and ‘similarity’ makes the ‘equal and similar’ a necessary third sign”.¹²

The two adjectives connected by *καὶ* can be applied to one and the same object, or the adjectives can be used for two different objects. The two applications have different effects, as a few examples demonstrate, beginning with the use for two different objects:

1. A fragment of the fifth-fourth century comedy writer Dionysius: οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὴν τούτων χάριν ἔχεις ὁμοίαν, οὐδ’ ἴσην τὴν ἡδονήν. “You will not always have a similar pleasure of these things, nor an equal delight”.¹³
2. In Plutarch’s comparison of Solon and Publicola: ἀρετὴν μὲν ἴσην καὶ προαίρεσιν ὁμοίαν παρασχόμενος, τύχῃ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει τελεσιουργῷ πρὸς τῇ ἀρετῇ χρησάμενος. “Thus, while exhibiting virtues equal to Solon’s, and a purpose identical with his, he (Publicola) enjoyed a good fortune and an efficacious power which supplemented his virtues”.¹⁴
3. Aristotle discusses movement: οὐκ ἴσης δὲ ἰσχύος οὐδ’ ὁμοίας κινήσεως [...]. “neither an equal power nor a similar movement”.¹⁵

As these examples show, applied to different objects the difference in meaning is highlighted, *isos* referring to quantity and *homoios* to quality, while *kai* (or, in example 1 and 3, the negative οὐδὲ) acts as conjunction in this idiomatic expression.

Another few examples show the effect of the adjectives juxtaposed by *kai* applied to one and the same object:

1. Herodotus recounts how the Spartans tried to choose one of the twin baby kings: Οὐκ ὦν δὴ σφεας ἔχειν, ὁκότερον ἔλονται, ὥστε καὶ ὁμοίων καὶ ἴσων ἐόντων· οὐ δυναμένους δὲ γνῶναι, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου, ἐπειρωτᾶν τὴν τεκοῦσαν. “But the children being alike in points of quality and

11 Euc. *Elem.* 6.19,3; 6.31, 23; 12.3, 31, 36 on triangles, some of which both *homoios* in form and *isos* in size; *Phaen.* Pr. 86; 2, 31; 12, 51 on spheres, which are *homoios* in form but not *isos* in size.

12 Fried 2009, 4-5.

13 Dion. Com. *Thesm.* fr. 2, l. 22-23 (K.-A.).

14 Plut. *Sol. Publ.* 3.5. (transl. Loeb-ed.). Cf. Phot. *Bibl.* (257; 477b11 Bekker): ἡ πόλις πᾶσα μετὰ τῆς ἴσης καὶ ὁμοίας τιμῆς καὶ δόξης. “The whole city with the same (great) reverence and similar (kind of) expectation [towards the church now named after the emperor]”.

15 Arist. [Pr.] 903b1: Cf. Theophr. *Caus. Pl.* 6.18.2: οὐ γὰρ ἴσης πάντα δεῖ θερμότητος οὐδ’ ὁμοίας ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείονος τὰ δὲ ἐλάττονος καὶ μαλακωτέρας. “Since not all (fruits) need the same quantity of heat nor of the same kind, but some more and others less and milder”.

- quantity (= in all respects), they knew not which to choose; and when they could not judge between them, or perhaps even before they had tried, they asked the mother”.¹⁶
2. The philosopher Teles, contemplating different burial practices in *On exile*, quotes Aristippos: ἡ οὐ πανταχόθεν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, ἴση καὶ ὁμοία ἢ εἰς ἄδου ὁδός; “Is not, says Aristippos, the road to the underworld from everywhere equal and alike (= exactly the same)?”¹⁷
 3. The grammarian Aristophanes summarises Aristotle’s treatise *On Animals*, dealing with the symbiosis of the Maurousioi with lions: τοῖς γάρ τοι βρέφεσι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν μαρτυροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς σκύμνους τῶν λεόντων τῆς ἴσης τε καὶ ὁμοίας διαίτης ἀξιοῦσι καὶ κοίτης μιᾶς καὶ στέγης μιᾶς (no need to be surprised about this) “because they attest that for their own babies they deem the lions’ cubs fit for exactly the same food and one bedding and one nest”.¹⁸
 4. When the Athenians decided in 352/1 to consult the oracle in Delphi what to do with the so-called Sacred Orgas, a tract of land between Athens and Megara in the domain of the goddesses of Eleusis, they inscribed the alternative options on two pieces of lead from which the god would choose one: γράψαι δὲ τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς εἰς δύο κα[τ]τιτέρω ἴσω καὶ ὁμοίῳ [...]: “the secretary of the council is to inscribe two pieces of lead equal (in size) and similar (in shape)” = exactly the same.¹⁹

In these examples of application to the same object, the two adjectives *isos* and *homoios* do not lose their different semantics of “quantity” and “quality”, but they converge into one shape, just as in the geometrical example above: two elements of the same size and form are exactly alike.²⁰

Among the multiple forms of ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, the adverbial expression ἐπὶ (τῇ) ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ is particularly intriguing.²¹ With both adjectives in the feminine singular dative following ἐπὶ, “on condition of”,²² but without a noun, ἐπ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ is analogous to similar expressions with an adverbial function, with an implied feminine noun; the ellipse of nouns like ἡμέρα, χώρα, γῆ, and ὁδός is frequent in idiomatic expressions.²³ In other words, in ἐπ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ

16 Hdt. 6.52. transl. Loeb slightly modified.

17 Teles *Phyg.* 29.13.

18 Arist. *Hist. an.* 2.163.21.

19 IG II³ 292, l. 29

20 LSJ *s.v.* καὶ III. Malkin in this volume explores yet another possibility, of *kai* as explicative: *isos* (equal) “namely” *homoios* (fair).

21 The expression appears in various spellings, for instance with rough aspiration ἐφ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ in inscriptions, among which the decree from Larbenoi.

