

Συμπολιτεύειν: Being a Citizen, with Others

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ABSTRACT:

The contribution examines how Greek poleis created a shared civic body when formerly independent communities merged in a sympolity. Drawing on epigraphic case studies including Delphi and Plygonion, Stiris and Medeon, Miletus and Pidasa, and the incorporation of Magnesia into Smyrna, it analyses how shared citizenship was defined and implemented in practice. Sympolity agreements reveal that citizenship was understood less as a set of rights than as participation in common political institutions, cult practices, and civic obligations. By regulating assemblies, offices, cult participation, and civic subdivisions, these treaties show how communities negotiated integration and redefined the polis as a newly constituted body politic.

KEYWORDS: Greek citizenship; Hellenistic *polis*; sympolity; *polis* identity; religion and citizenship.

1. A Hellenistic family story

In the year 200/199 BCE, Dionysios and Sopolis, sons of Asandros, served as witnesses to the manumission of a slave. The two brothers were citizens of Plygonion-Phlygonion—a modest *polis* in Phokis, a few kilometers east of Delphi¹—but the manumission took place in the sanctuary of Delphi, where they were recorded as witnesses in an inscription.² Three years later, in 196, Sopolis again appeared as a witness to the emancipation of a slave at Delphi.³

* I thank Christof Schuler (Munich) for many fruitful discussions on the topic over the years.

1 This is not the place to revisit the debate over whether the individuals at Delphi with the *ethnikon* Πλυγονεύς belonged to the Phocian *polis* Phlygonion, known from several sources, or to an otherwise unattested Locrian Plygonion. I follow Rousset 2002, 20–27, who convincingly argues for a single *polis* Plygonion/Phlygonion—its *ethnikon* appearing as either Πλυγονεύς or Φλυγονεύς—located east of Delphi. The postulate of two distinct *poleis* was most fully advanced by Daux 1936, 234–258, to whom it must be conceded that the identity of the two names cannot be positively demonstrated. Rousset 2002, 45; 63 places Phlygonion at Bania (following Robert, *BE* 1941, 8 p. 231), while Fossey 1986, 54–56 and Typaldou-Fakiris 2004, 209–216 argue for Kastro Tseresi.

2 *CID* V 1, 1.

3 *CID* V 1, 13.

By that point, the two brothers from Phlygonion had evidently grown accustomed to the procedure, and in the following year they manumitted one of their own slaves.⁴ We can trace the two brothers over the subsequent decades, catching glimpses of one or both of them in the years 189, 179, and 177—either as the master of a newly freed slave or as a witness to another’s manumission.⁵ In 167, we encounter Sopolis, son of Asandros, for the last time, when he manumitted another of his slaves.⁶ The witness on that occasion was his son, also named Asandros, after his grandfather—offering a fleeting view into the future of this slaveholding family before it disappears from the record.

This family story, drawn from Delphic manumission records, is dry and fleshless even by the epigraphist’s standards—and would hardly merit attention, were it not for a significant break in the pattern. In the documents from the first five years of the family’s recorded history, from 200 to 195 BCE, the two brothers are clearly identified as citizens of Plygonion-Phlygonion, as Πλυγονεῖς. After 189, however, the inscriptions consistently record them with the *ethnikon* Δελφός, as citizens of Delphi.

If the brothers were isolated cases, the change could be explained in many ways. But they are merely an example for a more extensive pattern: from the very last years of the third century (perhaps from 201) into the Imperial period, manumission documents were inscribed at Delphi on the large *mur polygonal*. In roughly every second document of the initial years up to the winter of 191/90, Πλυγονεῖς appear as manumitters, guarantors, or witnesses, usually alongside citizens of Delphi and Amphissa. In total, the manumission records of this period attest about fifty Plygonians. In addition, six individuals affected by the decisions issued in the winter of 191/90 by M. Acilius Glabrio bear Πλυγονεύς as their *ethnikon*.⁷

Given the numerous attestations from the first decade of the second century, it is all the more striking that in the still abundant manumission records of the following years—and in all other inscriptions—the *ethnikon* Πλυγονεύς no longer occurs at all. The individuals once labelled as Plygonians, however, do not disappear from the evidence. In the same way as Dionysios and Sopolis, no less than fourteen more Πλυγονεῖς reappear as Δελφοί after that date.⁸

It has long been recognized that this pattern can only be explained if all citizens of Plygonion-Phlygonion became Delphians sometime between the end of 191 and the beginning of 189: the *ethnikon* Πλυγονεῖς appears for the last

4 CID V 1, 22.

5 CID V 1, 61 (189); 63 (189); 143 (179); 152 (179), 159 (177).

6 CID V 1, 265 (167).

7 See Rousset 2002, 21 with n. 82 and the comments to the decisions of Glabrio edited as no. 41, expanding on the still useful collection in the index of *SGDI* IV 2, 295-296.

8 In seven cases, the identity is certain, for nine likely or probable. See again Rousset 2002, 21f. with n. 85, correcting and supplementing the extensive discussion by Daux 1936, 247-253, based in part on the yet unpublished index to CID V.

time in a document from November/December 191 (*CID V 56*) and in the decisions of Acilius Glabrio from the winter of 191/90. The earliest manumission documents in which former Plygoneis are attested with the *ethnikon* Δελφός date to January/February 189. Delphi and Plygonion-Phlygonion formed a political entity that the ancients sometimes, and modern scholars more frequently, call a sympolity: they merged into a single *polis*.⁹

2. Sympolities and the problem of shared citizenship

There can be little doubt that the unification of formerly independent city-states into a single *polis*—most often through the incorporation of a smaller *polis* into its larger neighbor—is an important phenomenon of the late Classical and Hellenistic periods. Some of the most important Hellenistic city-states were founded, re-founded, or significantly transformed through this process. Rhodes, Kos, and Megalopolis are probably the best known examples, but one could also mention *poleis* like Alexandria Troas, Ilion, Miletus, Ephesus, and many other, less prominent city-states. The political landscape of entire regions, such as Arcadia or the Troad, was profoundly reshaped by these processes of integration and centralization.¹⁰

Why did some *poleis* unite while others stayed independent? Why did some unions thrive, others fail? These are difficult and important questions, but here, I want to set them aside to focus instead on a more fundamental aspect of the phenomenon. It is for this reason that I have chosen the rather bland “family story” of Dionysios and Sopolis as a starting point. It illustrates in all its outward monotony what the creation of a sympolity was fundamentally about, if not for all, then at least for some of the people involved. They exchanged their old citizenship for a new one: that of the shared state, the sympolity.

How was it possible to bring together the citizens of separate *poleis*—who had viewed themselves, at least ideally, as independent, autonomous, even autarkic—into a single body politic? How can 1 + 1, just this once, not make 2, but 1 again?

That the solution of this unnatural equation, and with it the question of citizenship, lies at the heart of the problem becomes clear from the terminology in our sources. One of the terms the Greeks used to describe such a union between formerly independent *poleis*, and the one I have already used, is συμπολιτεία. Frequently, the corresponding verbs συμπολιτεύω or συμπολιτεύομαι also appear. However, the meaning of these terms was not narrowly defined.

The history of the word family can be traced back to the noun ζυμπολίτης, first attested in Euripides’ *Heracleidae*. Before the decisive battle against the

9 On the sympolity of Delphi and Plygonion-Phlygonion see the short remarks with further literature in Schuler, Walser 2015, 354.

10 Various aspects of the phenomenon have been discussed (with references to the earlier literature) in Walser 2009 and Schuler, Walser 2015. See also Reger 2004; Mack 2013; LaBuff 2016.

Argives, Demophon, king of the Athenians, exhorts his troops: “ὦ ζυμπολῖται, to the land that nourishes and has borne us, we must now offer assistance”.¹¹ The ζυμπολῖται so emphatically addressed are the “fellow-citizens”, the *Mitbürger*, *concittadini*. The compound συμπολίτης underscores the idea of shared citizenship that Demophon activates through his appeal to the ancestral land as both nurse and mother. But does the simplex πολίτης not already imply a community of citizens? This was precisely the view of the grammarian Phrynichos, who, in his attempt to restore “true Attic”, condemned the compound in the second century CE: πολίτης λέγε, μὴ συμπολίτης—“say citizen, not fellow-citizen”.¹² Thucydides, Xenophon, Isocrates and other classical authors, however, were untroubled by such linguistic purism, and all employ at least the verb συμπολιτεύειν in the sense of “to live as fellow-citizens”.¹³ At least in Thucydides and Xenophon the term shows a nuance that goes beyond simple synonymy: they use the verb to describe the sharing of a community’s political rights by groups or individuals whose status is, for one reason or another, precarious. Thucydides notes that certain Megarians who had come to Sicily “for a time lived as fellow-citizens of the Chalkidians”, before later being expelled.¹⁴ Xenophon reports that the Olynthians persuaded several *poleis* “to use the same laws and to live as fellow-citizens”,¹⁵ and with that, he is the first author who uses the term in a more technical sense to describe the incorporation of one *polis* into another.

The noun συμπολιτεία is used much more rarely in literary sources, and all but two references¹⁶ come from Polybios. He applies the term to various unions of *poleis* that are, in one way or another, characterized by the sharing of a common citizenship.¹⁷ Most of these were federal states like the Achaean *koinon* and only one corresponds to the type of sympolity I am examining here.¹⁸

11 Eurip. *Herac.* 824-826: Ἀθηναίων δ’ ἄναξ στρατῶι παρήγγελλ’ οἷα χρὴ τὸν εὐγενῆ· ὦ ζυμπολῖται, τῇ τε βοσκούσῃ χθονὶ καὶ τῇ τεκούσῃ νῦν τιν’ ἀρκέσαι χρεών.

12 Phryn. 144.

13 See LSJ *s.v.* συμπολιτεύω for the references.

14 Th. 6.4: κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ Λάμις ἐκ Μεγάρων ἀποικίαν ἄγων ἐς Σικελίαν ἀφίκετο, καὶ ὑπὲρ Παντακίου τε ποταμοῦ Τρώτιλόν τι ὄνομα χωρίον οἰκίσας, καὶ ὕστερον αὐτόθεν τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσιν ἐς Λεοντίνους ὀλίγον χρόνον ζυμπολιτεύσας καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐκπεσὼν.

15 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12: Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης μεγίστη πόλις Ὀλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων προσηγάγοντο ἐφ’ ᾧ τε νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι καὶ συμπολιτεύειν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. On the passage see also Walser 2009, 136 n. 5.

16 Diodorus uses the term in a technical sense for the Achaean *koinon* (28.19.1). In the first century BCE, the philosopher Philodemus of Gadara (*Mus.* fr. 139 Delattre) defines justice as the psychic disposition enabling one to choose between what is beneficial and what is harmful “for the communal life within the *polis*” (πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλοις συμπολιτείας). As Delattre observes *ad loc.*, the passage echoes an Epicurean maxim defining justice as that συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων (Epicur. *Sent.* 38).

17 As L. Robert remarked (1962, 55 n. 2), we should not be surprised that the noun might denote quite different realities.

18 Polyb. 18.2.4 (Byzantion-Perinthos). Another exception is the *sympoliteia* between Kydonia and Apollonia in Crete mentioned by Polyb. 28.14.3, which modern scholars classify as an

If the Greek term *sympoliteia* can describe both phenomena, the modern observer must nevertheless keep in mind a key distinction: while federal citizenship in a *koinon* merely supplements the existing *polis*-citizenship of the member states, in the cases I am analyzing, the citizenship of the sympolity replaces that of the formerly independent communities. The communities joined by this type of *sympoliteia* become parts of a single state. Sopolis and Asandros are Δελφοί and not Πλυγονεῖς anymore.¹⁹

That the Greeks felt little need for strict terminological consistency in legal and institutional matters is well known,²⁰ and we should not expect more rigor in the epigraphic sources discussed below. But the terms were chosen deliberately, even if, or indeed exactly because, their broad everyday meanings continued to resonate in technical contexts. If a *sympoliteia* is ultimately little more than a *politeia*, a *sympolites* merely a somewhat less “Atticistic” citizen, and συμπολιτεύειν nothing but “to live as fellow-citizens”, the vocabulary was still selected with care to underscore the political community’s character as a shared civic body. When Kos and Kalymna chose the closely related term *homopoliteia* to describe the union of their states, they signaled that the *sympas demos* of Koans and Kalymnians shared a single *politeia*, placing particular emphasis on the full equality of all citizens.²¹ Phrynichos would have frowned upon this term no less.

Terminology can illuminate, but it cannot answer the central question:²² what did it mean to hold the citizenship of a Greek *polis*, especially in the post-Classical world? This was not an issue that preoccupied the inhabitants of a *polis* in their daily lives, if they actually *were* citizens. One simply was a citizen and behaved like one, usually because one’s parents already held that status. What citizenship meant was learned not through formal instruction, but by growing up within one’s state and community.

isopoliteia; see Reger 2004, 148f. based on Chanotis 1996, 285-287.

19 The distinction was already sharply drawn by Feldmann 1885, 8, and by Szanto 1892, 114f. Szanto separates a “federal” (*bundesmäßige*) from a “synoecistic sympolity” (*synoekistische Sympolitie*). Since sympolities of the latter type do not necessarily involve resettlement, the term is best avoided (Walser 2009, *passim*).

20 This has been observed already by Reger 2004, 148f. in his discussion of the terminology for *sympoliteia*.

21 IG XII 4.1 152, ll. 16, 18. On the term ὁμοπολιτεία recently LaBuff 2016, 163-165 (with earlier literature), who rightly stresses the fine differences in semantics, but I would refrain completely—as he hesitantly tries—from attaching *sympoliteia* and *homopoliteia* to different political realities. Other terms or phrases, stressing different aspects, were available as well: the citizens of Orchomenos and Euaimon in Arcadia called their union a Συφοικία... ἐπὶ τοῖς φίσφοις καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις (IPArk 15, ll. 1-5), putting more emphasis on the question of residence. When Helisson was incorporated into Mantinea, the contract simply signaled the change of citizenship, but did not fail to emphasize the shared belonging to the state: τὸς [Ἐ]λ[ι]σ[φ]ασίος Μαντινέας ἦναι φίσος καὶ ὁμοίος, κ[ο]ινάζοντα[ς] πάντων ὄσων καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς (IPArk 9, ll. 3-5).

22 See also Mack 2013.

The *poleis* that united in a sympolity, however, created a new—or at least profoundly altered—political entity. Its members suddenly found themselves in a position not unlike that of a philosopher designing an ideal state: they had to formulate rules for future civic life and, in doing so, were compelled to understand—and articulate—what it meant to be a citizen of a *polis*. Unlike Plato, they were not writing philosophical dialogues about Kallipolis, nor, unlike Aristotle, treatises on *Politika*, but they were establishing laws, defining procedural rules, and negotiating contracts.

3. Doing politics together: Stiris and Medeon

Sometime between roughly 175 and 125 BCE, Stiris and Medeon—two small *poleis* in Phokis, not far from Delphi and Phlygonion—decided to form a sympolity.

The ancient city of Stiris lay a few kilometers southeast of the modern village of Stiri and the monastery of Hosios Loukas, on a hill plateau up to 200 m wide and roughly 250 m long. The inscriptions found there—including the sympolity treaty with Medeon—identify the site unequivocally as ancient Stiris. The rocky hill, steeply sloping in places, sits in the middle of a fertile plain that is separated from the Gulf of Corinth (ca. 5 km away) by a line of hills.²³

Medeon lies directly on the Gulf of Antikyra (Aspra Spitia), at the northern edge of an isolated coastal plain of about 3 km², on a hill rising close to 100 m above the sea, directly opposite Antikyra. From the top of the hill, one has a view not only of the entrance to the Gulf of Antikyra and the coastal plain, but also of part of the Gulf of Corinth. Since no inscriptions have been found at the site, its identification relies entirely on ancient literary references,²⁴ but is universally accepted today.²⁵

Medeon lies ca. 7.5 km from Stiris, but the two are separated by a mountain chain rising to almost 900 m. Only a difficult path, requiring a two- to three-hour walk through a deep gorge, connects Medeon and Stiris.²⁶

23 For the location and the surviving remains of Stiris see (each with earlier bibliography): Fossey 1986, 32-34; McInerney 1999, 319f.; Freitag 1999, 143f.; and most recently Typaldou-Fakiris 2004, 223-230, with the only plan of the site so far. An unusually detailed description of the place is provided by Lolling 1989, 102-106.