22 LSJ ἐπὶ, B III.3.

23 Gildersleeve, Miller 1900-1911, § 33-34: “There is often no conscious, or at all events no definite, ellipsis [...]. So in the examples [...] the exact ellipsis is often doubtful; (example): Thuc. 1.27.1: Smyth 1956, § 1027-1029: “From such substantivized adjectives arose many

the noun was probably elliptic from the outset. In such idiomatic expressions, contemporary users did not feel anything was missing, as its meaning in context was sufficiently clear. Later grammarians and scholiasts, however, keen to explicate the semantic implications, filled in the elliptic noun from the context, revealing how they assessed the relevance of the expression. They proposed the following nouns:

1. **τιμή** (social value, respect).

Thucydides describes how Corinth, learning that their colony Epidamnus was being besieged, prepared their army but also initiated a new settlement there, and whoever would go there would do so *ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ*.²⁴ The scholiast remarks: *λείπει τιμῇ· ἴση καὶ ὁμοία, τοῖς Ἐπιδαμνίοις δηλονότι τούτέστιν πολιτεία, ἵνα κάκεῖ ἔχῃ πάντα ὡς ἐν Κορίνθῳ*. (“*timē* is left out. On equal and similar (*timē*), for the Epidamnians this is clearly in the *politeia*, in order that everything would be just as in Corinth”).²⁵ Later in book 1, Thucydides recounts how the Athenians followed Pericles’ advice not submit to the dictates of the Spartans, but to welcome arbitration *ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ*.²⁶ For the scholiast, this meant *ἐξ ἰσοτιμίας καὶ οὐχὶ κελευόμενοι* (on a basis of equal *timē* (respect) so that they were not following orders).²⁷

2. Nouns for “share”.

a) **μοῖρα**. In the summary Heracleides Lembus made of [Arist.] *Athēnaion Politeia*, Theseus features as the founder of democratic Athens, ending the feuding groups by inviting all to settle *ἐπ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ μοίρᾳ* (“with an equal and similar share = on exactly the same footing”).²⁸

b) **τιμή**, because one’s share of land, booty or sacrifice both supports and reflects one’s *timē* (social esteem). A scholion to Homer’s *Iliad* 11.702-5

prepositional and adverbial expressions of whose source the Greeks themselves had probably lost sight. Many of these seem to be analogues of phrases once containing *ὁδός*: “*τὴν ἄλλως ψηφίζεσθε*” you vote to no purpose” Dem. 19.181 (*i.e.* the way leading elsewhere than the goal), “*ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης*” at the very beginning” Thuc. 7.43, *ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης* on an equality 1. 15, *ἐξ ἐναντίας* from an opposite direction, facing 7. 44. Many thanks to Ineke Sluiter and Luuk Huitink for their advice on this section.

24 Thuc. 1.27.1: *ἅμα ἀποικίαν ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἐκήρυσσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι*. trans. Th. Hobbes: “should have equal and like privileges”. See also below.

25 Schol. Thuc. 1.27.1. However, Simon Hornblower in his commentary *ad loc.* (Hornblower 1997² I, 71-72) argues that the expression refers to the new conditions at Epidamnus, where now the democrats were in power and some redistribution of land must have been envisaged in the new colony.

26 Thuc. 1.145.1. Cf. Aeschin. 3.83.

27 Schol. Thuc. 1.145.1.

28 [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* fr. 3 (Loeb-ed.) and fr. 2 (ed. Chambers) = Plut. *Thes.* 25 (in a different reading, *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις*). For the question whether this passage belonged to the *Ath. Pol.*, see Rhodes 1981, 112. This expression used with *μοῖρα* is most frequent in geometrical treatises, cf. above.

spells out this connection for a passage where Nestor recounts fights of long ago in Pylos: “Now aged Neleus [...] took a vast amount for himself, and gave the rest to the people to divide among them, so none might go away without a just share (μή τίς οἱ ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης).”²⁹ As the noun is absent in the last line, the scholiast explains: “so that none would go away bereft of equal and similar (“fair”) τιμή; equal is having the just and equal (δίκαιον καὶ ἴσον).”³⁰

3. δίκη.

Plato, speaking in the *Laws* about penalties for *asebeia*, says that different kinds of impiety should have οὐκ ἴσης οὐδ’ ὁμοίας δίκης, a punishment not exactly the same in measure nor in kind.³¹ In this passage, ἴσος καὶ ὁμοιος appears in connection with the singular noun δίκη in the sense of “penalty”. In the expression ἐπ’ ἴση καὶ ὁμοία, however, δίκη (justice, penalty, trial) is not attested in scholia *vel sim.* as the envisioned elliptic noun.³² Yet, in the heavily damaged regulation of Athens for Hestiaia, ἐπὶ ἴσε[ι καὶ ἁμοίαι] appears in the context of jurisdiction.³³ Presumably, it concerns a promise to give each others’ citizens a fair trial, since ἴσος καὶ ὁμοιος features regularly combined with δική in the sense of “trial” in treaties at this time.³⁴ Justice (τὸ δίκαιον) was strongly associated with equality (τὸ ἴσον) in Greek thought.³⁵ Aeschines claims in *Against Ctesiphon* (3.83) that according to Demosthenes, if Philip of Macedon was willing to refer the disagreements between him and Athens to another *polis* for arbitration ἴση καὶ ὁμοία, there would be no κριτὴν ἴσον (“equal = just arbiter”) between Athens and Philip. And something of this kind seems implied in a damaged honorific decree from Rhamnous of ca. 230, in which a contingent of secret agents (*kryptoi*) praise their general Philotheos of

29 Hom. *Il.* 11.705; *Od.* 9.42.

30 Schol. *Il.* 11.702-5: ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀπέλθῃ στερηθεὶς τῆς ὁμοίας καὶ ἴσης τιμῆς· ἴσης γὰρ τῆς τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἴσον ἐχούσης. Cf. Hesych. ο 755: ὁμοία· ἴσα· ὁμοίῃ ἔνθεο τιμῇ (Hom. *Il.* 4.410). Cf. LSJ *s.n.* ἴσος II.: equally divided or distributed; ἴση alone, one’s equal share, μή τίς μοι ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης. Hom. *Il.* 9.318-19 shows how τιμή could work as an equivalent of μοῖρα (and vice versa) in the context of distribution. For ὁμοιος assimilated with δίκαιος in juxtaposition with ἴσος, see also below.