24 Paus. 10.36.6; Strabo 9.2.26 (C 410); 9.3.13 (C 423). See also Steph. Byz. *s.n.*

25 See Amandry 1940, 273f. For the site see the rescue excavation report by Vatin 1969, and, using unpublished excavation notes, Typaldou-Fakiris 2004, 230-239, which also compiles earlier literature. The summaries in Fossey 1986, 26-29, McInerney 1999, 325-327, and Freitag 2000, 145f. are outdated.

26 The topography is clarified by the relief map in Rousset, Katzourous 1992, 211. A vivid description of the path is given by Lolling 1989, 598: “[er] gehört... zu den schwierigsten, so dass man lieber zu Fuss geht, als sich dem Sturze des Pferdes oder Maulthieres auf dem holprigen Wege und hoch am Rande des Abgrundes liegenden Wege aussetzt”. See also Amandry 1940, 273f. Typaldou-Fakiris 2004, 225 underestimates the difficulty of this route

The history of both cities, both before and after concluding their sympolity, is barely known. In the fourth century both belonged to the Phocian League (*Phokikṓn Koinon*). According to Pausanias, they were among the 21 cities destroyed at the end of the Third Sacred War, whose inhabitants were forced to resettle in scattered villages.²⁷ Like the other cities, Stiris and Medeon were probably rebuilt soon afterwards and restored as *poleis*.

The conflicts with Macedonia, the Aetolians, and the Celts, which shaped Phocian history thereafter, certainly affected Stiris and Medeon as well, though the sources do not make this explicit.²⁸ The few honorific and dedicatory inscriptions found in Stiris, almost all from the Hellenistic and Roman periods, provide little additional historical information.²⁹

The dating of the union of the two *poleis* has posed difficulties and is based on the prosopographical data provided by the *homologia* that defined the terms for the union.³⁰ There is little doubt that the sympolity was concluded in the second century after 189, and a date after roughly 130 is highly unlikely. The most recent edition argues for a date around 140-130 BCE.³¹

The contractual agreement between Stiris and Medeon, inscribed on a stele discovered in ancient Stiris, tells us nothing about the procedure that led to its drafting and conclusion, nor do the motives of the participating communities become clear. Although the document tries to disguise the imbalance between the partners through formulations that imply reciprocity—“the Medeonian land shall be entirely Stirian, and the Stirian land Medeonian”³² (ll. 47-51)—there is no doubt that Stiris was the stronger party: Medeon was incorporated and disappeared as an independent *polis*. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the unification was initiated by Stiris,³³ but there are strong indications that it was indeed driven by the stronger partner’s expansionist aims.³⁴

when she claims the sympolity between Medeon and Stiris can easily be explained by its “natural outlet to the sea and the bay of Antikyra”.

27 Paus. 10.3.2-3; see also D.S. 16.60; and on the resettlement (*dioikismos*) D.S. 19.81.

28 The political development of Phokis in the Hellenistic period has been summarized concisely and still valuably, though correctable in details by Schober 1924, 73-83.

29 The inscriptions found at Stiris are listed by Fossey 1986, 33.

30 IG IX 1 32 (H. Pomtow, *Syll.*³ 647; Schwyzler, *DGE* 353; Migeotte 1984, no. 28 [ll. 1-10]). I thank Denis Rousset for providing me with his edition and commentary to be published in IG IX 12 6, which will provide a full bibliography. Arnaoutoglou 1998, 105 gives an English translation.

31 The arguments of earlier editors are briefly summarized by Migeotte 1984, 102 n. 312, to which later scholarship generally refers. Rousset now firmly opts for 140-130 BCE, but I do not share his optimism that an earlier dating can be excluded with certainty.

32 Ll. 47-51: τὰν χ[ώραν] τὰν Μεδεωνίαν εἶμεν [π]ᾶσαν Στιρίαν καὶ τὰν Στιρίαν Μεδεωνίαν κοινὰν π[ᾶσα]ν.

33 See, e.g., below on Miletus and Pidasa.

34 The argument cannot be developed here. For short remarks see Walser 2015, 353f., starting from Rousset, Katzouros 1992, 197-215 (*SEG* 42.479; Ager 1996 no. 20; Magnetto 1997 no.

After a brief prescript dating the document with reference to the *stratēgos* of the Phocian *koinon*, the *homologia* opens with a short statement of facts and its core provisions.

The Stiriōi and Medeoniōi have formed a *sympoliteia*—both possessing sanctuaries, a city, a territory, and harbors, all free from financial liabilities³⁵—under the following conditions: all Medeoniōi shall be Stiriōi with equal and identical rights.³⁶

In other words, the Medeonians become citizens of Stiris. What this implies is spelled out with admirable clarity in the following sentence:

They shall hold assemblies and appoint officials together with the *polis* of the Stiriāns, and those who have reached the required age shall judge in all cases within the jurisdiction of the *polis*.³⁷

The passage echoes the famous definition of the citizen that Aristotle offers in Book 3 of his *Politics*: a citizen is simply one who participates in deliberation and in office.³⁸ But whereas the philosopher speaks in abstract terms—*κρίσις καὶ ἀρχή*—the authors of the sympolity agreement refer to the concrete institutions in which citizens “rule and are ruled in turn”: the people’s assembly, where issues were discussed and decisions made; the civic magistracies, to which officials were elected or allotted; and, finally, the law courts, where citizens served as judges.³⁹

The terms used to define what *συν-πολιτεύειν* actually means were carefully chosen, and in some cases even coined *ad hoc*: *συν-εκκλησιάζειν*—“to hold

68; Typaldou-Fakiris 2004, 193-195). The view of D. Knoepfler (1999, 248) that Stiris and Phanoteus were unified in a sympolity is not convincing (see already D. Rousset, *BE* 2001, 243).

35 On this see Migeotte 1984, 102f., discarding alternate interpretations.

36 Ll. 6-12: *συ|νε|πολίτευσαν Στείριοι καὶ| Μ|εδεώνιοι ἔχοντες ἱερά, πόλιν, χώρα|τιν, λιμένας, πάντα ἐ|λευθέρα, ἐπὶ τοῖσδε· εἴμεν τοὺς Μεδεωνίους πάντας Στιρίους ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους*. The punctual verbal aspect of the aorist infinitive requires that *συμπολιτεύειν* here be translated as “to conclude a sympolity”; Giovannini’s attempt (1971, 20-24, esp. 23) to restrict the meaning of the word to a state of being is therefore untenable; cf. already Schmitt 1994, 37f.

37 Ll. 13-18: *καὶ συνεκλησιάζειν καὶ συναρχοστατεῖσθαι μετὰ τὰς [π]όλιος τῶν Στιρίων, καὶ δικάζ|ειν τὰς δίκας τὰς ἐπὶ πόλι|ος πάσας τοὺς ἐνικομένους ταῖς ἀλικίας*.

38 Arist. *Pol.* 1275a 22: *πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς*. Aristotle’s view of citizenship is discussed in several contributions to this volume in detail. I have analyzed the passage elsewhere and drawn attention to the parallel between the agreement between Stiris and Medeon and Aristotle in a different context: see Walser 2012, 74-76.

39 As Cassayre 2010, 79 has rightly seen, the specification *τὰς δίκας τὰς ἐπὶ πόλι|ος πάσας* makes clear that this applies only to cases falling within the jurisdiction of the *polis* and not, as one must undoubtedly understand, within that of the Phocian League. For the distinction between *δίκαι αἱ κατὰ ἔθνος/κοινόν* and *κατὰ πόλιν* in the jurisdiction of federal states, see Robert 1925, 224-226. Arnaoutoglou’s translation—“those who reach the appropriate age shall judge cases in the *poleis*”—misses the point.

assemblies, *together*”—and συν-αρχοστατεῖσθαι—“to fill the offices, *together*”.⁴⁰ The use of the prefix συν- may have earned the scorn of the Atticist grammarians, but it underscored what was seen as essential: all political action should be undertaken jointly by the *sympolitai* of the newly constituted *polis*, not by two merely affiliated groups of citizens. “Separate but equal” was simply not good enough. Citizens were not to act alongside each other, but together.

Not only the vocabulary, but also the phrasing of the clause is significant. Like Aristotle, the agreement does not speak in terms of rights. Of course, the framers of the *homologia* could have chosen expressions like ἔστω, ἐξέστω or ἐξεῖναι τοῖς Μεδεωνίοις—“let it be permitted to the Medeonians”—without changing the substantive meaning. But they did not: voting, electing, and judging are not “rights” that citizens possess; rather, they are simply what a Stirian does—and must do—to be a Stirian. This diction, which emphatically asserts the factuality of συμπολιτεύεσθαι, is not unique to the Stiris-Medeon agreement but a recurring feature of similar sympolity agreements.⁴¹

That this difference may be meaningful is suggested, interestingly, by the German language. We typically translate the Greek term *politeia* in these contexts as *Bürgerrecht*,⁴² and it is under this term that we conceptualize the Greek citizenship. We do this less by choice than by necessity, since the German language—perhaps not coincidentally—lacks a term that captures the meaning of *politeia* as the state of being and acting as a citizen. Instead, it persists in referring to the possession of rights—maybe more in line with the Roman understanding of *civitas* than with the Greek view of πολιτεία.

That for a citizen of Stiris “citizenship” meant above all an obligation to act, rather than a bundle of rights, is found in a later passage of the convention:

Undertaking the liturgical offices in Stiris shall not be obligatory for those Medeonians who had served in Medeon as archons, *xenodikai*, *praktores*, *damourgoi*, priests, or hierarchs, nor for those women who had held a priesthood, unless someone takes on an office voluntarily. The officeholders shall be appointed from among those Medeonians who have not yet performed a liturgy, and from among the Stirians.⁴³

40 The verb συναρχοστατέομαι is a *bapax*, the simplex ἀρχοστατέομαι not attested at all.

41 In a characteristic contrast, the contract of *isopoliteia* between Tylisos and Axos states: ἐξέστω δὲ πολιτεύεσθαι τῷ τε Τυλισίῳ φαζοῖ[καὶ τῷ φαζίῳ Τ]υλισοῖ καὶ μετέχε[ν θίνων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πάντων (Chaniotis 1996, no. 15 ll. 6f.; see *ibid.* no. 61 A ll. 10–12). On *isopoliteia* see most recently Saba 2020 and—with very different views—Müller 2023b.

42 The term *Staatsbürgerschaft* that emphasizes the status of being a citizen is used in international contexts in the sense of belonging to a state as a citizen.

43 Ll. 34–41: μὴ ἔστω δὲ ἐπάναγκιες λειτουργεῖν τοὺς Μεδεωνίους ἐν Στίρῃ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅσοι γεγένηται ἐν Μεδεῶνι ἄρχοντες, ξενοδίκαι, πρακτῆρες, δαμιουργοί, ἱερεῖς, ἱεράρχαι, καὶ τὰν γυναικῶν ὅσαι ἱερητεύκατι, εἰ μὴ τις ἐκὼν ὑπομένοι.

Therefore, the Medeonians who had already served in civic office in Medeon were not required to do so again upon becoming citizens of Stiris, though they were welcome to volunteer. The implication, of course, is that those who had not yet fulfilled their civic duty were in fact obliged to do so. Assuming office was thus an *officium* in the narrow sense, much more than a right to do so. The telling expression *λειτουργεῖν* [...] *τὰς ἀρχάς* makes it clear that these offices were real, and above all, financial obligations.

The agreement between Stiris and Medeon is remarkable in that it functions like a prism: it breaks the concept of “citizenship” into its constituent parts. These elements could also be identified in other sympolity treaties, even if they are not usually expressed quite so clearly in words.⁴⁴

4. Sharing the Gods: Miletus and Pidasa

With all this, we remain squarely within Aristotle’s definition of citizenship, where being a citizen is primarily about participating in political life in the narrow sense: decision-making and office-holding. That this view may be too limited is suggested by another notable sympolity treaty.

Shortly after 188 BCE, ambassadors from the *polis* Pidasa proposed to the people of Miletus, as the treaty phrases it, “to bring in their *polis*, territory, and all the revenues thereof” into the larger *polis* of their neighbors.⁴⁵

Pidasa was a small city, lying in the mountains about 30 km southeast of Miletus. The urban center—if it can even be called urban—has been located at the site now called Çert Osman Kale, about 800 m above sea level on Mount Grion.⁴⁶ Commanding the passage from the Latmian Gulf over the low pass leading south toward Euromos and controlling the route from Euromos toward Iasos, the city was of considerable strategic importance. The Milesians, hardly unwilling to expand their territory towards the east,⁴⁷ accepted the offer, and the terms of the unification—explicitly called a *sympoliteia*—were laid out in a formal treaty.⁴⁸

44 See e.g. the *synthesis* between Mantinea and Helisson, *IPArk* 9 (RO 14). Other sympolity agreements, such as that between Miletos and Pidasa (*I.Delphinion* 149; see below), are far more concise and address primarily a series of specific issues.

45 *I.Delphinion* 149, ll. 50f: προσφερομένων Πιδασέων πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων προσόδους.

46 The localization is due to Cook 1961, 91-96; the site and its strategic importance are characterized most effectively by Wörle 2003a, 1368f., while Radt 1973-74, 169-174 provides a description of the ruins. The publication of the first—and so far only—decree of Pidasa (Kızıl *et al.* 2015; cf. Blümel 2016), brought to light through an illegal excavation near Kurudere at the foot of the eastern slopes of Mount Grion, necessitates a re-evaluation of the topography of Pidasa and its territory. A study promised by Kızıl *et al.* 2015, 390 has not yet appeared.

47 They had incorporated Myous a few years before (LaBuff 2016, 87-92 with the evidence), and were, about the same time, in a territorial conflict and even war with Heracleia at Latmos (*I.Delphinion* 150; *StV* IV 644).

48 *I.Delphinion* 149 (*StV* IV 638), referring to τὴν συμπολιτείαν in l. 49; see also Herrmann, *I.Milet* I, p. 184f. (with further bibliography). For the date, see Wörle 1988, 445 n. 92, and

Following the preliminaries, the treaty opens with the fundamental stipulation implementing Pidasas's incorporation into Miletus:

The Pidasais shall be citizens of the Milesians, with them their children and wives.⁴⁹

As in the Stiris-Medeon agreement, this is further elaborated, though much more briefly:

Those who have sworn the oath and are registered (as citizens of Miletus) shall take part in the sacred affairs, the offices and everything else, in which the other Milesians take part.⁵⁰

The mention of ἀρχεῖα underlines the importance of political participation, but here it takes second place to religious matters, which appear first. Equal participation in sacred affairs is guaranteed in other sympolity agreements as well, though rarely in such a prominent position.⁵¹ And while religion falls into a blind spot in Aristotle's *Politics*, the sacred realm has long been recognized as a key domain in which citizenship was performed and belonging to the *polis* was expressed and experienced. Particular attention has been given to the carefully orchestrated religious festivals, with their elaborate sacrifices, grand processions, and communal feasting. The contemporary celebrations of Zeus Sosipolis at Magnesia-on-the-Maeander⁵² are perhaps the best-known of many examples from the Hellenistic period, where, in the words of Angelos Chaniotis, "the citizens were celebrating themselves".⁵³

In the 19th century, Fustel de Coulanges famously defined the Greek citizen on the most fundamental level as "the man who has the religion of the city".⁵⁴ We do not need to subscribe to this idea, or one of its much more refined formulations,⁵⁵ in order to acknowledge the significance of religion for citizenship.

Errington 1989, 287f. Gauthier 2001 clarified the procedure that led to the conclusion of the treaty. I have discussed the sympolity under a different perspective in Walser 2009, 139-141; Reger 2004, 156-161 and LaBuff 2016, 93-103 (with an English translation and commentary of the contract) pay particular attention to the motivations behind the unification of the two *poleis*.