31 Pl. *Leg.* 906b 3: οὐκ ἴσης οὐδ’ ὁμοίας δίκης δεόμενα.

32 LSJ *s.n.* ἴσος II. 2. lists several passages with “sc. δίκη”, but this inference is in fact not always clear; for instance, in the Thucydides-passages discussed above LSJ suggests δίκη, but the scholia offer other nouns.

33 *IG* I³ 41, l. 52 of 446 or slightly later; in the edition in *AIUK*, it is l. 43; <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/papers/aiuk-42/>.

34 Thuc. 5.27.2: δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι; 5.59.5: δίκας δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας; 5.79.1-2: ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας and and δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. See also Malkin this volume.

35 Arist. *Pol.* 1282b 17-23: δοκεῖ δὴ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. “All men deem that justice is some form of equality”.

Phrearrhoi because he had (distributed watch positions?) [ὅ]πως ἂν ἴσης οὔσης καὶ ὁμοίας [...].³⁶

Not only ἴσος is associated with δίκαιος, but also ὅμοιος.³⁷ Demosthenes replaces ὅμοιος by δίκαιος in juxtaposition with ἴσος, when he claims in his speech against Meidias that every citizen is happy to do his utmost for the *polis*, because in a democracy everyone is aware of having a share in equality and justice (τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν δικαίων).³⁸

Associated with “justice”, Greek *isos kai homoios* (just like English “fairness”) implies that everything happens above board, and that no one feels slighted or cheated. The procedure is impartial, the result is “equal treatment for those who are alike”;³⁹ it does not mean that everyone gets the same. A passage showing this clearly is Herodotus’ account how in the treaty the Persian King offered to Athens in 479 the Athenians were to get back their land and become allies of the King ἐπ’ ἴση τε καὶ ὁμοίῃ and ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης: “on a fair footing” with the King (= with due respect on both, very unequal, sides) and “without ruse or deceit” (= openly and honestly) in one breath.⁴⁰

4. πολιτεία.

Among the range of meanings of *politeia*, “constitution” and “citizenship” are relevant here. Thucydides (4.105.2) describes how the Spartan commander Brasidas, after his successful siege of Amphipolis (424/3), orders “that any Amphipolitan or Athenian living in the city who wished to remain could do so, keeping his property and political rights on an equal footing (τῆς ἴσης καὶ ὁμοίας μετέχοντα), or leave within five days taking their possessions with them”.⁴¹ The scholiast fills in the elliptic noun in καὶ ὁμοίας with *politeia*.⁴² Xenophon, recounting how a popular leader in

36 *I.Rhamnous* II 20, ll. 7-8; *kryptoi* = secret agents: *AIO* 823, l. 9. Philotheos son of Philion of Phrearrhoi was an ephebe in 260/59 (*IG* I³ 1 981) and contributed to a public subscription in 248/7 (*IG* II³ 1 1011).

37 Aeschin. 3.83; transl. C.D. Adams (Loeb-ed.), rendering ἴση καὶ ὁμοία “as an equal and impartial arbiter”.

38 Dem. 21.67: τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἕκαστος ἡγεῖται ἑαυτῷ μετεῖναι ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ. Or the reverse: Dem. 18.284: ἐκ ποίας ἴσης καὶ δικαίας προφάσεως (the pretence of equality and justice).

39 I thank Daniela Cammack for this translation. Bielman 1994 (e.g. in no. 16) translates ἐφ’ ἴση καὶ ὁμοίῃ as “avec égalité complète des droits”.

40 Hdt. 9.7. α 1: πεμψαν ἡμέας Ἀθηναῖοι λέγοντες ὅτι ἡμῖν βασιλεὺς ὁ Μήδων τοῦτο μὲν τὴν χώραν ἀποδιδού, τοῦτο δὲ συμμάχους ἐθέλει ἐπ’ ἴση τε καὶ ὁμοίῃ ποιήσασθαι ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης. “The king of the Medes is ready to give us back our country, and to make us his confederates, equal in right and standing, in all honour and honesty” (transl. Loeb-ed.).

41 Thuc. 4.105.2: Ἀμφιπολιτῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐνόντων τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἴσης καὶ ὁμοίας μετέχοντα μένειν.

42 Schol. Thuc. 4.105.2: καὶ ὁμοίας: πολιτείας. In the passage on Epidamnus, above, for the scholiast elliptic noun was *timē*, but conceived in the context of the *politeia*.

Sikyon began a democratic revolution (in 367), uses *politeia* explicitly with this expression, albeit in a different form (ὥς τῆς πολιτείας ἐσομένης ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις) “that the *politeia* will be on fair and equal terms”.⁴³ In 342/1, Delphi granted πολιτείαν ἴσαν καὶ ὁμοίαν (*isos kai homoios* citizenship) to a man from Larisa, and in the third century the Aetolian league issued several such grants to individuals.⁴⁴ As the elliptic noun, πολιτεία does not fit in the construction with ἐπὶ (“on condition of”), but it appears in other forms of the expression.

The abstract nouns τίμη and μοῖρα, with which scholiasts filled in the elliptic expression ἐπ’ ἴση καὶ ὁμοίᾳ, and its association with δίκη, all stand for the terms on which the citizens shared in the *polis*. These nouns thus appear as *pars pro toto* of the *politeia*, an abstract noun that itself, too, was proposed to complete some elliptic forms and figured in citizenship formulas. What precisely does the expression refer to when used for citizenship?