49 Ll. 10f.: εἶναι Πιδασεῖς Μιλησίων πολίτας καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας.

50 Ll. 13-15: μετεῖναι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ ἀνενεχθεῖσιν ἱερῶν καὶ ἀρχείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὧν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς μέτεστι Μιλησίοις.

51 E.g. *IPArke* 9 (Mantineia-Helisson), ll. 9f.; *SEG* 47.1563 (Latmos-Pidasas), ll. 10-13; *IG* IX 1 32 (Stiris-Medeon), ll. 18-24.

52 *LMagnesia* 98 (Sokolowski, *LSAM* 32; *Greek Ritual Norms* 194).

53 Chaniotis 1995. The literature on the topic is vast; see e.g. Chankowski 2005; Wiemer 2009a, 2009b; Parker 2011, 171-233, who underlines the importance of festivals for civic identity already in the Classical period.

54 Fustel de Coulanges 1864, III ch. XII: "Si l'on veut définir le citoyen des temps antiques par son attribut le plus essentiel, il faut dire que c'est l'homme qui possède la religion de la cité".

55 The discussion cannot be opened here. One could refer to de Polignac 1984 or, with a focus on Athens, Blok 2017, 47-99, as well as to Sourvinou-Inwood 1990, who took the idea as the starting point for her much debated concept of *Polis* Religion.

Still, the extent to which religion shaped the self-understanding of the citizen remains a matter of serious debate.

It is true that cultic practices were, in principle, open to all inhabitants—including foreigners—and only loosely centered on citizens.⁵⁶ Foreigners were free to enter sanctuaries and perform cultic practices. Civic festivals like those at Magnesia often included the city's entire population, not just citizens. It is equally true, however, that citizens and non-citizens usually had different rights and different roles in cultic practices. Religious officials in civic cults had to be full citizens.⁵⁷ The processions at the major festivals were carefully arranged and deliberately reflected the social order of the *polis*, with its gradations of rank and status.⁵⁸ While all inhabitants might be present at civic festivals—and in some cases were even required to attend—certain parts of the celebration were reserved for citizens or at the very least assigned them a special role. Exactly because all city dwellers are present, the exclusivity of citizenship becomes visible. That is why sympolity agreements, as well as individual grants of citizenship, stress again and again that what is given is a citizenship ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίαι, on equal and identical terms. They are designed to erase the differences between citizens old and new when they guarantee full participation for newly incorporated citizens, especially in religious affairs.

5. Making a body politic

In defining συμ-πολιτεύειν—participation in civic life across all spheres—sympolity agreements generally articulate aspirational goals and anticipate, rather than describe the actual implementation of unification. The practical mechanics of integration are laid out in most detail in the extensive inscription dossier that governs the incorporation of Magnesia ad Sipylum into Smyrna.⁵⁹ Magnesia lies at the edge of the plain at the foot of the Sipylos mountains near modern Manisa. It is located roughly 35 kilometers from Smyrna, with the approximately 1,500-meter-high mountain range forming a sharp dividing line between the two. As the dossier shows, Magnesia was not a *polis* in the political sense, but a military colony,⁶⁰ with active-duty soldiers, military colonists and a civilian po-

56 See the wide-ranging study by Krauter 2004, especially 53-113.

57 Krauter 2004, 94-98. The exceptions are easily explainable.

58 See in general, again, Chankowski 2005, especially 189 (“il s’agit là encore d’une image de la structure de la communauté”). At many festivals, the significance of citizenship was even more visible because the citizens participated κατὰ φυλάς, as part of their civic subdivision. See Zimmermann 2000, 465-469 with many references.

59 *I.Smyrna* 573 (*SI*V/ III 492; *I.Magnesia Sipylos* 1; Bencivenni 2003, 203-226).

60 See also Schuler 1998, 50. The contrast between a military colony and a *polis* is most clearly illustrated by the letters in which Eumenes II granted *polis*-status to Toriaion around 180 BCE (*I.Sultan Dağı* 393; see Savalli-Lestrade 2018). That Magnesia was not a *polis* remains true even

pulation. Soon after 246 BCE and in the context of the Third Syrian War,⁶¹ the Smyrneans at the behest of Seleucus II incorporated the territory of Magnesia and offered citizenship to the infantry and cavalry stationed at Magnesia, as well as to the colony's other free inhabitants. The grant of citizenship was part of a peace agreement between Smyrna and the army at Magnesia.⁶²

One lengthy passage details the process of enrolling the new citizens from Magnesia into the *dēmos* of Smyrna:

It shall be given to the military colonists in Magnesia, both to the cavalry- and infantrymen in the city and to those in the camps, citizenship in Smyrna, on an equal basis with the other citizens. Likewise, citizenship shall be given to the others living in Magnesia insofar as they are free and Greeks. The acting secretaries of the troops shall bring the rosters of the cavalry- and infantrymen in Magnesia—of those in the city and in the camps—before the people, the list of the other inhabitants, however, the men designated by the military colonists in Magnesia. When the secretaries have deposited the rosters and the designated men the list of the other inhabitants, then the *exetastai* shall administer an oath to them in the Metroon over newly burnt sacrifices: to the secretaries that they have, to the best of their knowledge and belief, presented the list of the military colonists with them—the cavalry- and infantrymen, both those stationed in the city and in the camps; to the men designated to provide the list of the other inhabitants, that they have, to the best of their knowledge and belief, presented the list of those living in Magnesia, being free and Greeks. The *exetastai* shall give the provided lists to the registrar of the council and the people who will deposit them in the public archive. The *exetastai* shall allot to the *phylai* all the registered names and inscribe them on the allotment-machines.⁶³

though some of the soldiers are said to be living *κατὰ πόλιν*. The *lex Hafniensis*—if it needs to be said—does not hold up.

- 61 A *terminus post quem* for dating the dossier is provided by the recognition of Smyrna's *asylia*, which happened either in 246 or—more plausibly—in 243/42. It depends in turn on the equally difficult dating of *I.Smyrna* 574, by which Smyrna accepts the *Sōtēria* in Delphi as an *ἀγὼν στεφανίτης* while mentioning its own *asylia*. For the historical circumstances see the commentaries cited above.
- 62 The incorporation of Magnesia into Smyrna is usually called a sympolity. Yet if we define, as I suggest, a sympolity strictly as a union between existing *poleis*, involving the integration of the citizens of both partners into a single state, this case does not qualify: Magnesia was not a *polis* at the time, and consequently neither the soldiers nor the other inhabitants were citizens of Magnesia. For the discussion here, the point is not critical.
- 63 LL 43-53: δεδόσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κατοίκοις, τοῖς τε κατὰ πόλιν ἱππεύσι καὶ πεζοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὑπαίθροις, πολιτείαν ἐν Σμύρνῃ ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίαι τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις· ὁμοίως δὲ δεδόσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς οἰκοῦσιν ἐμ Μαγνησίαι ὅσοι ἂν ὦσιν ἐλεύθεροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες· ἀνενεγκάτωσαν δὲ τοὺς μέγ καταλοχισμοὺς τῶν ἐμ Μαγνησίαι ἱππέων τε καὶ πεζῶν τῶν τε κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων οἱ ὄντες γραμματεῖς τῶν ταγμάτων ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οἰκητῶν τὴν γραφὴν οἱ ἀποδειχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κατοίκων ἄνδρες· ὅταν δὲ τιθῶνται τοὺς καταλοχισμοὺς οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀποδειχθέντες τὴν γραφὴν τῶν ἄλλων οἰκητῶν, ὀρκισάτωσαν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐξετασταὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μητρώου ἱεροῖς νεοκαύτοις τοὺς μὲν γραμματεῖς ἢ μὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ

The fact that the people living at Magnesia were not a well-defined body of citizens, but a heterogeneous group of soldiers and settlers made the registration of the new citizens a difficult process, and even if the Smyrneans, following the king's binding wish, were not able to independently vet them, they still took great pains to avoid granting citizenship to anyone not qualified.

After registration and review by the ἐξετασταί, the new citizens were assigned to one of Smyrna's *phylai* and had their names inscribed. It is remarkable that the names of the new citizens were inscribed on the κληρωτήρια, the allotment machines. Such machines existed in other Hellenistic *poleis*,⁶⁴ but they are certainly best known from Classical Athens, where they were used for the selection of judges. Whether the devices in Smyrna were constructed in the same manner, and whether they served the same or different purposes, remains unknown. It is possible that they were also used for allotting the new citizens into the *phylai*. In any case, they were both instruments of political participation and symbols of civic equality. It is fitting that the passage ends with a now-familiar formula:

Those inscribed on the allotment machines shall partake in everything in which the other citizens partake.⁶⁵

While other treaties do not describe the enrollment process in such detail, the registration of the new citizens—often in combination with an oath—is a recurring theme. Miletus and Pidasa simply state that the designated Milesians should give a list of the names of the new citizens to the *bouleuterion*.⁶⁶ When Mantinea incorporated its small neighbor Helisson in around 390 BCE,⁶⁷ they had to register themselves with magistrates of the cities. Their names were then displayed on white boards in public, and if one claimed that any of the registrants was not a former citizen of Helisson, the question would be decided by a court.⁶⁸

βελτίστου ἀνενηνοχέαι τὴν γραφὴν τῶν ὄντων παρ' αὐτοῖς κατοίκων ἱπέων καὶ πεζῶν, τῶν τε κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰ ὑπαιθρα τασσομένων, τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀναφέροντας τὴν γραφὴν τῶν ἄλλων οἰκητῶν, ἧ μὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίστου ἀνενηνοχέαι τὴν γραφὴν τῶν οἰκούντων ἐμ Μαγνησίαι καὶ ὄντων ἐλευθέρων καὶ Ἑλλήνων· τὰς δὲ ἀνενεχθείσας γραφὰς οἱ ἐξεσταταὶ παραδότωσαν τῷ γραμματοφύλακι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου, ὃ δὲ θέσθω εἰς τὸ δημόσιον. ἐπικληρωσάτωσαν δὲ οἱ ἐξεσταταὶ εἰς τὰς φυλάς τὰ ἀνενεχθέντα ὀνόματα πάντα καὶ ἀναγραψάτωσαν εἰς τὰ κληρωτήρια.

64 I have collected the evidence in Walser 2012, 87.

65 L. 53: καὶ ἔστω μετουσία τοῖς ἀναγραφείσιν εἰς τὰ κληρωτήρια πάντων ὧγ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πολίταις μέτεστιν.

66 *LDelphinion* 149, ll. 12f.: παραδοῦναι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βουλευτήριον τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀναγραφὴν τοὺς αἰρεθέντας ὑπὸ Μιλησίων ἄνδρας.

67 *IPArk* 17. I prefer the earlier dating of the sympolity, reaffirmed by Funke 2004, 431-434, to the later date of 350-340 defended by H. Taeuber and G. Thür, *IPArk*, p. 99f.

68 Ll. 16-25. It is noteworthy that the right to bring an accusation is granted only to the former citizens of Helisson who are themselves entered on the list, not to the Mantineians (see

Where civic subdivisions existed, as in Smyrna, the repartition in these sub-units forms the core of the naturalization process.⁶⁹ As the cases demonstrate, two fundamentally different approaches could be taken: the first appears in the sympolity of Metropolis and Onthyrion in Thessaly. Metropolis lay on the western edge of the western Thessalian plain, in the *tetrás Hestiaiotis*, at the foot of a spur of the Pindos range, which separates Thessaly from Athamania.⁷⁰ As Strabo reports, Metropolis was originally formed by the synoecism of three insignificant small towns; several others were added later. One of the *poleis* integrated into Metropolis mentioned by Strabo was Onthyrion, whose exact location is unknown, and it seems to have been one of the later additions towards the end of the third century BCE, but the details are extremely difficult to reconstruct.⁷¹ From a citizenship decree of Metropolis we learn that around 200 BCE the *polis* had a φυλή Ὀνθυρέων.⁷² This strongly suggests that the *polis* Onthyrion—and probably the other earlier *poleis* as well—was incorporated into Metropolis as a new *phylē*, with its citizens grouped together as an identifiable unit.

The *homologia* between Stiris and Medeon says nothing about how the new citizens should be integrated. However, an amendment to the main part of the contract mentions a φατρία⁷³ τῶν Μεδεωνίων as recipient of a sum of money and a site.⁷⁴ As far as we know, Stiris—like other Phocian *poleis*—did not originally have a system of civic subdivision of *phylai* and *phratriai* as we know it from Athens. Rather, such a subdivision was expressly created for the Medeonians.⁷⁵ As such, the Medeonians—even as Stirians ἴσοι καὶ ὁμοῖοι—remained just as the Onthyreis in Metropolis a recognizable subgroup within the new citizen body.⁷⁶

IPArk, p. 105). Rhodes and Osborne (RO 14) miss that point in their translation. On the passage see also Faraguna 2005, 78.

69 On civic subdivisions and citizenship see most recently Brock 2023 (with the earlier literature).

70 For topography and history, see still F. Stählin, *RE* 15.2 (1932), 1491-1494 (largely taken over from the same author 1924, 128f.), much briefer and restricted to the Classical period J.-C. Decourt *et al.* in Hansen, Nielsen 2004, no. 403.

71 Str. 9.5.17 (437-438 C). See most recently Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000, 117f., but she has overlooked the important discussion by Helly 1993, 191-196.

72 SEG 51.724, ll. 5-7: φυλῆς εἶναι ἧς ἂν βούλωνται—εἵλοντο Ὀνθυρέων. See Habicht 1970, 142, followed by Helly 1993, 193; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000, 117.

73 The form φατρία, arising through dissimilation of the liquid from φρατρία, appears in a wide range of dialects (cf. Buck 1955, 64 § 70.3).

74 Ll. 77-81: τῇ φατρίᾳ τῶν Μεδεωνίων ἐν ἐτέοις τεττάροις ἀργυρίου μνᾶς πέντε κα[ὶ] τόπον τὰν καλειμέναν Δα[μ]ατρίαν.

75 See Sébillotte 1997, 44f. who suggests that the use of the term φρατρία could be explained through Stiris's connections to Athens.

76 A case that is as interesting as it is complex is the sympolity of Mylasa in Caria, which incorporated several of its neighbors; see Reger 2004, 164-168; 2010. When Olymos was incorporated, its former *phylai* were reduced to *syngeneiai* within the new state. It is clear that the former *polis* Olymos retained a considerable degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, I find it

As we have seen above, the Smyrneans chose a very different approach: the soldiers and civilians from Magnesia were not incorporated as a new and separate unit, but distributed by lot among all existing *phylai*, thereby guaranteeing that they did not constitute a distinct group. This was an approach that aimed for deeper integration, and it was chosen as well in the sympolity treaty between Latmos and Pidasa.⁷⁷ Around 320 BCE—some 150 years before the Pidaseis sought union with Miletus—the satrap Asandros attempted to merge Pidasa with Latmos.⁷⁸ As in the case of the treaty between Smyrna and the soldiers and civilians at Magnesia, the agreement between Latmos and Pidasa likewise offers detailed regulations for the incorporation of the new citizens into the civic structure:

One shall furthermore add a *phylē* in addition to the existing ones and name it Asandris, and allot into it by lot persons from all the *phylai* and *phratries* in Latmos and in Pidasa; the remaining Pidaseis, however, shall be allotted into the existing *phylai* as evenly as possible. And according to the results of the allotment, the Pidaseis shall share in all the cults—the *phratores* in those of the *phratries*, and the *phylai* in those of the *phylai*—each according to the allotment assigned to them.⁷⁹

As it seems to have been the case in Metropolis, a new tribe was created when the union was formed, named *Asandris* in honor of the satrap who was the driving force behind the project. However, the new *phylē* was not reserved for the incorporated Pidaseis as a group but both citizens from Latmos and Pidasa were assigned to it. Other Pidaseis were assigned by lot to the existing *phylai* so that they were dispersed equally across all civic subdivisions.⁸⁰

The two approaches—the one seen in Metropolis or Stiris, the other in Smyrna or Latmos—embody radically different conceptions of how a

very difficult to follow Reger's view that Olymos kept its own citizenship, "whatever its exact 'constitutional' value" (2004, 167).