2. *Isos kai homoios* as a civic norm

Clearly, the values combined in *isos kai homoios* are a crucial element of Greek citizenship. Within this expression, *isos* (equal) retains its reference to quantity and measure. In citizenship, *isos* means equal in standing or rights, as it implies having an equal share of esteem or power in the *polis* to the other citizens, a notion captured in the abstract noun *isonomia* (equal shares in the law). In a *polis* context, neither *isonomia* nor other uses of *isos* are intrinsically markers of democracy or oligarchy, the political effect depending on the situation to which the term applies.⁴⁵ Since the equal shares of *isonomia* cannot really be measured, equality must be made visible in other ways, notably in equal access to *polis* office and equal treatment in adjudication. In fourth-century Athens, proud of its principal *isotēs*, Demosthenes phrased this principle as follows:

[The law] does not allow introducing a law that is not valid for all citizens, a rule in the best democratic spirit. As to every man belongs an equal share (*ison*) in the *politeia* generally, so this statute appraises each to participate equally (*ison*) in the laws as well.⁴⁶

43 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.45; the ellipse is not a feminine noun, but the neuter plural, likewise indicating an abstraction. Likewise, alliances were made on these terms; Thuc. 5.79.1; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1 (δέοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις τὴν συμμαχίαν εἶναι); Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.13 (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις ἥκοις τὴν συμμαχίαν ποιούμενος).

44 FD III 4 378; IG IX,1², 1, 7, 10, 12, 25.

45 For *isonomia*, the debate about its meaning, the date of its emergence, and its implementation, Malkin, Blok 2024, 313-15.

46 Dem. 24.59. Οὐκ ἔα νόμον ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέναι κατὰ τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων, καλῶς καὶ δημοτικῶς λέγων. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας ἴσον μέτεστιν ἐκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τούτων ἴσον μετέχειν ἕκαστον ἀξιοῖ.

Crucially, democratic *isotēs* was associated with *dikeē*, meaning that one's station in life, especially wealth, ought never to give an advantage over other citizens in the essential civic matters of legislation and jurisdiction.⁴⁷

In the combination *isos kai homoios*, *homoios* (similar) retains its reference to quality, kind and form.⁴⁸ For citizens in a *polis* this means that they are all the same kind but may differ in “size” (measure, quantity). A conspicuous example are the Spartans, who famously called themselves the *Homoioi*, of the same quality as a collective, notably in contrast to the *perioikoi* and the helots, but among themselves they were not *isos*; whoever lost his wealth also lost his equal rights.⁴⁹ In the third century, the legend that once upon a time Lysurgus had ruled all Spartans to be *isos* in wealth was circulated to advocate the redistribution of land.⁵⁰ By contrast, from the Athenian perspective the Spartans elected to the Gerousia were made superior to their fellow citizens because they had more power over the *politeia*; no equality here, either.⁵¹ *Homoios*, then, allowed for a differentiation that *isos* did not.

Democratic Athens offers an interesting case for the implications of this vocabulary. While all male citizens were *isos* in the law, the city prided itself that the *politeia* also gave room to individual differentiation. Thucydides' rendering of Pericles' funeral oration captures the ideal picture of Athens' civic norms:

While in accordance with our laws there is, in the face of their individual differences, equality (*to ison*) for all, in accordance with the esteem that comes with distinction in whatever field, an individual enjoys higher standing (*time*) in relation to matters of common concern on the basis not so much of belonging to a group (*meros*) as of personal merit; while at the same time, with regard to poverty, someone who is capable of benefitting the city is not prevented from doing so by obscurity of status.⁵²

47 Cf. Isoc. 20.20; Dem. 21.112.

48 David 2011, 146–54 shows how in the discourse in tragedies about the Seven against Thebes *isos* indicates equality of measure, notably time and part of the inheritance, and *homoios* similarity of nature, notably blood and kinship.

49 Taylor 2018, 355–60, esp. 359: “[t]he consequences, therefore, of citizen ‘poverty’ were much greater in Sparta than in Athens...”. Cf. Kulesza 2023a and 2023b on inequalities among the Spartans, and Seelentag 2013 on *homoios* on Crete.

50 See Plut. *Ages.* 9.4; Müller 2023a, 77–80. Cf. Thuc. 8.58.7: the treaty between the Persians and the Spartans ruled that if they wished to end the war with Athens, they would do so on similar terms (ἐν ὁμοίῳ) for both. In other words, the terms would not be exactly the same, because the concerns and interests of the Persians and Spartans were not at all identical, but the conditions were to be equivalent.

51 Dem. 20.106–7, with Canevaro 2025, 108–9.

52 Thuc. 2.37.1: μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὥς ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ εὐδοκίμῳ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλεόν ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ’ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκόλυται. Transl. Winton 2004, modified.

In democratic Athens, even among all male citizens some legal distinctions existed. For most political offices, 30 years was the minimum age, but the *di-aitētai*, for instance, had to be in their 60th year.⁵³ Taxes of various kinds were imposed in proportion to wealth, notably liturgies with the potential recompense of public acclaim (*timē*). Only members of the *pentakosiomedimnoi* class were eligible for the office of *Tamias* of Athena.⁵⁴ Being *isos* in the law apparently included such distinctions provided they were considered reasonable or useful, were applied to all male citizens, and did not infringe the *isotēs* of a citizen in other respects.

But the law also allowed awarding honours to citizens beyond the base line of *timē*.⁵⁵ Crowns became a standard reward for, at first, excellent, and later, correct fulfilment of duties in office.⁵⁶ The great honours of *sitēsis*, a statue, and *proedria*, awarded separately or together, were granted to citizens who had achieved spectacular successes or provided exceptional benefits to the *polis*. Over and against the horizontal, equal *timē* of all citizens, this bestowal of far more *timē* on some citizens created a vertical effect of inequality, with an inherent tension between the two norms.⁵⁷ In fully-fledged democracies like classical Athens, this tension was a particularly sensitive issue, and a potential cause of serious friction. Whereas *philotimia* became a virtue for which citizens were praised in honorific decrees, notably from the fourth century onward, in fifth-century tragedies about the Seven against Thebes, as Sylvie David notes, *philotimia* belongs to the vocabulary of superiority which threatens the just norm of *isotēs*.⁵⁸ The tension between horizontal and vertical vectors was not solved, but it was made at least palatable by encapsulating the award of the greatest honours in a democratic legal framework, of which the *dēmos* was fully in charge.⁵⁹

In citizenship discourse, then, *isos kai homoios* means “exactly the same” when it was applied to one object (compare above). When it applied to new citizens, the clause held a promise, which, as Irad Malkin emphasizes in his discussion of the clause, meant full and equal integration of new citizens in the *polis*.⁶⁰ But

53 [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.3-4.

54 [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 8.1.

55 On the centrality of *timē* for citizens in the institutions of democratic Athens, Blok 2017, 187-217; Blok and Van 't Wout 2018; Mann 2023; Futás 2024; Canevaro 2025; Canevaro in this volume; Blok forthcoming; in ancient Greece in general Blok 2025; in Hellenistic democracies Forster 2018.

56 Canevaro 2025.

57 On the tension between the horizontal, base line of *timē* and the vertical, distinctive *timē*, Malkin, Blok 2024, 300-15; in Athens, Canevaro 2025.

58 David 2011, 166-68. Eur. *Ph.* 532-35, 566-67, in both cases Jokaste speaking.

59 Iacoviello 2025; cf. Ma 2013, ch. 2.4 for the community in charge of the honours for *euergetai*. For discrepancies between honours granted to outsiders and to the *polis*' own citizens, Domingo Gygax 2006.

60 Malkin (this volume).

this “exactly the same” included not only the horizontal equality but also the hierarchical, vertical differentiation in *timē* among citizens, on criteria of merit, prestige, wealth, or other successes, provided all of this was granted by the *dēmos* in accordance with custom and law. In the normative discourse of the *polis*’ institutions, the expression captures in shorthand the *polis*’ economy of *timē*.

3. *Isos kai homoios* in citizenship arrangements

The decrees and literary testimonia reveal that the expression ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος and the (ἐπὶ τῇ) ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ clause feature as a normative clause in the institutional arrangements of Greek citizenship. The expression pledges to implement the roles of the (new) citizens in the *polis* following all the formal rules in laws and informal rules of conduct and esteem valid for the citizens. Beside the literary instances discussed above, ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος *vel sim.* appears in several categories of epigraphical documents: arrangements for new settlers in an existing *polis* or a new foundation, grants of citizenship by *poleis* to individuals, and *isopoliteia*-and *sympoliteia* treaties, *i.e.* grants of citizenship to entire *poleis*. The extant inscribed documents were issued by around twenty *poleis* and one confederacy, which can be grouped in five geographical clusters and in the following approximate order of appearance:

1. Cyrene/ Thera: the oath of the settlers from Thera, once a colony of Sparta, at Cyrene (seventh or fourth century).⁶¹
2. Athens: the terms of jurisdiction in Athens’ regulation for Hestiaia (mid-fifth century).⁶²
3. Crete: in Gortyn the regulation for freedmen in the second half of the fifth century, to settle in the *polis* on the same terms as the Latosioi, a group who apparently had settled there before.⁶³ Itanos introduced in the third century a new civic oath which all Itanians who wished to enjoy full citizen rights were required to swear at an annual festival, pledging to perform their civic obligations ἐπ’ ἴσαι καὶ ὁμοίαι in accordance with the law. With this oath, Itanos ritually refounded itself.⁶⁴ Possibly, no citizenship grants were issued in Crete with this clause.⁶⁵

61 See above. Cyrene: *SEG* 20.714, ML 5.

62 *IG* I³ 41, l. 43 (*AIUK* 4.2-3). The precise context is unclear due to the fragmentary condition of the stone.

63 Gortyn: *IC* IV 78 = Gagarin, Perlman, *Laws of Crete* G78 (450-400). On the relations between citizens, freedmen and other groups in this text and in wider context, Seelentag 2023.

64 Perlman 1995, 162-3. *IC* III iv 7 appointed the *kosmoi* and priests of Itanos to compose a new civic oath, preserved in *IC* III iv 8. The oath was introduced after a period of internal and external conflict.

65 In a letter (*I.Iasos* 606. ll. 1-17, 250-150 BCE) by an unknown, Doric speaking city to Bargylia, thanking this *polis* for receiving their sacred officials so well, the Bargylians are made (πολίτας

4. Asia Minor, in the coastal region from Ionia (southern Lydia) to Caria from the mid- to late fourth to the first century. Citizenship grants were awarded in Kolophon, Ephesos, Phygela, Samos, Magnesia on the Maeander, an unknown city (for men from Priene) and Mylasa, and further inland Olymos, Alabanda, Stratonikeia and Larbenoi.⁶⁶ Treaties of *sympoliteia* for the incorporation on these terms of citizens of Magnesia at Sipylos in Smyrna, of Olymos and Labranda in Mylasa, and of Chalketor in presumably Euromos or Mylasa, in the third century.⁶⁷ Temnos and Teos, and Tralles (Seleukeia) and Miletus, agreed to *isopoliteia* on these terms in the late third and early second century.⁶⁸
5. Central Greece: Delphi made a grant with the clause to a Thessalian in 342/1.⁶⁹ The Aetolian League issued grants of *isa kai homoia politeia* and *isopoliteia* to individuals between 275 and 236, and *isopoliteia* with Magnesia in the first quarter of the second century.⁷⁰ Phalanna (Thessaly) made a grant in the second century.⁷¹ In Phokis, Medeon and Stiris made a *sympoliteia* treaty with this clause in the early second century.⁷²

The geographical spread of this evidence across the Greek world is strikingly uneven, particularly of the citizenship decrees. In numbers, too, the citizenship decrees with the clause are highly uneven: from Ephesos around 100 are extant, from Samos also around 100, from Mylasa 6, from Kolophon and the Aetolian League 4, from the other *poleis* fewer or just one. Their abundance at some places and absence elsewhere can be explained by two structural, intertwined causes.