77 Blümel 1997 (*SEG* 47.1563); Wörrle 2003b, supplemented by Wörrle 2003a, provides a new edition with a thorough commentary. See further Reger 2004; Walser 2009, 141f.; Priol 2017.

78 The decree published by Kizil *et al.* 2015 has once again demonstrated the extent of the satrap's interest in the region and his willingness to intervene in its affairs. It has thus deprived LaBuff's already unconvincing attempt (2010; see also 2015, 79-87) to deny Asandros the role of instigator of the union of any remaining foundation.

79 IL 4-13: προσκατατάξει δὲ καὶ φυλὴν μία[ν] πρὸς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι αὐ[τ]ήν Ἀσανδρίδα, ἐπικληρῶσαι δ' εἰς αὐτὴν ἐκ πα[σ]ῶν τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν ΦΡΑΤΟΡΙΩΝ τῶν τε ἐν Λά[τ]μοι ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῶν ἐμ Πιδάσοις, τοὺς δὲ λο[ι]πὸν Πιδασείων ἐπικληρῶσαι ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας φυλάς ὡς ἰσότατα, τοὺς δὲ λαχόντας Πιδασεῖς μετέχειν ἱερῶν πάντων τοὺς μὲν φράτο[ρ]ας τῶν φρατορικῶν τὰς δὲ φυλάς τῶν φυλε[τ]ικῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἕκαστοι λάχουσιν. For a detailed commentary on this passage see Wörrle 2003b, 125-128.

80 As Wörrle (2003b, 128 n. 27) has seen, an interesting parallel is also provided by Robert, *Amyzon*, 212-215 no. 26, where a group of persons who were integrated as new citizens, probably to repopulate the city (*ibid.* 188-191), was distributed by lot into the three smallest *phylai*.

sympolity, a community of fellow citizens, ought to be constituted. The first allows for continuity: although the incorporated citizens become Metropolitans or Stiriens in legal and external terms, they retain their identity as Onthyreis or Medeonians. They acquire a new name, but they remember and preserve the old.

The second approach aims to efface that earlier collective identity. Within the new *polis*, the former inhabitants of Magnesia or citizens of Pidasa no longer experience themselves as part of a shared group. If they wished to “celebrate themselves”, they would not know when—or with whom. Their former civic identity was extinguished—or at least: that seems to have been the intention.

That interpretation may seem drastic, but the treaty between Latmos and Pidasa lends it strong support, with its regulation of marriages:

In order that they may also contract marriages with one another, it shall not be permitted for a Latmian to give his daughter to, or take a daughter from, a Latmian, nor for a Pidaseus to do so with a Pidaseus; rather, for six years a Latmian shall give to and take from a Pidaseus, and a Pidaseus shall give to and take from a Latmian.⁸¹

It is difficult to imagine a more brutal intervention in the lives of citizens, ultimately reaching even into the sphere of bodily autonomy, than this enforced exogamy. That the rule sprang from the whims of the ruler rather than from deliberation among those who had to live under it seems obvious. The goal was clearly to form a single political body in which differences of origin would no longer be visible. The bitter irony, of course, lies in the very premise: the rule can be observed only if Latmians and Pidaseis continue to exist as two distinct communities, thus reaffirming the very division it aims to erase.

6. Reimagining the *polis*

The creation of a sympolity, however, challenges not only the identity of the newly incorporated, but also the self-image of the original *polis* community. The body politic is forged in a process of identity construction, where present communal life must be reconciled with a narrative of “us”—usually rooted in the past. This is not a one-time process.⁸² The *polis* is never a fixed “imagi-

81 Ll. 21-25: [ὅ]πως δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιγαμίας ποιῶνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους μὴ ἐξέστω Λάτμιον Λατμίῳ διδόναι θυγατέρα μηδὲ λαμβάνειν μηδὲ Πιδασέ(α) Πιδ[α]σεῖ ἀλλὰ διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν Λάτμιον μὲ[v] Πιδασεῖ Πιδασέα δὲ Λατμίῳ ἐφ' ἔτη ἕξ. Wörle 2003b, 132-134 places this paragraph, “zweifelloos der originellste des Dokuments”, in the wider legal context of political exo- and endogamy.

82 Any invocation of “identity” and “identity construction” inevitably engages with wide-ranging debates that extend well beyond Ancient History and Classical Studies. These cannot be addressed here; however, Anderson 1991² and Bhabha 1994 may be cited as distant, yet

ned community”, but one that must constantly reimagine and reaffirm itself. Citizens must repeatedly experience their unity, celebrate themselves, and reaffirm a shared history.

This is why not only the new citizens incorporated into an already well-established *polis*, but also the old must reorient themselves. After the formation of a sympolity, the “original” citizens of Stiris, Miletus, or Smyrna must come to terms with the fact that the *σύμπας δῆμος*—the total citizenry—is no longer the same. Evocations of a common ancestry, of a shared past, fall flat when the person next to you in the procession comes from another origin and holds different memories. The *polis* must be reimagined so that its citizens’ self-image aligns with lived reality. Divergent genealogies must be harmonized, foreign traditions appropriated, and the shared history rewritten with new intent.

These dynamics are, by their nature, difficult to capture in the sources. What follows can only sketch three aspects that appear especially pertinent, even though none of them can be explored here in detail.

First, when we return to the sphere of religion, the creation of a sympolity made transformations of cult practices inevitable. As we have seen above, full participation in all cults for citizens old and new was of fundamental importance. As Robert Parker has shown in his thorough study of the topic,⁸³ the new political circumstances made a re-write of the ritual calendar of the *polis* necessary. The cults of a *polis* incorporated through a larger neighbor did not simply cease to exist but became part of the religious landscape of the sympolity.

Once more, the stipulations in the *homologia* between Stiris and Medeon provide an instructive example. The first concern the appointment of a sacred official:

A *hierotamias* is to be appointed from among the Medeonians, who is to perform the traditional sacrifices for the Medeonians—those defined in the civic law—together with the officials appointed in Stiris.⁸⁴

A second simply states, for the Stirians:

nonetheless fundamental, theoretical points of departure for the considerations offered here. Skinner *et al.* 2025 could offer an entry point into the debates on identity in antiquity. The act of redefining the collective “we” within the context of sympolity—a process in which contractual language performs as much as it describes—has been convincingly highlighted and examined in detail by Mack 2013. His discussion aligns in many respects with the considerations offered here, although the present argument was developed independently of his and from a different direction.

83 Parker 2009.

84 11. 18–24: ἰστανθω δὲ καὶ ἱεροταμίαν ἐκ τῶν Μεδεωνίων ἕνα, τὸν θυσέοντα τὰς θυσίας τὰς πατρίους Μεδεωνίους, ὅσαι ἐντὶ ἐν τῷ πολιτικῷ νόμῳ, μετὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν σταθόντων ἐν Στίρῃ. The text does not make it clear whether the *hierotamias* appointed from the Medeonians is chosen by the Medeonians alone or by all the citizens.

They shall also administer the sanctuaries in Medeon, as prescribed by the civic law.⁸⁵

The *homologia* guaranteed the continued performance of rites and the maintenance of the sanctuaries. The details were set out in the πολιτικός νόμος, most probably the law of Stiris, that had been adapted to include the cults of Medeon.⁸⁶

As we see here—and in many of the cases analyzed by Parker—even when religious cults were not physically transferred from one urban center to another, the creation of a sympolity necessarily entailed a transformation of sacred space. This, in turn, reshaped the symbolic discourse through which cults held meaning for the *polis*.

If the concept of “*polis* religion” has any validity at all, the reconfiguration of the body politic that accompanies the creation of a sympolity must have religious consequences for all partners involved.

What we ultimately observe is the result of this restructuring: when a city such as Alexandria Troas begins to depict Apollo Smintheus—whose sanctuary lay in the incorporated *polis* of Hamaxitos—on its coinage, it has fully appropriated the cult into its own “*polis* religion”.⁸⁷ The cult of the small incorporated *polis* has been absorbed so thoroughly that it has become a central element of the *polis*’s identity.