The first structural cause is the convergence of democratic regime and epigraphical habit.⁷³ Democracies issued far more public decrees on stone than

ἐπ' ἴ[σαι καὶ ὁμοίαι]. A Cretan *polis* as sender is possible, but the clause is fully restored and the sender unknown.

66 For the dates of the decrees from Ephesos, I follow the overview in Walser 2008, 321–56.

67 Magnesia Sipylos: *LSmyrna* II 573 + II.2, p. 376; Olymos and Labraunda: *LMylasa* 863; Chalketor: *LMylasa* 913; Carless Unwin 2017, 157 n. 192; Reger 2004.

68 *MDAI(I)* 1979, 242–49; *Miletos* 20/ *Milet* I 3, 143B.

69 Delphi: *FD* III 4 378.

70 Aetolian League: *IG* IX 1² 1, 7, 10, 12, 25; Müller 2023b persuasively argues that *isopoliteia* for individuals is basically the same as for *poleis*, *contra* Saba 2020, 2–5 for an essential difference between these grants. *Isopoliteia* with Magnesia on the Maeander: *IG* IX 1² 1, 4. One citizenship grant (*IG* IX 1² 1, 9) was offered in the first half of the third century to a woman, Kallisto, and made her *π[ο]λιτὴν καὶ Αἰτωλίδα π[ό]λ[ι]τ[η]ν ἰσόμοιρον ὅσων καὶ οἱ [λοι]οὶ π[ο]λὶ Αἰτωλοί*.

71 *IG* IX,2 1230.

72 *IG* IX,1 32.

73 “Democracy” covers a range of *politeiai*, from the “ultimate” democracy in classical Athens to very broad oligarchies that preferred to call themselves “democratic” (Mann, Scholz 2012); likewise, the Aetolian League, which granted citizenship to several individuals, was regarded as (largely) democratic. For democracies generally, Robinson 2011.

oligarchies, let alone tyrannies: in democratic regimes, decisions were shared with all citizens.⁷⁴ With the growing numbers of democratic regimes from the later fourth century onwards,⁷⁵ the numbers of decrees likewise multiplied. Among these democracies, however, the epigraphical habit was also an important factor of its own.⁷⁶ In western Greece, where this habit was relatively weak, democratic *poleis* issued few inscribed decrees.⁷⁷ By contrast, in several *poleis* on the mainland, most prominently Athens, and in the cities in the eastern part of the Aegean and Asia Minor, the shift towards democracies reinforced an already developed epigraphical habit, leading to a conspicuous increase of inscribed decrees.

The second structural cause is a difference in policies: to democracies, granting citizenship made sense in a way it did not to oligarchies. For democracies, allowing outsiders in was advantageous if they were valuable individuals: citizenship was usually offered to individuals who had greatly benefitted the *polis* by their wealth, power, or wisdom, or were otherwise highly esteemed.⁷⁸ The case of Larbenoi, awarding citizenship to citizens of Magnesia who had acted as arbiter or judge, is a case in point.⁷⁹ The Samians began issuing grants as soon as they could return to their island in 321, once it was freed by Alexander, in 324, from the Athenians, who had occupied Samos in 365.⁸⁰ Nearly all of these grants, dating between the late fourth to mid-third century, were acts of gratitude to Greeks who had supported Samians in their exile.⁸¹ After this first flow,

74 On the scarcity of inscribed decrees in oligarchies, Simonton 2017, 145 n. 38 with further refs.

75 Ma 2024, 213-28; Fleck, Hanssen 2018, 218.

76 Liddel 2016 shows how also in Athens there was a distinction between honorific discourse and epigraphical habits.

77 Western Greek *poleis* produced, besides smaller inscriptions such as dedications and grave markers, some sacred laws, but few other *polis* decrees. An exception is Entella in the third century.

78 *Contra* Kierstead 2025, who argues (155) that in classical Athens, citizens were reluctant to grant citizenship to outsiders because they did not want to diminish their own share of power by sharing it with others. Kierstead illustrates his argument with hypothetical numbers of 100 or 200 voters, but his example is misleading. Athens awarded on average one citizenship grant a year, but even with a hypothetical several grants a year, such numbers would make no difference to the 30,000-40,000 male citizens eligible for office or the 6,000 voting in the Assembly. Kierstead's use of Rational Choice Theory for his case obscures the force of the honour-system driving the grants of citizenship. For the honorific nature of citizenship and citizenship grants in Athens, Blok 2025 and forthcoming.

79 It must be noted, however, that generally the powerful individuals honoured with citizenship would not implement their honour by settling in the granting city and interacting with the other citizens; the honorific grant functioned as a token of reciprocity on the part of the *polis* for benefits received and further anticipated in the future. However, a high-status individual could make real use of the grant awarded him, for instance when he faced danger at home.

80 For these events, Habicht 1996.

81 *IG* XII,6, 1, 17-80, possibly more.

Samos continued awarding such grants to benefactors along more conventional lines. However, not all recipients of citizenship grants were of exceptional significance for the democracies which bestowed these honours. When the new citizens were just average persons, as was the case in mass grants, it was not disadvantageous if the *dēmos* would grow in size.⁸²

To an oligarchy, by contrast, a larger *dēmos* offered no political advantage, rather the opposite, and the ruling few were by and large reluctant to allow a prominent outsider into their own circle, where he was likely to be a competitor in an already limited arena of power.⁸³ Only in highly exceptional circumstances would a grant of citizenship be advantageous to an oligarchic regime.

The divergent patterns of inscribing decrees and especially citizenship grants are exemplified by Kolophon and Erythrai. Kolophon had an oligarchic regime after the Kings' Peace of 386 until 334, when Alexander "liberated" the Greek cities of Asia Minor and instituted a democracy. But in 294 Lysimachos moved the Kolophonians to Notion near Ephesos and imposed an oligarchy, until after his death in 281 the Kolophonians adopted again a democracy. No inscribed decrees are known from the oligarchic periods, but between 334 and 306 the council and *dēmos* of Kolophon issued decrees for rebuilding the city walls and for honouring benefactors from elsewhere with citizenship.⁸⁴ And after 281, Kolophon granted again citizenship by decree, now with the clause ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίαι.⁸⁵ Erythrai was a democracy in the early fourth century, issuing decrees including a citizenship grant to Konon in 394, after the battle of Knidos.⁸⁶ Soon after, an oligarchic regime took over, which lasted until 334. From this period, only two, remarkable decrees are extant: honorific decrees offering citizenship to the Persian satrap in Caria Mausolos and his wife Artemisia, and

82 In the section in *Politics* on citizenship policies (*Pol.* 1278a 27-35), Aristotle presents birth from two citizen parents as the legal criterion for citizen status, as normative, adding that *poleis* allow flexibility on this norm due to under-population. He suggests that democracies in particular are prone to such policies, since they allow *xenoi*, children from a citizen mother only and *nothoi*, to become citizens. Although no evidence from (before) Aristotle's time unequivocally supports his general contention on the relation between citizenship grants and population size (but on third-century Miletus, see Köcke 2012; Günther 2014), he was right that in Greece generally double citizen parentage had become normative (Vérilhac, Vial 1998), and presumably he noticed that only democracies allowed outsiders, either singly or in larger numbers, in as citizens.

83 Some oligarchies were tightly closed, but others allowed any citizen meeting the wealth criterion access to political office; cf. Simonton 2017. That oligarchies were not inclined to offer citizenship grants cannot be demonstrated by a wealth of epigraphical evidence: one cannot argue for absence of citizenship decrees where there is a nearly total absence of decrees in the first place.

84 *Kolophon* 2, 3, 4 and 6 (334-306), on building city walls, with a list of contributors; for the dates, Meritt 1935, 371-79; citizenship grants *Kolophon* 1, 5.

85 *I.Iasos* 80; *Kolophon* 8; *BCH* 39 (1915) 36; *SEG* 42.1065.

86 *I.Erythrai* 6, ll. 10-11. For the honorific decrees of Erythrai, Liddel 2021.

to his brother Idrieus.⁸⁷ These telling exceptions to the rule about oligarchies are honorific decrees for men holding a more powerful position in the Persian empire, to which Erythrai at the time belonged, than the oligarchs of the city. Both men are honoured for benefits conferred, not on the *dēmos* of Erythrai as would be the common phrase in a democratic decree, but on “the *polis* of the Erythraians”.⁸⁸ This grant typically did not feature the clause ἐφ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίαι. When Alexander effected a regime change in 334, Erythrai, now democratic, immediately began issuing decrees, beginning with a citizenship grant for a man who had been well-disposed towards the *dēmos* of the Erythraians, and many more were to follow.⁸⁹

Virtually all citizenship grants, in sum, were issued by democratic *poleis*, and inscribed in the *poleis* with a strong epigraphical habit. Among them a “democratic *koine*” developed, as Philippe Gauthier put it, of common norms and institutions with a shared vocabulary applied in decrees.⁹⁰ Yet, within this vast corpus, the grants with the expression *isos kai homoios* are a smallish subgroup.⁹¹ Determining why some *polis* used it, and others did not, is not an easy matter. No firm correlation can be established between the use of the clause and the way of enrolment of the new citizens in subgroups by lot or by choice.⁹² Neither can a point of origin be identified. Miletus and Magnesia claimed longstanding ties to Crete, where the clause is attested in the fifth century, but while such warm relations developed in the third century, their alleged “ancient origins” were by and large fabricated.⁹³ Moreover, in their extant citizenship grants, Magnesia used the clause only once, Miletus not at all. In the triangle Ephesos, Tralles, Priene, surrounding Magnesia, the clause was used abundantly in Ephesos, not at all in Priene, and in Tralles in an *isopoliteia*-treaty. Of all extant cases, the grant by Delphi seems the earliest, but the coincidences of survival of inscribed decrees are too huge to assign this special significance. It seems that application of the clause in these inscribed grants was a purely regional feature, on a small scale in central Greece, and on a somewhat larger scale in south-west

87 *Erythrai* 12*5, ll. 15-16; the other is *Erythrai* 15, see RO 56 with comm.: both Mausolos and Idrieus are called “of Mylasa”, as if they were common Greek citizens.

88 *Erythrai* 12*5, ll. 6, 8; *I.Erythrai* 8, l. 4. This clause is a warning not to assume a democratic assembly behind a reference to “the *polis*”.

89 *I.Erythrai* 21; 334-332.

90 Gauthier 1993a, 217-18; see also Ma 2003 on *peer polity interaction* between Hellenistic cities, Kamphorst 2023 for epigraphical “mirroring” between cities, and Simonton 2025b on the exchange in “foreign” judges.

91 Grants are included here down to the first century BCE.

92 *Ep’ isei kai homoiai* with choice: perhaps Kolophon (*BCH* 39, 1915, 36), certainly Tralles (*Miletos* 20 / *Milet* I 3, 143B); with sortition: Samos and Ephesos. Other *poleis* enrolling by sortition do not use the clause. On the procedures Savalli 1985, on patterns of choice and sortition, Jones 1991.

93 *I.Magnesia* 20; cf. Carless Unwin 2017, ch. 5.

Asia Minor, where some *poleis* mirrored each other's actions and vocabulary.⁹⁴ Samos displayed its grants in the Heraion, Ephesos in the Artemision, highly visible not only to their own citizens, but to all visitors.

Inconsistency in usage appears even within the corpus of a single *polis*: some *poleis* applied the clause in some grants and not in others, in decrees that in other respects are virtually identical and of the same period.⁹⁵ Apparently, adding the clause ἐπ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ did not change the (formulas for the) conditions of citizenship or mark a difference in content. This outcome is in line with our earlier finding that *isos kai homoios* is a shorthand for the entire economy of honours in democratic *poleis*. Yet, the evidence from Samos and Ephesos, which added the clause in most of their numerous grants, allows a tentative sketch of the development how the clause functioned in these decrees.