Another faint trace of this search for collective identity—or fear of losing it—may be found in the treaties between Miletus and Pidasa, and between Smyrna and Magnesia. As noted earlier, the Miletus-Pidasa treaty grants citizenship to Pidaseis along with their children and wives.⁸⁸ However, this grant is subject to a restriction: if the wives were not born citizens of Pidasa, they were eligible for citizenship in Miletus only “as far as they were citizens of another Greek *polis*”.⁸⁹

A similar ethnic criterion appears in the Smyrna-Magnesia treaty:

And in like manner, citizenship shall be given to the others living in Magnesia, insofar as they are free and Greeks.⁹⁰

85 Il. 44-47: δαμιοῦρ[γ]εόντων δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν Μεδεῶνι ἱερά, καθὼς ὁ πολιτικός νόμος κελεύει.

86 Commentaries diverge on whether the “law of the *polis*” was that of Medeon or of Stiris but it is difficult to imagine that the πολιτικός νόμος of Medeon would remain in force after the creation of the sympolity.

87 See Bresson 2007 for all the evidence and earlier literature, superseding the brief remarks of Parker 2009, 210.

88 See above with n. 48.

89 *I.Delphinion* 149, ll. 11f.: ὅσαι ἂν ὧσιν φύσει Πιδασίδες ἢ πόλεως Ἑλληνίδος πολίτιδες.

90 *I.Smyrna* 573, l. 45: καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τ[οῖς] οἰκοῦσιν ἐν Μαγνησίαι ὅσοι ἂν ὧσιν [ἐ]λευθεροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες.

The social background of these two otherwise similar provisions was, of course, quite different. In the case of Miletus and Pidasia, the concern seems to have been that only women who possessed at least one form of citizenship would become Milesians.⁹¹ This probably excluded *nothai* and freedwomen, as well as women from indigenous Carian communities without *polis* status.⁹² It remains striking that the treaty explicitly speaks of female citizens of “a Greek *polis*”, and one cannot help wondering which non-Greek *poleis* the Milesians had in mind.

In the case of the incorporation of the Magnesians, it is noteworthy that the qualification “Greek” applied only to the civilian inhabitants of Magnesia. The troops stationed there included a foreign contingent of Persians under a Persian commander, and they were explicitly included in the grant of citizenship.⁹³ “The others living in Magnesia” with civilian status may likewise have included men and women of foreign—presumably Persian—origin, as family members of soldiers. One might also think, again, of members of an indigenous Anatolian population.⁹⁴

Since Magnesia was not a *polis*, citizenship—unlike in the case of Pidasia—could not serve as a criterion; the condition for eligibility was therefore defined as being “free and Greek”. What “being Greek” actually meant—was it sufficient to speak Greek?⁹⁵—and how “Greekness” could function as a legal criterion for the grant of citizenship in practice are interesting, if ultimately unanswerable, questions.

Whatever these two provisions in the respective treaties may mean, and however they may have been implemented in practice, their origin seems to lie in a discourse on civic identity in which the question of who should be a citizen (and female citizen) of Miletus or Smyrna acquired a somewhat unexpected ethnic dimension.⁹⁶

Finally, and most briefly, it is worth underscoring the role of the sympolity agreements that have been central to the reflections presented here. They function not only as legal instruments but also as acts of identity formation—far more than manuals for municipal mergers or blueprints for civic order. The complex negotiations between ambassadors and officials, only faintly visible in the surviving texts, their adoption by popular assemblies, their confirmation

91 See Günther 2014 for female citizens in Miletos.

92 On these communities see Debord 2003.

93 *I.Smyrna* 573, ll. 140–146: ὑπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ὤμάνει καὶ το[ίς] Πέρσαις τοῖς ὑπὸ ὤμάνην... τήν τε πολιτείαν καὶ τὰλλα φιλόφρονα, ἃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐκ Μαγνησίας ἐνῆφισται.

94 When the military colony at Toriaion was given *polis* status, the indigenous population was explicitly included: see Schuler 1999.

95 That is the view of Th. Ihnken, *I.Magnesia Sipylos*, p. 71.

96 Once again, the concept of ethnicity leads to debates that cannot be taken up here. Vlassopoulos 2015 reflects on and reviews the debates following the seminal study by Hall 1997; more recently and with a broader focus Gruen 2020.

through solemn oaths, and their inscription on stone—all of this endows them with performative force. Displayed in prominent locations as lengthy inscriptions that were surely far too long to be read under ordinary circumstances by citizens of limited literacy, they nonetheless become a shared point of reference for all *συμπολῖται*, genuine *lieux de mémoire*. More than codifying a political union, they help bring into being the very community of *συμπολῖται* whose existence they so confidently proclaim.⁹⁷

7. Conclusion

What does it mean to be a citizen of a Greek *polis* in the Hellenistic world—a citizen, with others? The treaties and agreements governing the unification of once-independent *poleis* into sympolities do not offer systematic theories of citizenship. What they offer are fragments—evident, coherent elements that, taken together, show at least part of what citizenship entailed in political reality.

Having certain political, social, and cultural rights matters. But these rights are only the preconditions for true citizenship. A citizen is not defined by the right to vote, but by voting; not by the right to hold office, but by holding office. A citizen does not watch the sacred procession in awe; he walks in it with his *sympolitai*, proceeds to the sanctuary, and performs the rites at the altar with his brethren in the *phylē*. It is in doing so that he experiences himself—and those around him—as a Stirios, a Milesios, a Metropolitēs.

The harmonization of legal and civic rights is only the first step in forming a sympolity. The actual integration of citizens into a unified body politic—the realization of sympolity—is another, and more difficult, step. The different approaches to civic integration that were analyzed above reflect profoundly distinct visions of how this might be achieved.

Whatever the methods used, the creation of a sympolity was a formidable challenge—for the dominant *polis* as much as for the weaker one. One of the greatest challenges was adapting the collective self-image of the citizen body to new political and social realities. And as voters in several modern European states have shown quite recently, that challenge is as pressing—and as difficult—as ever. Stiris and Medeon, Mantinea and Helisson or Miletus and Pidasa, appear to have successfully met the challenge and achieved a stable and enduring union. There are many other sympolities that must have had some kind of success, if we take the disappearance of a *polis* that was incorporated into another as a measure.

97 The literature is again far too vast to be cited here, but see the careful observations by Faraguna 2005, especially 80–83, with the essential references. Drauschke 2019 analyzes the public display of interstate agreements, including sympolity-treaties, comprehensively, though certainly not exhaustively.

But success was far from guaranteed: at around 140 BCE, Phlygonion—the case that served as a starting point—had again separated from Delphi, but formed a new sympolity with Ambryssos, another one of its Phocian neighbors. As we have already seen, the sympolity between Latmos and Pidasa did not last, if it was ever realized at all. The same is true for the unification of Teos and Lebedos, famously ordered by Antigonos Monophthalmos between 306 and 302. The project met resistance already in its earliest stages and seems to have been quickly abandoned once the king was dead. The small *polis* Lebedos preserved its independence, though with difficulty, throughout antiquity. The sympolity between Melitaia and Peraia in Achaia Phthiotis was in a precarious state indeed when, in 212/11 BCE, judges of the Aitolian *koinon* were asked to arbitrate a conflict between the Melitaians and the Pereans who obviously never succeeded in creating a closely knit community of citizens. It was a fatalistic acceptance of that situation when the judges included provisions for the case that the two communities would part ways again in their arbitration.

As the writer and journalist Martha Gellhorn observed in the conclusions to her collection of essays on the “faces of war”: “citizenship is a tough occupation”.⁹⁸ Dionysios and Sopolis—the Delphians from Phlygonion with whom we began—along with the Stirioi, Medeonioi, Milesioi, and Pidaseis (and Pidasideis), would, I suspect, have understood exactly what she meant.

98 Gellhorn 1988, 336. The often quoted sentence—expressing some hope in view of the Peace Movement of the Seventies and Eighties—was cut from later editions.