Ephesos issued over 135 honorific decrees, the majority of which citizenship grants awarded in the half century between ca 330-275. The earliest grants are concise and basic: the council and *demos* decide to grant *politeia* ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ to person X because of his goodwill and he is to be enrolled to the subgroups by lot.⁹⁶ Soon, the city honoured the recipients explicitly "like the other benefactors", with the gift to be inscribed in the list of benefactors honoured by the city "for all to see ... that the *demos* honours their benefactors".⁹⁷ In the following citizenship decrees, most of which with ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ, Ephesos increasingly added the extra honours for benefactors: first the regular *enkētēsis*,⁹⁸ later also a gold crown, the proclamation of their names at the city Dionysia, immediate access to council and assembly after the *hiera*, *proedria*, *ateleia*, and so on.⁹⁹

Samos issued numerous grants to individuals between the late fourth and mid-second century, beginning with the wave of grants in gratitude for support in exile (above). All grants begin with a narrative part on the beneficial deeds of the honorand, followed by the part with the actual grant, which is similar in structure in all grants. First, the beneficiary receives *politeia* ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ and is to be enrolled by lot in subgroups and inscribed in the list "just like the

94 Kamphorst 2023. On the rapid disappearance of different dialect forms in Ephesos, Samos and Miletus, Walser 2008, 332.

95 Magnesia on the Maeander: with the clause *I.Magnesia* 12, without 82/10, 86/5, 90/4, 91/9, 92/3, 93/6, all dating to the early third century, and 84/2 of possibly the late fourth c.; cf. O. Kern in *I.Magnesia*, xxix. Ephesos: *I.Ephesos* 1417 with, and 54/1425, 61/1426 without the clause, all three very short texts of late fourth century. Delphi: *FD III* 4 376-380 of the mid-fourth century all grant ἐπιτιμίαν καθάπερ Δελφοῖς, only 378 also πολιτείαν ἴσαν καὶ ὁμοίαν.

96 *I.Ephesos* 2010, of 340-320 or 306 (very fragmentary); *I.Ephesos* 1421, *I.Ephesos* 1419; *I.Ephesos* 1425; *I.Ephesos* 1426, of 326/5 and 323/2.

97 *I.Ephesos* 1412; *I.Ephesos* 1443; *I.Ephesos* 1459, before 320 (without the clause); *I.Ephesos* 1458; *I.Ephesos* 1450.

98 *I.Ephesos* 1443.

99 *I.Ephesos* 1452, 302/1; *I.Ephesos* 1405, early third c.

other Samians”.¹⁰⁰ In this part of the procedure, the new citizen was indeed “equal and similar” to all Samians. But in addition, he was elevated above them, as the decree proclaimed him *proxenos* or/and *energetēs*, with more honours, beginning with first access to council and *dēmos* after the *hierai*,¹⁰¹ and increasingly enumerating more.

4. Conclusions

The expression ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος (“equal and like”) and the clause ἐφ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ (“on equal and like terms”) used in the context of citizenship, held a pledge about the *polis*’ dealings with others, particularly to new citizens about their condition in their new *polis*. In the literary and epigraphical evidence taken together we may discern the contours of a chronological pattern. From an archaic beginning to at least the second century, migration, colonization, and exile were the backgrounds against which this clause became meaningful. It did not indicate the kind of *politeia* in which the new citizens would find themselves, which could be oligarchic or democratic or anything in between. In the third century, Itanos made its citizens pledge to implement these values to themselves in a civic oath. From the mid-fourth to at least the first century, the clause also became part of the formulaic discourse of citizenship grants to individuals issued by democracies. Of this particular application, the evidence is limited to a few regions. Beside three polities in central Greece, about a dozen cities in Ionia and Caria and Samos issued grants with this clause. It would seem Ephesos and Samos were the first to do so in this area, and they certainly did so on the largest scale. Treaties of *sympoliteia* and *isopoliteia* in this region, and one in Central Greece, were mass grants of citizenship, in which the clause guided the implementation of refoundation and settlement.

Originally, the clause indicated the equality of the citizens in all formal and informal valuations, including the differentiations law and custom created among them. When a newly made citizen was included ἐφ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ, he could expect to be so in the basic status of a citizen, including the conventional differentiations. But precisely in grants of citizenship the clause ἐφ’ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ got intertwined with the institutionalised layering of citizens’ *timē* with honours and privileges. In Athens, this institutionalization is first documented in the Prytaneion-decree (IG I³ 131) of the early 420s. From the late fifth to the late Hellenistic period, most democratic *poleis* awarded to citizens and outsiders an increasing array of honours with ever more frequency. In this process, the honours for *proxenoi* (outsiders) and for *energetai* (both outsiders and citizens) gathered into a stable catalogue. For outsiders, the honorific titles of *proxenoi*

¹⁰⁰ IG XII 6, 1, 17; shortly after 322.

¹⁰¹ IG XII 6, 1, 22; 45; shortly after 322.

and *energetai* became virtually synonymous, and the honours attached to these titles merged.¹⁰² When such benefactors of the city were granted citizenship, as was usually the case, they were showered with all the honours their *timē* as benefactor required. In a few distinct areas, *poleis* added the clause *isos kai homoios* or *ep' isei kai homoiai* to the formulas of inclusion at the basic level “like all other citizens” with the conventional flexibilities, as the clause implied. But the high-profile new citizens were bracketed into the exalted group of the *energetai* with the highest honours of the city. In the Hellenistic stratification of citizenship, in these cases the connection *kai* between *isos* (equal) and *homoios* (like) was drawn out to a thin, dotted line.

102 In Athens, the honorific titles of *proscenos* and *energetēs* for outsiders were usually combined, from the first extant inscribed decrees (Henry 1983, 116).